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When Ariel Sharon was stricken with the massive stroke which has ended his political career, one of the tasks on which he was engaged was preparing the electoral list for his new party, Kadima. Kadima is so new that it had no procedures in place for choosing its candidates, no primary or convention, and they were to be the choice of the party’s leader.
That Kadima was the Sharon Party is obvious; not surprisingly, after Sharon’s stroke many commentators asked whether Kadima could go forward (the meaning of “Kadima” without him. Or would the new Kadima supporters revert to their original parties, Likud or Labor or Shinui, once Sharon was gone from the scene?
If Kadima had been formed but elections had not yet been scheduled, such an eventuality might have been possible. But such prominent figures in Israeli political life as Shimon Peres, Ehud Olmert, Shaul Mofaz, Haim Ramon, Tzipi Livni and others had already cast their lots with Kadima, and they were not about to be welcomed back to the electoral lists of their former parties. They had cast their lot with Kadima, whatever the future of that party might be.
Interestingly, as time has past, Kadima has not (yet) faltered in the polls. Most polls are still showing it winning more than 40 seats in the 120-seat Knesset, and far more than Labor or Likud, neither of which does better than half that. This could change; it could be popular sentimentality while Sharon is comatose; a misstep by Acting Prime Minister Olmert could alter the odds. But so far the new political constellation seems to be attracting far more support than Likud, with Binyamin Netanyahu returned to its leadership, or Labor, where former Histadrut labor federation boss Amir Peretz leads of list in which prominent figures in past Labor governments are notable by their absence.
Much can happen in the two and a half months remaining before the elections. But at the moment Kadima seems to have managed to pull itself up from the apparent loss of its founder/leader, and to be positioning itself to lead the next Israeli government.
discussing the formation of Kadima late last year, The Estimate noted that for much of Israeli political history, one of the chamaeras always just beyond reach has been the emerging centrist party. (See the Dossier, “Israel’s Political Earthquake,” The Estimate, December 5, 2005.) There are certain to be many ironies in Ariel Sharon’s legacy: the hawkish general to be remembered as a peacemaker, the scourge of Gaza and patron of the settlement movement becoming the man who dismantled all the settlements in Gaza. It would be equally ironic if one of the most ideological figures on the Israeli right becomes the man who finally brought forth the long evanescent centrist party.
Whether Kadima is here to stay is hard to say, but the centrists have few other places to go. The previous centrist party, Shinui, is coming apart at the seams. Its leader, Tommy Lapid, barely won a place on its list and subsequently quit in disgust, denouncing his own party; its number two was defeated in the primaries, and many of its rank and file were already in Kadima. On the right, Likud has in effect purged itself of those willing to return to a land-for-peace formula, leaving such former Likud stalwarts as Ehud Olmert, Shaul Mofaz, and Tsipi Livni (now Israel’s Foreign Minister) no home but Kadima. The Labor Party’s elder statesman, Shimon Peres, and one of its longtime “princes,” Haim Ramon, are in Kadima, while Labor’s new leader, Amir Peretz (Profile in The Estimate for December 5, 2005), has been criticized for a labor list composed of little-known Histadrut cronies, one which at least initially excluded such figures as former Prime Minister Ehud Barak. In short, Kadima may be occupying the center because the left and right have moved farther to the extremes.
If Peretz is seemingly not that popular as the new leader of Labor, so Binyamin Netanyahu has never been as popular as Sharon among Israeli voters generally; Netanyahu has made many enemies within Likud, though many of them have now departed for Kadima. But it is by no means obvious that, given the popularity Kadima has shown in the polls and the low numbers for Likud, that Netanyahu can make a comeback. (He also has concerns that his strongest opponents in the primaries appeared to be on his right, making for an unusual situation in which Netanyahu was portraying himself as the moderate. But we are speaking here of what is left of Likud after the departure of so many of its figures for Kadima.)
In fact, those holding Cabinet posts in the present transitional Cabinet are all Kadima recruits from Likud, due to a technical reason: only if enough members of a party bolt in forming a new party, so that the law considers that the older party has split rather than that a new one has been formed, can members of the new party serve in a caretaker Cabinet while waiting for elections. For this reason Peres and other ex-Laborites could not serve in the Cabinet until after the March 28 vote, but the ex-Likudniks could, because they are considered a faction split from Likud.
But what made Kadima possible in the first place was, of course, Sharon. He had his fanatic admirers and his determined opponents, but few, in Israel or abroad, ever had neutral or noncomnuttal feelings towards Sharon. His onetime constituency in the settler community became his bitter opponents in the end, but again, they were never neutral towards him.
By the time this issue went to press it was clear enough that Acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert will lead Kadima in the coming elections, with former Prime Minister Shimon Peres in the second-ranked position but with former Justice Minister (and as of last week, Foreign Minister) Tzipi Livni as the real number two, Peres being an elder statesman and symbol for Labor voters. This arrangement seems to have emerged more or less by consensus in the backroom maneuverings which took place after the disabling of Sharon. Olmert is profiled on Page Nine. Other emerging figures in Kadima are profiled more briefly later in this Dossier.
The conventional wisdom that Kadima was Sharon’s and that, without Sharon, it would have little raison d’être might have held true if the election process were not already under way, but with many key players in Israeli politics already committed to Kadima, it soon became obvious that the party would continue. The apparent weakness of the new leaderships in Labor and Likud also reinforce Kadima’s standing. As noted, it still appears likely, based on early polling, to win about a third of the seats in the Knesset.
What was certainly critical in keeping Kadima together was the quick rallying of the major figures in the party around Olmert. Such key figures as Tzipi Livni and Shaul Mofaz, themselves potential leaders, supported Olmert; in fact, of the party’s founding members, only Shimon Peres did not rush to back Olmert, and Peres, whatever ambitions he may still harbor, is too old and too frequently defeated to lead Kadima this time around.
As the party rallied behind Olmert, it became more and more obvious that it was going to survive Sharon’s departure. The elections are still more than two months away, so naturally, much can happen between now and March 28 which could change the Party’s chances. But it seems likely that it will benefit both from disillusionment with Likud and Labor and from sentimental support for the stricken Sharon.
One problem Kadima will certainly face is the question of the next steps in its effort to forge some kind of modus vivendi absent a renewal of a direct-negotiation peace process. Many expected Sharon to take further steps towards unilateral disengagement in parts of the West Bank (in effect, transforming the existing separation wall into something like a unilaterally-decreed border). But that would have involved more confrontations with settlers, and while Sharon appeared to have the authority and reputation to pull off such a confrontation, as he did in Gaza, it is far less clear that Olmert or anyone else will enjoy the same sort of authority. So far, Olmert has spoken of the need to adhere to the “road map” approach, emphasizing that new negotiations will depend on an end to Palestinian violence. Such an approach is predictable and relatively safe, but it does not really chart out the directions in which Olmert is likely to take theprocess once elected.
Olmert, like Sharon himself, is a man of the Israeli right who has come to recognize the need to disengage from Palestinian territories; he actuallywas speaking of that need before Sharon was. But he does not have the military reputation and maverick leadership skills of Sharon; how successful Olmert will be remains to be seen. His years as Mayor of Jerusalem showed that he can be an administrator, but his skills in the dangerous world of Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking are mostly untested. Most of Kadima’s leaders are experienced political figures. But none, of course, is Ariel Sharon.
Who’s Who in Kadima
The new Kadima Party finds itself with no shortage of prominent political personalities. Because those who came from the Labor Party or other parties other than Likud are not eligible to hold Cabinet portfolios during the interim period (See Above), so the present allocation of posts in the interim government will not necessarily reflect the distribution of power if Kadima wins. There was even a period, when it was thought that Sharon might come out of his coma soon, that consideration was given to leaving Sharon’s name first on the party list, but with the understanding that Ehud Olmert will be Prime Minister.
The top three positions on the list will be held by Ehud Olmert, the current Acting Prime Minister, who is profiled on Page Nine; Shimon Peres, former Prime Minister, veteran Labor Party politician, and the most prominent Laborite to support Sharon’s initiatives; and Tzipi Livni, formerly Justice Minister and now Foreign Minister in the new Cabinet. She, like Olmert, came from Likud; a brief profile appears below.
Among other key Likud defectors include Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz, a former IDF Chief of Staff; Tzahi Hanegbi, who, despite facing potential charges in a scandal, will reportedly run the party’s electoral campaign; former Likud figures such as Gideon Ezra, Meir Sheetrit, Ronni Milo and others.
Besides Peres, Labor defectors in the new party include former Ministers Haim Ramon and Dalia Itzik, as well as a number of less prominent figures, including Navah Barak, ex-wife of former Prime Minister Ehud Barak, who remains in Labor.
The new party also includes some veterans of the centrist Shinui party, including the party’s former President, Uriel Reichman.
Another figure entering politics is the former head of the Shin Bet domestic security service, Avi Dichter, who had gone to a Washington think-tank after leaving Shin Bet but was recruited by Sharon to join Kadima.
Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni
Tzipora “Tzipi” Livni was named Foreign Minister when incumbent Silvan Shalom, a Likud member, resigned with other Likudniks from the Israeli Cabinet. She has frequently been described as a rising star in Kadima and in Israeli politics generally, perhaps the most prominent woman to hold a senior ministry since the late Golda Meir. She was born July 5, 1958 in Tel Aviv, daughter of Eitan Livni, a Polish-born immigrant who rose to become Operations Chief of the Irgun Tzvai Le’umi, the pre-independence guerrilla force led by Menahem Begin.
Tzipi Livni holds a Bachelor of Laws degree from Bar Ilan University’s Faculty of Law. She served as a lieutenant in the Israel Defense Forces and, from 1980 to 1984, served in the Mossad. She subsequently practiced law, and served as Director of the Registrar for Government Corporations; in 1999 was elected to the Knesset for Likud. She served on the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, and the Committee for the Advancement of the Status of Women. From March to August of 2001, she served as Minister for Regional Cooperation, then as Minister without Portfolio in the Prime Minister’s office. From December 2002 to February 2003 she served as Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development. In February 2003, she became Minister of Immigrant Absorption. In July 2004 she became Acting Minister of Housing and Construction, and then Minister in August of that year. In December of 2004 she became Acting Minister of Justice (while retaining Housing), and in January 2005 became Minister of Justice.
Late last year she became the first prominent figure on the right to deliver a memorial address at the commemoration of Yitzhak Rabin’s assassination.
She prominently supported Sharon’s withdrawal from Gaza, and followed him into Kadima. Though not previously well known outside Israel, her role as Foreign Minister in the Interim Government (reportedly likely to continue if Kadima is elected) should make her better known in the West.
Livni is married with two children.
Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz
Another key figure in the Interim Government and a prominent player in Kadima is Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz. The Iranian-born Mofaz, a former Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces, followed Sharon into Kadima and has supported Olmert’s emergence as the Party’s new leader.
Mofaz was born in Tehran in 1948. He immigrated to Israel with his parents in 1957. In 1966, on graduation from secondary school, he entered the IDF, and served in the Paratroops and in the elite commando unit Sayeret Matkal, becoming its Deputy Commander. (Other Sayeret Matkal veterans in Israeli politics include its former Commander, Ehud Barak, and Binyamin Netanyahu.) Mofaz served in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, in the operation in 1976 to free hijacked passengers at Entebbe, Uganda, and in the 1982 war in Lebanon. Mofaz had the kind of elite, commando-based military career that traditionally promises a rapid rise through the ranks.
A brigade commander in Lebanon, Mofaz attended the Marine Corps Command and Staff College at Quantico, Virginia, and headed Israel’s Officers School briefly before being named Commander of the Paratroop Brigade in 1986. In 1986 he was promoted to Brigadier General; in 1993 he commanded forces in the West Bank, and the following year was made Major General and commander of Southern Command. In 1997 he became Deputy Chief of Staff and in 1998 Chief of Staff, being appointed by Binyamin Netanyahu and going on to serve under Ehud Barak and Ariel Sharon. He was Chief of Staff during the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada.
On retiring as IDF Chief of Staff he joined the Likud Party, and in 2002 was named Defense Minister by Sharon. In November of 2005, he announced that he would not follow Sharon out of Likud but would himself be a candidate for the Likud leadership. In December, however, he decided to join Kadima, and thereforremains as Defense Minister. Some expected him to seek the leadership when Sharon had his stroke, but he has apparently decided to support Olmert to assure the party’s survival. |
