What Would the US Lose if it Left Saudi Arabia?

A Washington Post report on January 18 suggesting that Saudi Arabia might be preparing to ask US forces to leave the Kingdom, and remarks by Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin suggesting that the US might pull out of its own accord, were both met with strong denials from both US leaders and the Saudis. But it is generally recognized that the presence of US forces in the Kingdom provides an irritant which makes the ever-cautious Saudis somewhat nervous, and US-Saudi relations are generally in a rather difficult period for a variety of reasons (See the lead story on Page One and the Profile of Crown Prince ‘Abdullah, Page Nine).

In fact, it is unlikely that any major change will take place in the short term. The Saudis have allowed the continuing American presence as a deterrent to any neighbors who might wish them ill, particularly Iraq; at the same time, they are sensitive to criticism that they have foreign forces on their soil. The Saudis insist that the presence is sanctioned by the United Nations and note that they do not in fact have a formal security agreement with the United States, unlike the other Gulf states where the US is deployed.

Prior to 1990, the US-Saudi defense relationship was described as "over the horizon"; although the US maintained a command ship and a small force in the Gulf, based in Bahrain, and had facilities agreements with Oman, it did not officially have any presence in Saudi Arabia. After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the US deployed forces at the invitation of the Saudis. After the war, a residual force was left behind to enforce the no-fly zone over Iraq. In fact, however, the US had been closely involved in the construction of several modern Saudi Air Force bases, which were conveniently ready when deployment was needed.

The southern no-fly zone operations, currently called Operation Southern Watch, operate from air bases in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and from carriers at sea. Prior to the attack on US personnel at Khobar Towers, most US personnel were in the Dhahran area; after that they were redeployed to Prince Sultan Air Base (PSAB) near al-Kharj, south of Riyadh, to be safer and also less visible to the Saudi public.

One measure of the delicacy of the issue of the US presence is that the main Air Force unit enforcing Southern Watch was designated "Provisional" until 1998. Its complement of perhaps 4,000 constitutes the bulk of US forces in the Kingdom, though there are also Army personnel and support units. Today the Air Force component is called the 363rd Air Expeditionary Wing; it was formerly the 4404th Wing (Provisional). It is under command of the Joint Task Force/Southwest Asia and 9th Aerospace Expeditionary Task Force/Southwest Asia, part of the US Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF), and of the US 9th Air Force.

Since the Southern Watch flights also operate from Kuwaiti air bases, loss of facilities in Saudi Arabia would not automatically end the ability to enforce Southern Watch. But the loss of Prince Sultan Air Base would remove US access to its new, state-of-the-art Combined Aerospace Operations Center (CAOC) at PSAB.

The CAOC was inaugurated at Prince Sultan in June of 2001 after a preliminary, smaller version had earlier been set up at Eskan Village. Its precise characteristics are classified, but by most accounts it is the most sophisticated and advanced command-and-control facility for coalition air operations in the world, and a prototype for similar CAOCs elsewhere. It links space-based intelligence with multiple air elements, unmanned aerial vehicles, and probably much more. Last fall there was a brief flap over whether or not the US would be allowed to use the CAOC during operations against Afghanistan. (Saudi Arabia had prohibited the US from flying combat missions against Iraq from Saudi bases during 1998's Operation Desert Fox.) Although there was never any formal announcement, it is generally understood that the US has been using the CAOC for command and control of its Southwest Asian operations but has not been flying combat missions from Saudi bases.

If US forces were to be withdrawn, loss of the CAOC would probably be the most sorely missed element. But if the US should find itself in a position to launch operations against Iraq, as has been discussed, it would be extremely difficult to do so without access to Saudi territory. The Saudis officially oppose any operations against Iraq at this time, and would presumably have to be convinced of a successful outcome before they would allow any major ground force deployments in the Kingdom again.

The current arguments about the US presence may well be another tempest in a teapot; the Saudis are unlikely to give Usama bin Ladin the pleasure of seeing the Americans leave, and even if some elements were withdrawn, there would likely be a continuing low-key presence and much prepositioned equipment would remain in place.

Home

Current Issue

About Us

Back Issues

Resources

Subscribe