Egypt‘s Copts After Kosheh:
Part 2: The Mubarak Era
As noted in Part One
of this Dossier,
in the last issue, the violent events at Kosheh in Upper Egypt on December 31 took the greatest casualty toll of any incident of Christian-Muslim violence in recent years. Part I traced some of the difficulties in relations between Egypt’s Copts and Muslims through the Nasser and Sadat eras. This second part examines the same theme in the years since 1981, while Husni Mubarak has been President, with particular attention to the recent events in Kosheh and the government’s response to date.
As noted last time, there are a number of problems confronting Egypt’s Copts, particularly since the rise of activist political Islam,
but the aggressive publicity campaigns of Copts abroad, especially in the US and Canada, have at times infuriated the Egyptian government and probably had a negative effect domestically. That
appears to be happening again to some extent, with President Mubarak publicly blaming “foreign” influence for allegedly stirring up confessional trouble. He may have been referring in part to
overseas support for radical Islamists, but in all probability he was also referring at least in part to full-page advertisements in US newspapers by Coptic support groups in the West.
On the other hand, the government has made it clear that it will punish those responsible for the outbreak of violence — Christian or Muslim — and the ruling National Democratic Party has
indicated that it will include Coptic candidates on its lists for Parliamentary elections later this year — something other parties are now rushing to emulate.
When Anwar Sadat was assassinated on October 6, 1981, one of the others killed on the platform with him was a prominent Coptic Bishop, Samwil. But Coptic Pope Shenouda III was
sequestered in one of the desert monasteries of the Wadi Natrun, after Sadat had deposed him during the widespread crackdown on political critics of all stripes. Earlier that year, violent
Coptic-Muslim troubles in Cairo, in the al-Zawiya al-Hamra’ area, had led to criticism of Sadat by Copts abroad, which infuriated Sadat. Shenouda attended Sadat’s funeral, but then had to retire again to the monastery.
Husni Mubarak moved, cautiously, to defuse the dangerous situation which had emerged in 1981; he waited about a year before allowing Shenouda to resume his leadership.
Shenouda appeared to be somewhat chastened by his deposition and restoration; his open criticisms of the government stopped, and the Pope has generally been openly supportive of
government measures in the years since, though he has spoken out again, indirectly, since the Kosheh events at the end of 1999.
Unlike the events in Khanka in 1972 and al-Zawiya al-Hamra’ in 1981, both of which were in the Cairo area, most Coptic-Muslim incidents since 1981 have been limited to Upper Egypt, where
substantial Coptic populations often live side-by-side with radical Islamist groups, and where it is not uncommon for the Friday mosque to be built very close to the Coptic Church, and for troubles
to erupt after services at one or the other. As is also true with the sporadic anti-government violence in the same parts of Egypt, local
family vendettas, resentment of particular shopkeepers, or the petty corruption of local police often lie behind outbreaks, but if Muslims and Copts are involved, these quickly take on a
confessional coloration which might otherwise never have been suggested. During the late 1980s and into the early 1990s, the government was fighting a protracted, if
low-level, war with Islamist radicals in Upper Egypt; in certain towns, there were a series of shootings, sometimes of police, sometimes of Islamists; there were also attacks on trains,
threatening the tourist trade to the ancient temples of Upper Egypt. During these years, Coptic churches were sometimes targeted by the Islamists, and wild rumors
were often spread, sometimes by Islamist sermons in local mosques. Coptic video stores were attacked and destroyed after rumors that Copts were selling pornography; rumors that Copts
were trying to force conversion of Muslim girls sometimes spread, and, as mentioned last time, even the ancient canard about poisoning the wells was sometimes heard. On the other side of
the fence, Copts spread stories of forced conversions to Islam, even of crucifixions of Copts. While there were certainly occasional outrages, both sides seem to have fueled the rural
population with wild exaggerations if not absolute fabrications. In Egypt, as in much of the Middle East, the man in the street prefers to believe rumors rather than the official press: if it isn’t in the
papers, then it must be true. In 1997, a new wave of violence produced some killings. In February, an unknown but apparently
Islamist group attacked a charitable group meeting at the Mar Girgis church in al-Fiqriyya, killing eight or nine Copts. A few days later at al-Zuheir in Minya Governorate three Copts were found
killed in a field. In March, a group of armed men opened fire on a group of villagers near Nag‘ al-Hammadi, killing nine Copts and four Muslims. It was not entirely clear if this latter shooting
was targeting Christians or just villagers generally, but the Coptic community became concerned that there was a deliberate anti-Coptic movement emerging.
The government, and the Sheikh al-Azhar, the senior Islamic scholar, denounced these events. But in the midst of this period, during municipal elections in Egypt, the Supreme Guide of the
Muslim Brotherhood, Mustafa Mashhur, answered an interview question by saying that in an Islamic system, Copts could hold high public office if elected, but that they should not hold high
positions in the military, since their loyalty would be in question against a Christian enemy. That provoked more Coptic outrage, though of course the Muslim Brotherhood is technically illegal.
During these years as well, Coptic groups in the West, particularly the US and Canada but to some extent also in Europe, continued to charge that the Egyptian government discriminates
against Copts, and to charge the government with some sort of complicity in the attacks. Kosheh 1998
The “village” of El Kosheh, a town of some 35,000 inhabitants, two thirds of them Christian, first came to international attention in 1998. In August of that year, two Copts were murdered. The
Christian community claimed that the killings were carried out by Muslims, who in turn were allegedly seeking revenge for the “poisoning” of a brother who had actually died of natural causes.
But the local police responded by rounding up large numbers of Christians for investigation into the murder.
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Egypt still has a deeply rooted internal security system inherited from the Nasser era; police interrogations, particularly in the countryside, are not too scrupulous about their treatment of the suspects. Added to this, however, is the fact that local police units are of course drawn from the local community, and that local feuds, including Muslim resentment of Christian families, may color police behavior.
The government version of what happened in 1998 differs considerably from the version told by Copts; the government still seems to believe that Christians carried out the killings. But certainly the security forces overreacted, reportedly rounding up as many as 1,200 Copts. When Anba Wissa, Bishop of Balyana, in whose diocese Kosheh lies, criticized the roundup, he was arrested himself. Wissa and two priests were charged with using religion to incite strife and damage national unity, a charge which can, at least theoretically, carry the death penalty, and which is intended to prevent sectarian violence.
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Security Forces in El Kosheh. The black cloths mark Coptic homes in mourning. Photo from the Church newspaper Al-Kiraza. |
That began to provoke attention elsewhere. In October 1998, an article by Christina Lamb in London’s Daily Telegraph reported rather sensationally that some of the arrested Copts had undergone mock crucifixions and that the Bishop faced possible execution. The Egyptian government was outraged at the negative publicity, and arrested the head of the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR), who it apparently suspected had given the story to the Daily Telegraph.
Eventually, the head of the EOHR was released, as was the bishop; the government promised to punish any police who had acted improperly (though Copts claim some of the police were in fact promoted), and the story died down.
Many Egyptians, including some officials, appear to agree that the government reacted poorly in 1998; the arrest of the bishop and the head of the EOHR looked like a case of killing the messenger bringing bad news; what might have been one more local blood feud turned into an international incident. Coptic groups in the West began to push for the US Congress to include Egypt among nations discriminating against Christians.
Kosheh 1999-2000
As noted last time, Kosheh is a classic case of the sort of place where Christian-Muslim rivalries can boil over. Located on the east bank of the Nile in Sohag governorate, a few miles east of Balyana, it is the trading center for a number of villages in the area. There is little farmland in Kosheh; it serves rather as the shopping nexus for the rural areas around it. Most of the shopkeepers are Copts; most of the farmers in the surrounding villages are Muslims. The violence which broke out at the new year included locals of both religions firing automatic weapons at each other; it would appear that, despite the difficulty of obtaining firearms in Egypt, the 1998 incidents have persuaded both sides to arm themselves.
What happened at the end of the year apparently began with another feud. The official government report is not yet available but the semi-official press has reported extensively on the story; the Coptic side has been laid out in a lengthy article in al-Kiraza, the Church’s newspaper, which is edited by Pope Shenouda himself. (He was in fact its editor before being elected Pope, and formerly worked as a journalist.) That version is being widely treated as the Pope’s own take on the events, though he has not expressed the same feelings publicly. The core of the argument is that the “cover-up” of the 1998 events led to an escalation of tensions which provoked the bloodshed of the new year: as a result of doing nothing about 1998, “physical attacks have turned into killings”.
The trouble started with an argument on December 31 between a Coptic merchant and a Muslim customer. This somehow escalated into bloodshed, and Muslims burned and looted Coptic shops and reportedly attacked some Copts in their homes. By the time the violence was over, at least 23 people were dead: 20 Copts, one Muslim, and two burned bodies not positively identified. Egyptian press reports say 73 shops were destroyed. Some Copts have alleged that preachers in mosques in neighboring villages called for attacks on Christians during the Friday sermon on December 31.
that in al-Zawiya’ al-Hamra’ in 1981, and thus the worst casualties of any Coptic-Muslim clash in recent decades. The government, accused of doing nothing after 1998, has moved quickly to try to improve the situation this time. It sent a large number of security forces into Kosheh and the neighboring Muslim villages and clamped down hard; it promised a full investigation. Though President Mubarak did denounce outside elements during a Police Day speech, the government and the pro-government press have generally been speaking of the need for tolerance and understanding, and denouncing those who spread religious factionalism.
On the other hand, at least one Coptic priest has been arrested; of 59 people rounded up for questioning, one of those listed was Father Gabriel ‘Abd al-Masih; however, he was not found by the local prosecutors and turned himself in in Cairo, apparently to avoid dealing with the local authorities in Kosheh. He was charged with leading a gang, but reportedly said he was not even in Kosheh during the events, and he was recently released on bail.
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Some of the government’s moves have been cosmetic: the Sohag Governorate has changed the name of Kosheh, which can mean “strife”, to al-Salam, peace. The government has given money to those who lost family members, were injured, or had shops damaged, but the amounts are small and this has raised further complaints. The government has also promised new development funds to rebuild Kosheh, new electricity and water lines, and other benefits. And the press has been far more sympathetic to the Copts this time than in 1998. (Meanwhile, the trial stemming from the 1998 violence is going on in Sohag.)
Since the full details are not yet clear and the government and Coptic versions tend to differ in some ways, it is hard to be certain what could have been done to avoid the violence. But the al-Kiraza article explicitly blamed the local security forces, and this seems to be a theme carried over from 1998: local police, mostly Muslim, seem to automatically either side with Muslims in local feuds or simply stand aside while Muslim mobs burn Coptic shops. Kosheh’s Copts and Bishop Wissa have claimed that the local police did nothing to stop the burning and killing. Although certainly some Copts were armed and fighting back, the fact that most of the dead and most of the burned shops were Coptic, suggests that the Muslims were better armed in the battle.
The latest violence has already produced the predictable reaction among foreign Copts: the group U.S. Copts has taken out full page newspaper ads, and such moves have already drawn criticism from Egyptian leaders, including Mubarak, who resent the Egyptian government being blamed for local feuds and vendettas, even when they seem to involve police. The problem has been a difficult one for the Egyptian government. Local resentments, wild rumors, the intolerance of some local Muslim preachers influenced by political Islamist rhetoric, and certainly at times the suspicions and complaints of local Copts as well, have helped fuel this sort of explosion.
It does need to be acknowledged that the troubles which simmer in Kosheh are not replicated throughout the country. There seem to have been no serious problems between Copts and Muslims in Cairo since 1981, despite some minor incidents. The problems are in the cities, and even more in the villages, of Upper Egypt, where local resentments can run deep, where the religious figures on both sides are neither as well educated nor as tolerant as those in the capital, and where rumors often are more deeply believed than the newspapers.
The ruling National Democratic Party has said it will include Copts on its electoral lists. In fact, Copts usually do not do very well in Egyptian elections, largely because they are not usually a majority in the country’s complicated constituency system. The President, who appoints some members of the Parliament, usually appoints a number of Copts and women because neither win readily at the polls.
A few more Copts in the People’s Assembly will not, of course, make much difference in the everyday life of villagers in places like Kosheh; nor does the prominence of Coptic families like the Boutros-Ghalis translate into influence at the village level. But the government does seem to have recognized the problem will not go away on its own, as it seemed to hope in 1998, and that may help decrease the danger of future explosions.
The problem of minority populations in the Middle East, in an era of Islamic revivalism, is not unique to Egypt, as the recent confrontations in Nazareth and elsewhere remind us. But the violence at Kosheh has once again drawn international attention to the problems facing some Coptic communities, and this time the Egyptian government seems to recognize that it must address the situation.
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