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Landslide! Scope of Victory Stuns Even Iranian Reformers; But
Reformist Divisions, Conservative Bastions Remain Problems Genuine electoral surprises are rare in the Middle East (competitive
elections being rare as well). Though Iran’s reformers hoped to win control of the Majles in the parliamentary elections on February 18, and most observers expected them to improve on their previous
position, even the most optimistic seem to have been surprised (in some cases, even disconcerted) by the apparent scope of their victory. With projections suggesting the reformers might control as
many as 200 of the 290 seats by the time runoffs are complete (a 70% majority), the results appeared to be a rout for the hardliners. And it is a rout as extensive and unpredicted as — well, as the
same 70% majority President Mohammad Khatami won against the establishment candidate in the 1997 Presidential elections.Those races requiring runoffs will not in fact be settled until
sometime in the latter part of April; as a result precise analyses of the composition of the Sixth Islamic Majles are a bit premature. And in many races it is debatable whether a candidate is a
“reformer” or a “hardliner”; some candidates were endorsed by partisan groups on both sides, and some rural and local candidates may not be aligned with either major bloc. What analysis can be done is attempted in this issue’s
Dossier, which examines the results as known so far. In interpreting those results, however, a few things should be kept clearly in mind. Among them:
- There is a solid consensus for change.
The 1997 Presidential elections and the 2000 parliamentary ones combine to suggest that about 70% of Iran’s voters want “reform” of the system.
- Beyond the desire for change, the consensus is less clear.
President Khatami’s support base in 1997, and that of the loosely defined “reform” bloc in 2000, draw from a
wide range of constituencies: liberal mullahs, old and new leftists, graying revolutionaries linked to the American Embassy seizure in 1979, businessmen favoring a liberalized
economy, young people seeking relaxed social strictures, women’s activists, and more. Khatami’s genius has been to meld a coalition of such diverse constituencies; his
challenge will be holding it together to enact a coherent agenda once it controls the Majles. On social issues they are largely in agreement, but on economics, they range from far leftists to free marketeers.
- The divisions within the winning coalition may soon be on display.
The reformers will have a chance to choose the Speaker of the Majles; former President ‘Ali Akbar
Hashemi-Rafsanjani’s hopes of becoming Speaker again (See the Last Issue) were shattered by the reformist landslide and the results of his own campaign: at presstime he
was running a humiliating 29th out of 30 candidates in Tehran: likely to be elected, but still not certain to avoid a runoff. But who will be the Speaker? The two most important
reformist groups, the Islamic Iran Participation Front and the Executives of Construction, are each likely to put up candidates, and other groups may as well. Although the
Participation Front’s recently chosen leader, President Khatami’s brother Mohammad-Reza Khatami ( Profile) is the celebrity of the moment, he is relatively new to politics, and better-known reformers are likely to bid for the job. A public quarrel among
the reformers over the Speakership may well be in the offing.
The hardliners are down, but not out.
In the aftermath of the initial returns, a number of prominent hardliners admitted that the reformers had shown they have the people behind them, and many hardliners went down to defeat. (See the Dossier
.) But conservatives still
dominate the Council of Guardians, which can overrule the Majles on legislation it deems un-Islamic and also vets candidates; the Council of Experts, which elects the Religious Leader or rahbar
; the Judiciary, including the special clerical courts which have been notorious for cracking down on reformers; and the security services, though former
Intelligence Chief ‘Ali Fallahian was one of those who was defeated in the first round of voting. It could take years to change the makeup of some of these bodies, and many are directly controlled by the rahbar,
Ayatollah ‘Ali Khamene’i, usually seen as an ally of the hardliners.
The reformists could overplay their hand. The reformers may be tempted by their
majority to overplay the hand they have been dealt by the public. Curiously — or perhaps not so curiously — they may already recognize the danger of this, for many of the
reformers are expressing concern that the sheer size of their mandate may encourage the more radical elements in the reform coalition to demand too much. President Khatami,
and most but not all of the reform “parties”, have refrained from criticizing the fundamental principle of velayat-I-faqih, of rule by the religious scholar, the governmental principle
imposed by Imam Ruhollah Khomeini and the basic ideology of the state. Though most Iranians would probably admit that the rahbar, Ayatollah Khamene’i, is no Khomeini in his
religious scholarship, and does not really meet the standards originally called for in Khomeini’s writings on velayat-I-faqih, the basic principle has been sacrosanct. A few
academics and members of unapproved parties have openly opposed it, as has Ayatollah Hossein ‘Ali Montazeri, one of the formulators of the original constitution and Khomeini’s
onetime heir apparent. But these figures are outside the government, and the Council of Guardians will not approve any candidate who is not, openly at least, a supporter of velayat-I-faqih.
If enough reformers begin openly criticizing the dual system under which the elected leadership (the President and Parliament) can be overruled by the unelected
leadership (the Religious Leader and the Council of Guardians), at least some of those in the ruling coalition might see this as too radical. President Khatami’s brother,
Mohammad-Reza Khatami, and his party, the Participation Front, have at times seemed to flirt with the idea of opposing velayat-I-faqih, but not so the President himself.
The danger of a revolution of rising expectations. In a situation such as this, it is always difficult to know for certain what voters really expect. But many of the voters for
reform lists may well be voting for what they think will be economic prosperity, or at least a decent job. But the reformists are a coalition of old and new leftists, free enterprise
entrepreneurs from the Bazaar, younger people merely hoping for a comfortable life, and just about everything in between. Iran has an entrenched statist economy, with enormous power held by the bonyads,
the big holding-company enterprises often run by parastatal groups such as clerical bodies or the Revolutionary Guards, and it is not an easy
economy to reform. The problem is compounded by the fact that the “reformers” are more in agreement on political and cultural matters than economic ones: their economic
agendas range from quasi-Marxist to free marketeers. If the voters who elected them expect economic miracles, they may well be disappointed; and that could disillusion the
voters. (Next year, 2001, Khatami will stand for re-election. If little progress is seen from a year of a “reform” Parliament, he could find himself called to account.)
The specter of violence. The violent clashes produced by the student demonstrations of 1999, and the continuing scandal of the apparent police/intelligence apparatus involvement
in the disappearances and presumed killings of dissidents, are a reminder that violence may not be far below the surface, and might be instigated by either side. All the other
concerns expressed above in a sense combine in this one: that if the power struggle is resumed under a new form, it could be a violent one, with the attendant possibility of the
situation spinning out of control in unpredictable directions. With luck, both sides in Iran will recognize that danger and work to minimize it.
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