Libya Abolishes Government (Again)

Mu‘ammar al-Qadhafi has always shown a penchant for drama and the unexpected gesture. Though the onetime enfant terrible of the Arab world is now 58 and Libya is slowly resuming ties with the rest of the world after the long Lockerbie interlude, surprises can still come out of Libya. On March 1, Libya’s General People’s Congress — its highest governing authority — not only replaced Libya’s equivalents of Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, but proceeded to abolish 12 of the ministries outright, announcing that their duties would be taken over at the provincial level, rather than by the central government.

While dramatic, the move is not entirely unprecedented. The General People’s Congress was meeting on the eve of the 23rd anniversary of the March 2, 1977 declaration of “rule by the people”, under which Qadhafi declared Libya to be a Jamahiriyya or state run by the masses. Over time, Libya claimed to have abolished traditional government; it did not have a “cabinet” with “ministers”, but rather Secretariats of the General People’s Committee; its provinces were not called muhafazat or wilayat as in most Arab states — words meaning basically “governorate” — but rather sha‘abiyyat, from the word for “the people”. And of course, it had no head of state — Qadhafi himself holds no title other than “Guide of the Revolution”.

However democratic the structure may seem on paper, real power in Libya of course resides with the Guide of the Revolution, a few of his surviving comrades from the days of the 1969 Revolutionary Command Council, and various Qadhafi kinsmen and fellow tribesmen, along with the security services. And “Brother Colonel” does, from time to time, forcibly remind everyone who is really in charge. When he opened the General People’s Congress at the end of January, he publicly tore up the state budget for 2000, and criticized the government. A reshuffle had been expected; abolishing a dozen ministries out of hand merely adds the particular Qadhafi touch to the expected shakeup.

The day after the General People’s Congress abolished most of the government, Qadhafi gave a speech in which he made another interesting suggestion: maybe, he said, it is time that Libya actually have a head of state again, like other countries,  “in case something happens, like a catastrophe, a war, or whatever”. He suggested that the job might go to the “Coordinator of the General Social Popular Command”, a post which theoretically rotates every six months. But the suggestion might also be an attempt to lay the groundwork for a future succession. Many think that Qadhafi his grooming his own eldest son to succeed him, but it is hard to succeed to a post that theoretically doesn’t exist. Creating a post of head of state might be a way of passing the baton.

The recent changes probably will have little real effect on how Libya runs from day to day, but they come at a time when Libya is resuming relations with Europe and dealings with most of the world after years of isolation. They therefore provide a convenient excuse to examine Qadhafi’s system, prospects for succession, and other issues.

Mu‘ammar Qadhafi has always seen himself as a political theorist. His Green Book, presented as a governmental system providing an alternative between Western bourgeois democracy and Communism, is in fact brief and highly general, but Qadhafi has also sought to apply his theories to Libya itself. On March 2, 1977, he proclaimed that People’s sovereignty had been achieved in Libya and declared the country the world’s first Jamahiriyya, a word he coined. (The standard Arabic word for a republic, Jumhuriyya, is based on the root jumhur, meaning the general public; the plural of jumhur is jamahir, roughly the masses; Qadhafi created a new noun from the plural, implying a republic that is more mass-based than others.)

Qadhafi also created a political system which is, theoretically, a grass-roots democracy, with local People’s Committees constituting the basic instrument of government, and the highest authority being the General People’s Congress, consisting of delegates from lower tiers of the People’s Committees. The General People’s Congress has both legislative functions and executive, exercising the latter through a General People’s Committee, which is the equivalent of a Council of Ministers; each of the Secretariats of the General People’s Committee is what other countries would call a Ministry or government department.

“We have shown the world a model demonstrating that governments are not needed . . .  You have no more government to complain against. Now, everything is in your hands and in the future you can complain only to yourselves.”   — Qadhafi addressing Libyans at the Sabha Oasis, March 2

Over the decades, Qadhafi has never been completely satisfied with the system, and has tinkered with it frequently, first by encouraging the growth of “Revolutionary Committees” which, in effect, were security-oriented bodies to create a check on local People’s Committees; and also by periodically overriding decisions of these bodies. There are clearly limits to the democratic role of the People’s Committees, and in fact there is no Secretariat for Defense. In theory, that is because defense is a nationwide duty and the Army will someday be phased out; in fact it is because the Army and the Security Services are directly under the control of Qadhafi and a few key figures from the Revolutionary era or from his own clan.

On January 28, when the meeting of the General People’s Congress opened, Qadhafi showed up for an unscheduled appearance, criticized the government’s failure to achieve more economically, dramatically tore up the proposed budget for 2000, and asked that the session be postponed. He said that governments have remained too reliant on oil revenues, and have not sufficiently diversified Libya’s economy.  By early March reports were leaking that there would be a major reshuffle, and that took place, along with the realignment of most departments, on the eve of the anniversary of the establishment of “People’s Power”, March 2.

Following what was apparently Qadhafi’s prescription, the General People’s Congress:

• Replaced Muhammad Ahmad al-Manqush as Secretary of the General People’s Committee (Prime Minister) with Mubarak ‘Abdallah al-Shamikh, who had been serving as Secretary for Housing and Utilities. Shamikh, 50, will likely prove a relatively faceless figure: Libya’s Prime Ministership is essentially technocratic, and involves few of the real reins of power.
• Replaced ‘Umar Mustafa al-Muntasir with  former Ambassador to Germany Muhammad ‘Abd al-Rahman Shalqam as Secretary of the People’s External Liaison and International Cooperation Bureau, Libya’s equivalent of a Foreign Minister.
• Abolished 12 secretariats (ministries) altogether. retaining only five to function at the national level: Foreign Liaison, Finance, Justice and Public Order, and Information, as well as a new Secretariat for African Unity. Qadhafi reportedly said that even these might be abolished at a later date.
• The 12 abolished departments — including key ones like Mining, Economy and Trade, and Agriculture —  will now be run by the 26 sha‘abiyyat or regions, which will handle local affairs in a less centralized, more regionally based manner which was not clearly spelled out.
• Among the abolished ministries was that of Energy. Oil policy will now be run by the National Oil Company, reporting directly to the General People’s Committee.

As usual, there are ironies. The General People’s Congress met in Sirte (Surt), the town near which Qadhafi was born; he spoke the next day in Sabha, the oasis where he spent his youth. For all his declarations about Libyans taking control of their own government, the institutions of government still tend not to hold major meetings in the big cities of Tripoli or Benghazi, but in places known for their role in the life of the “Guide of the Revolution”, Qadhafi’s only title. (For more on Qadhafi’s career, See the Profile in this issue.)

At the same time, there have long been indications that Qadhafi, who sees himself as a revolutionary, has been frustrated by the natural bureaucratization of any regime, including one supposedly based on grass-roots popular committees. Abolishing the ministries is certainly a rather drastic means of controlling bureaucracy, of course.

And the move may simply be an effort on the part of Qadhafi to reclaim and revitalize the management of Libya’s economy as it begins to trade more with the outside world in the wake of the compromise over the Lockerbie Pan Am bombing. International airlines have resumed flights to Libya after several years of boycott, and Europe in particular is rushing to normalize ties.

Thinking About the Succession?

Another remark made by Qadhafi during his speech at Sabha in honor of the 23rd anniversary of “People’s Power” raised questions of another sort. He said, “I would like that a constitutional reference be established: the General Coordinator of the Social Popular Command could be the formal Head of State”. What Qadhafi “would like”, of course, is likely to happen. But as part of some of the earlier abolitions of government institutions, Libya has long prided itself on having no formal head of state. Qadhafi’s only title is “Guide of the Revolution”, a title whose very ambiguity means it can mean as much or as little as his current mood dictates. (He is known for his long sojourns in the desert, but apparently can, at other times, micromanage pet projects.)

The particular suggestion about who might serve is also curious. The General Coordinator of the Social Popular Command is the rotating head of what is generally described as an unofficial body, one consisting of powerful Libyan leaders but with little visibility. That this post, instead of the more visible Secretary of the General People’s Congress (the de facto Parliament Speaker) or the Secretary of the General People’s Committee (the de facto Prime Minister) might be designated as the official, ceremonial Head of State may seem curious.

But at least some commentators immediately suggested that this might be a means of providing for a smooth succession. For decades, Qadhafi’s longtime number two man, ‘Abd al-Salam Jallud, seemed to be in line for succession, but he has been in eclipse for some years. The military chief, Abu Bakr Yunus, and one or two other survivors of the original free officers, have sometimes been seen as potential successors.

But the revolutionary generation is aging; Qadhafi is 58 this year. And in recent years he has been giving more and more visible responsibilities to his sons Sayf al-Islam and Sa‘idi. Sa‘idi has just been in Morocco for talks with King Muhammad VI about resurrecting the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA); Sayf al-Islam has also made diplomatic visits, heads the National Consultancy overseeing various projects, and has other posts. Most reports suggest that Sayf al-Islam, 29, is the likeliest to be chosen successor. He is a civil engineer by training.

The soccer riot which broke out in Tripoli on July 9, 1996, a rare instance of violence in the country’s major city, appears to have originated in a feud between teams supported by the two brothers, with Sa‘idi being jeered by the fans of the team backed by Sayf al-Islam. Whether this suggests potential rivalry between the sons, however, is unclear.

Stability Issues

Of course, at 58, Qadhafi could have many years ahead of him. But there have been numerous rumors of assassination attempts through the years. While these are always hard to pin down — they circulate among exile groups, and among what the press inevitably calls “travelers arriving in Egypt” — and at least some may be disinformation planted by the Libyan regime, some seem to have solid underpinnings. Certainly in 1994 there was some sort of military mutiny in the Bani Walid area around Misurata. In 1995 and 1996 there were numerous reports of dissidence in the east, the former Cyrenaica, where resistance to Qadhafi has always been most entrenched. A prison break in Benghazi apparently led to an insurgency in the Jabal Akhdar (Green Mountain) region. In 1995 Qadhafi expelled Egyptian and Sudanese guest workers, blaming them for disturbances.

In 1998, exile groups claimed that Qadhafi had been wounded in an assassination attempt, dated variously between May 31 and June 2 of that year. Allegedly, his motorcade came under fire on the coast road east of Benghazi (See The Estimate , June 19, 1998). According to the claims, Qadhafi was en route for a visit to Egypt, going by land because of the international flight moratorium.

Libya and Egypt both denied the story; Egypt said Qadhafi had indeed been expected but had canceled due to a throat infection.

A few weeks later, in early July, as African leaders and others were visiting Libya for the Prophet’s Birthday, it was announced that Qadhafi had broken his hip while exercising. Egypt flew a medical aircraft to Libya to help, despite the international flight ban. For some time thereafter, Qadhafi was shown from time to time in a hospital bed or, later, walking with crutches or a walker. There was no clear link between the reported assassination attempt in June and the “broken hip” of July, but the coincidence of the events was a reminder that Qadhafi is not immune to opposition.

Looking Forward

So far, most of Libya’s neighbors, and most of Europe, seem comfortable with a normalization process in the wake of Libya’s turning over the two Lockerbie bombing suspects. Their trial may well result in an acquittal; the agreement not to allow accusations to be made higher up the ladder of the Libyan government than the two accused is likely to make it hard to prove the case, particularly under the cumbersome rules (it is being tried in the Netherlands under Scots legal principles) agreed upon.

Libya has been trying to mend its fences with the West, and in fact has paid a substantial sum to the survivors of a French UTA passenger aircraft blown up over Chad. Attempts to cut a deal with the Pan Am survivors have been less successful, and the US is less willing than some other countries to simply write off a terrorist incident it blames on the present Libyan leadership.

But Libya is reasserting its presence in the Arab world — the attempts to revive UMA are in part due to the fact that UMA was partly moribund due to Lockerbie — and in its links with Europe. Qadhafi clearly wants to see some economic progress at home as well, to give Libyans some rewards for having endured the boycotts and ban on air travel. That may be at least one motive behind Libya’s latest effort to ostensibly abolish government.

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