The Saudi Peace Initiative: What Is And Isn't New

Since it was first broached in an interview between Saudi Crown Prince ‘Abdullah and The New York Times' Thomas Friedman in the Times on February 17, a great deal of attention has been paid to the peace initiative proposed by the Crown Prince, which has been characterized as a Saudi "peace plan" under which the Arab world would offer full normalization with Israel in exchange for a full withdrawal to the 1967 borders. The suggestion, according to ‘Abdullah, would be made in a speech to the forthcoming Arab League Summit in Beirut.

While it was unremarkable that Arab countries engaged in the peace process such as Egypt and Jordan promptly supported the proposal, Syria too quickly joined in support. The European Union began actively promoting the idea, and the US, somewhat reluctant at first (characterizing the proposal as positive but without much enthusiasm) also seemed to be exploring whether the plan could offer a formula for breaking the present bloody impasse (See the Related Story on Page One).

The Israeli response was more measured of course. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon indicated that he would be willing to engage in direct negotiations with the Saudis, which missed the point that the Saudi proposal was for an Arab League initiative; hardline newspapers tended to dismiss the proposal as nothing new, unrealistic, or a revival of the "Fahd Plan" of 1981. More peace-oriented papers, most vocally Ha'aretz, began actively editorializing in favor of responding to the Saudi gesture. Meanwhile, many op-ed writers in the United States have tended to take their cue from the hardline Israeli analysis and dismissed the Saudi plan as nothing new.

That misses the point. The key word in Saudi Peace Plan is not Peace (which is some distance down the road) or Plan (since the initiative so far is very generalized), but Saudi. A country which has long, and somewhat notoriously, stayed aloof from the nitty-gritty of the peace process (though joining in the Madrid Peace Conference and other forums), and a country which itself often claims to speak for the Arab and Islamic worlds, has floated this proposal and apparently intends to do so at the Arab Summit.

This Dossier examines what is known about the plan so far (not much), how it differs from the Fahd Plan of 1981, and what opportunities it might offer.

The "Saudi peace plan" is, at least so far as its public exposition to date, not so much a carefully-crafted plan as a broad proposal about how to pursue a possible breakthrough towards peace. In its broad and undefined form, it contains elements that Israel has consistently rejected through the years, notably complete withdrawal from territory occupied in 1967, including East Jerusalem (though unnamed Saudi officials have been quoted as saying Israel could keep the Western Wall). In that sense, it is little more than a reflection of the Arab land-for-peace formula which has long been the stated position of most moderate Arab states.

What the plan adds to that previous position, however, is the explicit emphasis on full normalization that would be offered by the Arab world as a whole, through the Arab League. Earlier formulas, including the Fahd plan of 1981, tended to include vague guarantees of the right of all countries in the region to live in peace; "full normalization" means diplomatic relations and normal trade and other interchange between Israel and the whole Arab world. Logically, that would imply Israeli embassies not just in neighboring states but in Riyadh and Tripoli as well.

It is easy to dismiss the Saudi plan as nothing new; many critics have already done so, sometimes dismissing it as an attempt by the Saudis to improve their image in the wake of September 11. But in fact, the "plan" (which isn't really that yet) would make explicit from the beginning that full recognition is on the table. Though obviously part of the separate peace treaties negotiated and signed with Egypt and Jordan, and of the agreement that has eluded conclusion in the Israeli-Syrian talks, the question of broader acceptance of Israel by the Arab world as a whole has rarely been raised.

In the column in The New York Times on February 17 which first revealed the Saudi initiative, Thomas L. Friedman wrote that he had previously urged such an initiative by the Arab League and that some countries such as Jordan and Morocco favored it, but were waiting until one of what Friedman called "the big boys", Egypt or Saudi Arabia, supported the idea. Friedman says that in his interview, ‘Abdullah responded, "Have you broken into my desk?", and revealed that he had already drafted a speech with exactly the same idea, of proposing full normalization for full withdrawal. According to Friedman, ‘Abdullah said that "My thinking was to deliver it before the Arab summit" but that he had reconsidered because of the violence by Israel against the Palestinians. What, Friedman asked, if Israel and the Palestinians reached a ceasefire before the Arab Summit? "Let me say to you that the speech is written, and it is still in my drawer", ‘Abdullah replied.

In short, ‘Abdullah did not commit himself to deliver the speech, but suggested that if a ceasefire could be achieved before the Arab Summit, he might do so.

Now, neither the interview nor subsequent official Saudi statements have spelled out a formal proposal: that would come, presumably, at the Summit. Since Arab Summits depend on unanimity, any peace plan which emerges from the Summit might differ somewhat from initial proposals anyway. And, of course, full withdrawal has always been anathema to Israeli governments. Not even the Ehud Barak government was prepared to offer full withdrawal, though it accepted the idea of compensatory land transfers elsewhere to make up for territories held beyond the 1967 lines.

That made it relatively easy for some analysts to dismiss the Saudi plan as nothing new. But there are several things that need to be emphasized here:

It is a Saudi plan. As noted above, that is a key element here. Saudi Arabia is, in Arab circles, the elephant in the living room, the rich relative who has often funded other Arab regimes and thereby enjoys considerable clout in Arab councils.

It was proposed by ‘Abdullah. The Crown Prince (See the Profile in The Estimate for January 25, 2002) differs from most other members of the Saudi Royal Family in that he is generally recognized as an Arab nationalist, someone with close ties to Syria and other Arab states, and is far less identified with the US than some other senior Saudis. ‘Abdullah has a standing in the Arab world that others might not enjoy.

It envisions an Arab League initiative, not a unilateral Saudi initiative. Some early responses, deliberately or otherwise, ignored this point, as with Ariel Sharon's announcing that he was willing to talk directly to the Saudis. What the Crown Prince wants is not a Saudi pledge of normalization, but an Arab League pledge binding all the members. In other words, he is offering full normalization with all the Arab states (though it is hard to imagine Libya and Iraq going along) in exchange for withdrawal.

It once again regionalizes the peace process, removing it from the seemingly intractable bilateral Israeli-Palestinian level. Some Israeli commentators saw this as a positive sign. After all, the argument went, one reason Yasir ‘Arafat did not accept the proposals offered at Camp David in July 2000 was that he lacked the "legitimacy" or a legitimizing green light from the rest of the Arab and Islamic worlds to deal on issues such as Jerusalem. An Arab League offer (provided it also allowed the Palestinians to cut some territorial deals if necessary) would provide such legitimization, the argument goes.

In the broad, undefined form published so far, there is no reference to a Palestinian right of return. Earlier Arab formulas have always included the right of return, one of the rocks on which the 2000 Camp David talks foundered; the Fahd Plan of 1981 incorporated the right of return. Many Israeli commentators were quick to note that the conversation between ‘Abdullah and Friedman made no reference to the right of return.

Those are the positive factors. It is true that there are negative factors as well. They include:

The proposal has not actually been offered, and may never be offered. Crown Prince ‘Abdullah implied to Friedman, after all, that he might give the speech he had written if there were to be a ceasefire by the time of the Arab Summit later this month. So the discussions may be much ado about nothing, and if no plan is offered, or the Arab League rejects it, the Saudis can blame Israeli intransigence.

Full withdrawal has been rejected by every Israeli government. As noted earlier, the Barak government did accept the idea of transferring some land inside Israel's 1967 borders (but adjacent to Gaza) to the Palestinians in exchange for retaining some settlement blocs and other areas inside the West Bank, and also sought a long-term security corridor in the Jordan Valley. But no Israeli government has ever accepted the full withdrawal to the 1967 borders, in part because that would leave the Western Wall, Judaism's most sacred site, in Palestinian hands. It would also mean that the main superhighway linking Tel Aviv and Jerusalem would run through Palestinian territory, since it was built after 1967.

On this latter issue, the Saudis have said in the past that they would accept any deal which was acceptable to the Palestinians; that presumably could include compromises on precisely where the boundaries run (the 1967 boundaries were in fact ceasefire lines, not formal boundaries), provided the principle of withdrawal is accepted. And unnamed Saudi sources have been quoted as saying that they would not object, for example, to Israel retaining the Western Wall. Still, Israel would almost certainly have to abandon virtually all of its settlements in the West Bank.

Another problem, of course, is that the continuing violence between Israel and the Palestinian Authority has reduced Israeli willingness to accept formal normalization as a substitute for defensible frontiers. And the 1967 boundaries did not provide defensible frontiers. The argument that peace and genuine normalization would preclude the need for territorial buffer zones is valid in a vacuum, but most Israelis now believe that any Palestinian state would continue to pose a security threat for the foreseeable future.

Though the Saudi willingness to play a role in a peace initiative is unusual, it is not unique. The so-called "Fahd Plan" of 1981, endorsed by the Arab Summit in Fez, Morocco in 1982 after some revision, is the obvious precedent.

Interestingly, Fahd was Crown Prince when the Fahd Plan was proposed. It was an eight-point plan spelling out the standard Arab position at a time when Egypt had already concluded a peace treaty with Israel and had been ostracized from the Arab League. The main difference between the Fahd Plan and that of ‘Abdullah is that the former made no reference to full normalization. In fact, though the original version did imply mutual recognition or at least securing the right of all countries to live in peace, Syrian objections prevented its adoption (the Arab League requiring unanimity). The Fez Summit of November 1981 was "suspended" because of disagreement, and reconvened in September of 1982, again in Fez, when it accepted a compromise under which "The [United Nations] Security Council will guarantee peace for all the states of the region, including an independent Palestinian state." Syria would not undertake any greater normalization at that time. By September 1982 Fahd had become King of Saudi Arabia.

That is the most obvious difference between Fahd's initiative and ‘Abdullah's, and it is why normalization is precisely the "new thing" on offer in the plan by Crown Prince ‘Abdullah. But that is the whole intent of the plan, so far as can be determined: to reassure Israel that there is a real intent to normalize in exchange for real withdrawal.

Why Now?
Although the entire sequence of events leading to the Saudi "plan" is unclear, Friedman's and other reports make clear that other Arab countries were particularly involved in pushing the Saudis towards making such a proposal. Jordan and Egypt, which have treaties with Israel, have found themselves increasingly criticized in the Arab world for maintaining normal (though strained) relations during a period of such violence. They are seeking to find ways of returning to a peace process, and there are indications that both King ‘Abdullah of Jordan and Husni Mubarak of Egypt are frustrated with the inability of Yasir ‘Arafat to enforce a ceasefire.

But, as countries already at peace with Israel, Jordan and Egypt do not enjoy the same clout in proposing a peace plan as Saudi Arabia does. Though Egypt is far more populous, the Saudis enjoy a prestige as the country where the holy cities of Mecca and Medina are located, not to mention the prestige that money can buy. They are able to deliver both clout and credibility which might be lacking from another sponsor.

The Saudis also have, in addition to prestige in the Muslim world, an ear in Washington. Though the US-Saudi relationship has its ups and downs, to be sure, the importance of Saudi Arabia both as the owner of the world's largest oil reserves and as a critical element in the US defense posture in the Gulf means that the US takes Saudi views more seriously than some smaller or less influential countries.

Add to that, of course, the fact that the US is at least contemplating military action against Iraq. Although that could take several different forms, including covert operations, a major military campaign would ideally need Saudi cooperation to be launched. An attempt to conduct a ground war solely from Turkish and Kuwaiti soil, or even those two plus Jordan, would be more costly in terms of money, logistical problems and perhaps casualties as well, than one which included Saudi territory. And the only state-of-the-art US command and control facility for air-ground operations is in the Kingdom.

So, why now? The Friedman interview took place in February, before the most recent escalation of the violence in Israel and Palestine. But it was clearly intended as something of a last-ditch attempt to return to the peace table in some way, and perhaps to find a way out for the Palestinian Authority, which increasingly seems to have painted itself into a corner from which it cannot find a way to extricate itself.

In addition, there may be an implied trade-off. King ‘Abdullah of Jordan and Crown Prince ‘Abdullah of Saudi Arabia have both said, more than once, that any US military action without a ceasefire and progress towards peace in Palestine would be destabilizing to the Arab world. In short, if you want to go after Iraq, first you have to produce something we can show our own people, and stop the bloodletting between Israelis and Palestinians.

So several factors go into the timing. The forthcoming Arab League Summit is only one; any possible US operations against Iraq later this year also are a factor.

The Saudi plan may, of course, go nowhere. ‘Abdullah seemed to say that he would not introduce the plan at the Summit if Israeli killings of Palestinians continued at that time. While there have been a few favorable signs — Sharon's dropping of the seven day condition and lifting of the ban on ‘Arafat's internal travel — they have been offset by a full-scale Israeli offensive in the territories and increasing casualties on both sides.

But for the reasons noted earlier, it is simplistic to dismiss the plan as "nothing new" because it does contain something new — a promise of full normalization by the Arab League — and it also comes from a country with clout in the region. It is true that the Saudis are looking for ways to improve their image in the West, and that the peace plan is no doubt part of that campaign (it was, after all, revealed to The New York Times, not announced in an Arab meeting). But it is also a sign that the Saudis want to move away from the present impasse and are seeking to float a plan which offers just enough that is new to have some chance of being pursued. And that slender chance seems one reason it has been so widely welcomed in Europe and the Middle East, if not in the United States. And the US also seems interested, since it has seemingly found no other way to break the impasse between Sharon and ‘Arafat.

Success is still unlikely, but not impossible, and the plan is not without some meaning.

Home

Current Issue

About Us

Back Issues

Resources

Subscribe