Thinking About Options in Iraq:
Some Key Questions, Part 1

Journalistic shorthand has tended to insist that the grand tour of the Middle East by US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney was intended to prepare the ground for military action against Iraq, and while Cheney has insisted that he is discussing many other issues, the trip was clearly in part sounding out potential allies in a new coalition. It is far from clear if he found any; it seems clearer that he got an earful at several stops.

In fact, it seems clear that the George W. Bush Administration has decided that Saddam Hussein must be removed from power by some means, covert or overt, because his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs pose an unacceptable threat. That some very senior people — Cheney's Deputy Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, and Defense Policy Board Chairman Richard Perle most frequently noted among them — are eager for a military operation against Iraq is clear enough; that some others, in the State Department and elsewhere, are more restrained is also clear.

It is not as clear as some seem to feel that the US has decided on military action, as opposed to some more indirect effort, but it does seem clear that it has made removal of Saddam, by some means, a priority. Some, such as Wolfowitz and Perle, reportedly believe that relatively limited military strikes (increased bombing) combined with special operations and support of Iraqi opposition forces might be enough to do the job: the Afghanistan model. Others would seem to provoke a coup from within or target the Iraqi leadership through black operations. Still others envision an all-out invasion of Iraq with up to 200,000 American troops involved, a sort of Desert Storm II that doesn't stop before it reaches Baghdad. In fact, in the current (April 2002) issue of Foreign Affairs, Kenneth M. Pollack, the Council on Foreign Relations' Deputy Director for National Security Studies and a veteran military analyst of the Middle East, actually makes the case for a full-scale invasion.

As everyone knows by now, all this talk has set off a great number of alarm bells, especially among US friends in the Arab world. How serious is the likelihood of a major war against Iraq, this year or next? What would the impact on the region be? And when is all this supposed to happen? Not only is the Arab world publicly opposed, but so is most of Europe; and the US is still engaged in Afghanistan, has not replenished its arsenal of weapons, and has not mobilized the reserves needed for a major effort.

These are just a few of the questions which have arisen. The US has sought to portray its planning against Iraq as part of the war against terrorism. But even the US acknowledges that there is little credible evidence of links between Iraq and the events of September 11. One alleged (and disputed) contact in the Czech Republic and a few murky links between Usama bin Ladin and radical groups in Kurdistan seem to be about as hot a trail as anyone has found. This Dossier, Part 1 of a series, looks at the debate and tries to answer some of the key questions that have been raised.

Although this Dossier goes over some of the same ground as the lead article, "US Dilemma on Iraq" in The Estimate for February 22, 2002, it does so in greater detail.

Even in the article in Foreign Affairs mentioned in the introduction, in which Kenneth M. Pollack argues in favor of a full-scale military invasion of Iraq, he notes that "Despite what many hawks now argue, it is a mistake to think of operations against Iraq as part of the war on terrorism. The dilemma the United States must now grapple with, in fact, is that attacking Iraq could jeopardize the success of that war, but the longer it waits before attacking the harder it will be and the greater the risk that Saddam's strength will increase."

Indeed, there seems to be less debate in Washington these days about whether to do something about Saddam Hussein, but rather what to do and when. Vice President Dick Cheney's recent tour of the region appears, from all reports, to have encountered widespread resistance from friendly Arab states to the idea of any military action against Iraq; in addition, the continuing battles in Afghanistan are a reminder that the fall of the Taliban has not ended the threat there, or from Al-Qa‘ida generally, and there are some who argue that one should not risk the war on terrorism by diluting the objective or substituting a new objective, namely the elimination of Saddam, however distasteful a figure he may be.

The debate, at least in US policy circles, is increasingly over the how question, but outside the Washington Beltway broader questions are being heard, including the obvious why. The European Allies, Britain excepted, are clearly not in agreement that the forcible removal of Saddam is necessary, and most of the Arab world (Kuwait perhaps excepted) is alarmed at the idea of a US-Iraqi confrontation without some progress on the Palestinian issue (See the lead article.) And while the US Congress and public opinion generally seem (if anything) even more hawkish than some in the Administration, that support could weaken as the actual requirements for full-scale action against Iraq become clear.

Secretary of State Colin Powell is on record (in his memoirs and numerous other comments) as having taken from his experiences in Vietnam a profound conviction that the United States should never embark on a war without the solid support of the American people, as well as a commitment to the full prosecution of the war. A short, Afghanistan-scale operation would no doubt enjoy public support in the US, but if the Arab world and most of Europe are not on board — if the US has to go it alone — the costs (both monetary and in terms of casualties) would be much greater.

How Acute is the Threat?
No one, including most Arab leaders and presumably most Europeans as well, wants to see Saddam Hussein remain secure in power. He is a despotic and murderous leader who has actively pursued weapons of mass destruction; the question is how he can be removed without destabilizing the region, or vastly increasing the already painful human costs paid by the Iraqi population, who never voted for Saddam.

Since the few, tenuous threads connecting Iraq to groups like Al-Qa‘ida have not been very convincing, those arguing for going to war with Iraq emphasize Iraq's development of weapons of mass destruction. Iraq used chemical weapons in the war with Iran and, notoriously, against the Kurdish town of Halabja. It had a well-developed biological warfare capability, the full scale of which was not fully appreciated until the UN inspectors arrived after Desert Storm. It reportedly had a workable design for a nuclear weapon and an active program to obtain fissionable materials.

Interestingly, various former weapons inspectors disagree about the nature of the Iraqi threat today; one, Scott Ritter, has become a proponent of Iraq's not being considered much of a threat. Others believe that Iraq may retain significant chemical and biological capabilities.

While Iraq has used chemical weapons and probably still possesses some, it is also worth noting, however, that they were not used in the 1991 war. Iraq was presumably deterred from using them by US hints that a devastating response would follow. Saddam is not Usama bin Ladin; he has no desire for suicide, and is committed to his own survival.

Biological weapons are of course of acute concern, especially since the anthrax scares of last fall in the US, and fears of an Al-Qa‘ida biological warfare program. But biological weapons are not battlefield weapons; they are too dangerous to one's own troops. The greatest threat of the Iraqi biological arsenal, if it exists, would be that it would be passed to terrorists. And there is little evidence that Iraq has ever shared its hard-won weapons programs with terrorist groups.

The nuclear capability is of course a major concern. It is possible that some of the "loose" fissionable materials in the former Soviet Union may have made their way to Iraq; the technology to build a bomb was already there. But again, deterrence worked between the superpowers for decades, and despite some nervous moments India and Pakistan have not used nuclear weapons against each other, nor has Israel formally brought its "bomb in the basement" into the public eye. None of this means that Iraq would not use a nuclear weapon if Baghdad were about to be captured, however, and one argument sometimes heard is that if one is ever going to force Saddam from power, it must be done before he has a usable nuclear weapon.

Some say that the fact that the US has accepted the presence of nuclear weapons in Israel, India and Pakistan, makes it hypocritical to threaten military action because Iraq is developing such weapons. The best counterargument to that is to note that unlike the other countries mentioned, Iraq formally agreed, as part of the ceasefire agreements of 1991, to abandon all its special weapons programs; it also agreed to UN inspections. Iraq lost the right to such weapons because it lost a war and agreed to give them up; it is in violation of that agreement.

Does that violation in itself provide a sufficient casus belli for war? Part of the diplomatic problem here is that the commitments made were to the United Nations; the United Nations seems unwilling to endorse military action purely to return the inspectors, and in fact, Iraq has lately hinted that it might permit the inspectors to return, to preclude giving the US a pretext for an assault.

In fact, one question that has occurred to a few people in both the US and Europe is whether or not the whole talk of war with Iraq is in fact a gigantic bluff to force Iraq to let the inspectors back in. It might well be, though the danger of bluffing is that if one's bluff is called, one must either deliver on the threat or lose credibility.

A Broad Spectrum of Options
Although there are certainly those, like Pollack, who think that a full-scale invasion will be necessary and therefore advocate it from the outset, such a military operation would take months to mount, even if all neighboring countries were cooperating; if key ones such as Saudi Arabia are not, the job will be even more difficult. Not impossible: the United States is the world's preeminent military power and it clearly has the military force to conduct such an operation. But logistically, and in terms of casualties and long-term domestic political support, it would be more difficult to accomplish if key Middle Eastern countries are not cooperating or if European allies are opposed. The fact that such a major operation cannot be done overnight is another problem. One of the great mysteries of 1990-91 is the fact that Iraq essentially sat still, its Army in place, while the coalition built up forces from August 2000 until January 2001. A long buildup this time would probably provoke more threats to Iraq's neighbors and, most vulnerable of all, to the autonomous Kurdish region, which Iraq might well attack during a coalition buildup.

There is some reason to believe that many planners (as opposed to some of the policy prognosticators) are seriously looking at other approaches, short of the full-scale military commitment required to march on Baghdad.

Though there are indeed advocates of an Afghanistan style mix of air power, special forces, and local allies, the Afghan model is not very appropriate to Iraq. The Taliban were a brittle, unpopular, poorly organized government, while Saddam Hussein runs a modern, tightly controlled authoritarian state. His Army is degraded from what it was in 1991, and it did not do well even then, but it is a real Army, not a ragtag militia like the Taliban. The Iraqi National Congress has no standing armed force like the Northern Alliance, and the Kurdish armed forces have tended to fight each other. And many observers were actually surprised at the speed with which the Taliban collapsed.

At a lower end of the spectrum would be some combination of air power and encouragement of a revolt against Saddam; possibly a combination of an air campaign, limited special operations, covert or black operations, and attempts to encourage uprisings in Iraq combined with a coup by Iraqi generals. The problem here is that while it might destabilize Iraq, it does not guarantee the end of Saddam; the troops in Baghdad are loyalists commanded by his son Qusayy and other close family members, and past military revolts have failed. In 1995 an effort to destabilize Saddam notoriously failed.

There is, of course, the possibility that the US might simply target Saddam and his family personally, in the hopes that whatever Ba‘athist general took over would be an improvement. But that is replacing the devil you know with one you do not; it also is hard to do.

Whatever constraints the US may have about assassination as a tool, there are plenty of other people who have been trying to assassinate Saddam for years. They are generally dead. There may be some possibilities for bringing about a rift in the inner leadership, even in the family, but it is far from clear that the US and its friends have the assets to do so. A bombing campaign aimed directly at the leadership might be one approach, but that requires real-time intelligence about who is where, intelligence that is so current that there is no danger that the target will have moved before it is struck. Saddam is an old hand at staying hidden; there were reportedly efforts to target him in 1991, but they failed.

Another often heard scenario is an attempt to create a "liberated zone" inside Iraq, perhaps in the south where Shi‘ite dissidence is strong, or in the north adjacent to the Kurdish regions. This could permit the establishment of an alternative government on Iraqi soil. But like the coup possibility, it could also simply fragment Iraq into opposing camps; it does not guarantee that Saddam would be removed from Baghdad, and it might encourage Saddam to strike back viciously at his own people.

A "Bay of Goats"?
Most of these approaches involving Iraqi opposition forces have been notoriously dismissed by former US Central Command Commander-in-Chief General Anthony C. Zinni (now the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiator) as risking a "Bay of Goats", a Middle Eastern version of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba. That may be unfair, but Zinni — who admittedly has a somewhat open disdain for the Iraqi opposition which he has expressed vividly on several occasions — is no neophyte when it comes to Middle Eastern military affairs. The Bay of Pigs was a political disaster for John F. Kennedy, and as noted, the Vietnam experience appears to be prominent in Secretary of State Colin Powell's approach to military affairs.

None of these approaches just discussed guarantees success. (Of course, success is never guaranteed in warfare of any scale.) Does that mean that the likely alternative is full-scale invasion. As noted, it has its advocates. The constraints on such an invasion are, however, many. It would not be a quick-and-easy victory like Afghanistan (though that war goes on); and while many Americans now remember the brief ground war of Desert Storm, they may forget the long buildup which preceded it, almost six months of preparation. The costs would be high in terms of money: Desert Storm was in part paid for with Saudi and Kuwaiti contributions, but that is unlikely to be available this time. The military forces the US had in Desert Storm are no longer available in such strength. The "smart weapons" which performed so well in Afghanistan (and particularly the new technologies which turn dumb weapons into smart ones) need to be replenished.

And, as noted above, Saddam is unlikely to sit still for six months as he did in 1990-91; the Kurdish autonomous region, in particular, would be a probable target for his wrath. Another round of Scud attacks on Saudi Arabia or Israel would be possible (depending on how many missiles he may have hidden), and in any event, he is not likely to simply stand by and do nothing during months of preparation. If nothing else, Iraqi propaganda would seek to inflame the Arab street and undermine whatever countries might be cooperating.

And all this assumes a 1991-style freedom of action, based in Saudi Arabia. If Saudi Arabia is not available, a whole other set of constraints would be added. An attack based only on Turkey and Kuwait, or those two plus Jordan, would limit options considerably; it would not be impossible, but it would be costly. Kuwait offers too narrow a front for attack; the Turkish border and Kurdish region is too mountainous and difficult to make for maximum use of US mobility and armor, which work better in the deserts of the south. Jordan would risk serious destabilization if it sought to provide a base at a time when the Palestinian intifada is still being hammered by the Israelis. And Turkey is by no means enthusiastic either, though it might have a bit less to lose than other likely basing states.

The second part of this Dossier, in the next issue, will look at the broad range of diplomatic and military constraints which would have to be dealt with for such a campaign.

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