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Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad has become a lightning rod for those campaigning for a hard line against Iran’s nuclear program: with his statements about Israel, the Holocaust, and the coming of the 12th Imam, he has provided Iran’s critics with an almost perfect foil: a figure who can be portrayed as both something of a madman and also a figure preoccupied with messianic end-times expectations combined with a desire for nuclear weapons, not generally a reassuring combination.
Like most polemics, this one is a mix of fact and exaggerated stereotype, and most importantly perhaps, it overlooks the fact that Ahmadinejad is rather marginalized even within the Iranian clerical establishment. But he is aligned with the extreme views of Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, patron of the Haqqani (or Haghani) school, and of the now-banned Hojjatiyya movement. The ideas of this movement not only reject pluralism — there is both a strong anti-Sunni streak and an open hostility to Baha’ism — but also take an extreme hard line on many social issues, and seek to speed the coming of the 12th Imam, who in Shi‘ite belief will return to lead the triumph of Islam throughout the world. One of the most controversial of their beliefs is that creating instability and crisis may help to bring about the chaos which in turn will speed the coming of the 12th Imam. At a time when many Iranian clerics had argued that nuclear weapons are against Islamic teaching and therefore Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful, a follower of Mesbah-Yazdi, Mohsen Ghorurian, was reported in early 2006 as saying that nuclear weapons were religiously permitted.
Mesbah-Yazdi is also believed to be seeking to run his own followers for the Council of Experts, due for election this year; the primary function of the Council (which should not be confused with the separate Council of Guardians) is to elect the Rahbar or religious leader. There have been reports that Ayatollah ‘Ali Khamene’i, the present Rahbar, is suffering from cancer; if so, the composition of the Council of Experts could be crucial in determining the direction of the Islamic Republic in the next few years.
The existing clerical establishment seems uncomfortable with Ahmadinejad, and it is clear that he is being excluded from at least some decision-making; despite his readiness to comment on the nuclear program, it is fairly clear that that program is under the direction of the more establishment-oriented Secretary of the National Security Council, ‘Ali Larijani. But understanding the ideological allies of Ahmadinejad could prove important in the internal ideological struggles likely to face Iran in the near future.
Like Christianity and Judaism, Islam has a messianic tradition relating to the end times of the world; and like the other two great monotheistic religions, some sectarian traditions place a far greater emphasis on the end-times traditions than others. In Islam there are groups of traditions relating to the coming of both a Mahdi (“Guided One”), who will be a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, and also traditions of a return of the Prophet Jesus, and of a final battle with an evil figure known as al-Dajjal, comparable to the Antichrist figure in Christian apocalyptic. In Sunni Islam the traditions of the Mahdi are not universally held and some of the traditions are considered of uncertain authority. In the mainstream version of Shi‘ite Islam, however, the expectation of the Mahdi is rather different, because it has become part of the tradition of the “Hidden Imam,” who once lived in the world and now watches over it obscured from view, but will return to lead the ultimate triumph of Islam.
There are other branches of Shi‘ism, some of which (like some varieties of Isma‘ilism) continue to have a living Imam (as with the Agha Khan). But the largest branch of Shi‘ite Islam is the “Twelver” or Ithna‘ashariyya (“Twelver” in Arabic) variety, also sometimes called the Ja‘fari (technically its legal school). This is the official religion of Iran and the religion of majorities in Iraq and Bahrain, and of significant minorities in Lebanon, Pakistan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Central Asia and a few other places.
All Shi‘ites believe that the Prophet Muhammad intended, and during his lifetime identified, his son-in-law ‘Ali as his legitimate successor, and through him the Prophet’s only grandsons, Hasan and Hussein as Imams or leaders of the community. Sunni Muslims deny that Muhammad chose ‘Ali as his successor, and instead believe that the umma, the Muslim community, elected the successors (khulafa’, whence the English “caliphs”), of whom ‘Ali is recognized as the fourth and last of the “rightly-guided” Caliphs.
For most Shi‘ites, the Imams are not mere successors as head of the political community, but also have a role in teaching and guiding the community on religious issues. Some Shi‘ite groups, such as the Zaydis of Yemen, came to believe that any descendant of ‘Ali could be Imam, and that there could be different Imams in different countries, but most branches of Shi‘ism believed in one line of descent that had the power of the rightful Imamate. Isma‘ilism split with the main line at the seventh Imam, and took on a far more esoteric, almost gnostic element. The main line of descent of the Imams recognized twelve Imams in succession from Muhammad, ending with the twelfth Imam, who disappeared from the world while still a youth.
The Twelfth Imam
The eleventh Imam of “Twelver” Shi‘ism, Hasan ibn ‘Ali al-‘Askari, was born in about 845 AD to the tenth Imam, and died in about 872 AD, allegedly through poisoning, only a few years after his father’s death in 868 AD. The tenth and eleventh Imams are buried at the ‘Askariyya shrine in Samarra, the bombing of which provoked extensive retaliation in Iraq recently.
Shi‘ites believe that Hasan ibn ‘Ali had a son, though the Eleventh Imam was still in his teens when he died. Many Sunnis have doubted the existence of a Twelfth Imam, bearing the Prophet’s name, Muhammad, born in Samarra in about 868 AD. He was protected by the Shi‘ite community and hidden from the view of the Caliphs of the time. When his father died in 872, the Twelfth Imam went into what is usually translated as “occultation,” literally in Arabic ghayba, absence. The Shi‘ite concept of ghayba is a somewhat complex one. The Twelfth Imam did not die. For 70 years (70 lunar years equating to 872-939 AD) the Imam was in communication with chosen deputies. This period is called al-Ghayba al-Sughra,the Lesser Absence. Since 939 AD and the death of the last of the deputies, Shi‘ites have endured al-Ghayba al-Kubra, the Greater Absence, in which the Imam has not been in communication with the believers.
The Twelfth Imam is traditionally called Imam al-‘Asr, the Imam of the Age, and Sahib al-Zaman, the Lord of Time. He is not dead, though he is absent from our world; he will reveal himself again at the suitable time for the battles of the last days and the ultimate triumph of Islam. The return of the Hidden Imam is equated with the concept of the Mahdi extant in the traditions, and he is often called Imam Mahdi. (For Sunnis, or at least those who accept the idea of a Mahdi, the Mahdi will be a new individual, not a returning figure.)
As with most metaphysical beliefs, it is difficult for a non-Shi‘ite to evaluate the historical reality (if any) of the Twelfth Imam. Sunnis have often denied that he even existed: the 11th Imam died without issue in his late teens. Shi‘ite works collect traditions, sourced like the hadith of the Prophet, of those who claim to have seen and spoken with the Twelfth Imam during his earthly life. Critics have noted that there seems to be a tradition of twelve successors to the Prophet, perhaps derived from the 12 months in the year or other prominent occurrences of the number (tribes of Israel, etc.), and that a 12th Imam may have been considered essential for numerological reasons, rather than preaching the return of the 11th Imam. Shi‘ites, of course, reject such speculation.
Although there have been occasional movements in Shi‘ite history in which anticipation of the return of Imam Mahdi was high, there have actually been relatively few claims that the Mahdi has returned; famous alleged Mahdis in Muslim history (such as the Mahdist movement in 19th century Sudan) have generally been Sunni, or have been from other branches of Shi‘ism, particularly among various branches of the Isma‘ilis.
Although Shi‘ites as a whole believe, or are supposed to believe, in the return of the Hidden Imam, throughout most of Shi‘ite history it has been, for the most part, one of those beliefs that probably did not have a great deal of influence on day-to-day life. Just as not every Christian expects the end times to begin imminently (though some, of course, quite vocally do) and not all Orthodox Jews expect the Messiah any day (though again, there have been exceptions), so too the Hidden Imam has come to be seen as a figure guiding the world but not in it. (There are some folkloric traditions that suggest the Imam does visit the world, such as a tradition that every Shi‘ite meets the Imam once in his life, but does not recognize him.)
But just as messianic movements appear from time to time in other monotheistic faiths, expectation of the Imam does become central to some Shi‘ites. In the case of the movement being described here, this expectation has often been linked with polemics against Sunni Islam or against others, in particular the Baha’i, the new religion which originated in 19th century Iran and which was seen by Shi‘ite Muslims as apostasy and therefore to be destroyed.
The Hojjatiyya Mahdaviyya Society was founded in 1953 by a cleric from Mashhad, and was initially founded as a specifically anti-Baha’i organization. It was supported by the Shah for a time, but later was associated with the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Many supporters of the Hojatiyya were also associated with the Madrasa Haqqani, founded by a number of early supporters of the revolution, and also known for its hard-line approaches.
The Hojjatiyya Society, however, was not completely in agreement with the ideology of Ruhollah Khomeini, since it held that true Islamic Government must await the coming of the Twelfth Imam, and some of its supporters actually argued that oppression should be endured because it would lead to the chaos and disorder which would hasten the coming of the Imam. The society was secret, and therefore it is still difficult to ascertain which leaders of the early years of the Revolution were actual members or merely sympathizers, but it is clear that many were indeed linked to the society. Khomeini, however, found its emphasis on Islamic Government being dependent on the return of the Imam as undermining his own principle of velayat-i faqih, and soured on the society. (Some extreme elements even suggested that Khomeini himself might be the returning Imam, something Khomeini never claimed or seems to have entertained.)
In 1983 Imam Khomeini, frustrated by the power and secrecy of the Hojjatiyya, made a speech in which he warned that waiting for the Twelfth Imam worked against the Revolution and said that “If you believe in your country get rid of your factionalism ... otherwise we will destroy you.” The Hojjatiyya society announced its dissolution. But many of its attitudes were still present among some in the clerical establishment, particularly those associated with the Madrasa Haqqani and with Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, who is profiled below. He is generally considered to have been a major figure in the Hojjatiyya; certainly he shares many of their attitudes, including radical opposition to the Baha’i and a conviction that the coming of the Hidden Imam can be hastened by actions in society.
Followers of Mesbah-Yazdi and the Madrasa Haqqani have included several Ministers of Intelligence and Police, key figures in the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps and the Basij or mobilization forces, and others associated with opposition to the reform movement in Iran and with support for Mahmud Ahmadinejad. Ahmadinejad is considered to be a sympathizer, if not a formal follower, of Mesbah-Yazdi and the Haqqani School, and perhaps of the dissolved Hojjatiyya Society.
Some conservatives in Iran claim that the Hojjatiyya Society was indeed dissolved and that focusing on it and its sympathizers is an attempt to create a bête noire to rally the reformists against, rather as other movements have demonized Freemasons, Jews, or other groups in other cultures. But Mesbah-Yazdi is not an imaginary figure; he is someone who has been widely denounced within the clerical establishment itself but who is a member of the Council of Experts, which elects the religious leader, and a figure who has written and lectured widely on his views.
Though the links between Ahmadinejad and Mesbah-Yazdi are unclear, when Ahmadinejad addressed the United Nations last fall he spoke of the coming of the Imam in his speech (and later was quoted as saying that he felt a halo about him during the speech), leading to concerns in the West about the man’s view of reality. Clearly, though, the preoccupation with the imminent arrival of the Hidden Imam is not unique to Ahmadinejad.
It must be emphasized that there have been growing criticisms of both Mesbah-Yazdi and Ahmadinejad even within the Iranian establishment. Not everyone is pleased with the idea of provoking a confrontation with the West over the nuclear program; others are certainly concerned about the degree to which Ahmadinejad’s comments on Israel and the Holocaust have isolated Iran after years of efforts to rebuild bridges with the outside world. One of the elements that most disturbs not only foreign critics but some Iranians is the focus of Mesbah-Yazdi, the Haqqani group, and perhaps Ahmadinejad on provoking disorder and chaos in order to bring about the crisis which will lead to the return of the Hidden Imam. The idea of provoking an apocalypse to bring about the return of the Imam does not sit well with leadership of a potentially nuclear-armed state. But Ahmadinejad is not the commander in chief of the Iranian military nor does he control the nuclear program; the President has relatively limited powers, as President Muhammad Khatami often complained. But Mesbah-Yazdi’s hopes of electing supporters to the Council of Experts, which will choose the next religious leader when Khamene’i passes from the scene, is another matter altogether.
Profile: Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi
Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi was born in the city of Yazd in the Iranian Year 1313, or 1934 by Western reckoning. He studied in the holy city of Najaf in Iraq, where he studied for a year before he traveled to Qom to continue his studies. Between 1952 and 1960 he studied under Ruhollah Khomeini, along with other prominent figures such as Ayatollah Bahjat and ‘Allama Muhammad Hussein Taba’taba’i.
Mesbah-Yazdi was closely involved with the clerical movement within Iran behind the Islamic Revolution of 1979. He was allied with Muhammad Beheshti, Ahmad Jannati, and ‘Ali Quddusi as leaders of the Madrasa Haqqani in Qom.
Despite his hard-line and traditionalist beliefs, Mesbah-Yazdi has long insisted that his students, if possible, study in the West in order to better understand Western societies. Among his followers and students through the years have been Ministers of Intelligence ‘Ali Fallahian and ‘Ali Younesi, a number of key officers of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps and the Basij, and other figures associated with opposition to the reformist movement in Iran. Following the 1997 victory of Muhammad Khatami as President, many from Mesbah-Yazdi’s school became the most prominent critics of the reformers, further polarizing debate.
Mesbah-Yazdi was eleced in 1990 to the Council of Experts which elects the Rahbar, initially from Khuzistan, but was reelected as a member from Tehran. He is reportedly seeking to run an entire slate of followers for the next Council of Experts election. He serves on a number of Foundations and directs the Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute in Qom; he has written widely on a wide range of Islamic subjects. He has tended to be opposed to the democratic elements in the Islamic Republic and to have urged a purer “Islamic Government” with even more clerical dominance. |
