Has Sharon Saved Saddam?
Israeli Offensive has Disrupted US Efforts to Forge Coalition on Iraq

Although Israel has been one of the few countries enthusiastic about US efforts to confront Iraq, ironically its incursion into West Bank cities and siege of Yasir ‘Arafat has outraged the Arab world and made it virtually impossible for already reluctant Arab regimes to sign on for a coalition against Iraq. Ariel Sharon may have saved Saddam Hussein, at least for the time being.

British Prime Minister Tony Blair's trip to Texas this weekend was originally billed as a visit in which he would bring a dossier on Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction program; now the British are saying that he will have more general discussions of Iraq, as well as express European concerns about Israel and Palestine. In other words, even the US' staunchest ally is not as solidly behind a move against Iraq as it was before Ramallah, Bethlehem and Nablus.

Though President George W. Bush's "enough is enough" call on April 4 and the dispatch of Colin Powell to the region may help, the US Administration was slow to realize the degree to which the Israeli-Palestinian crisis and its rapid deterioration would threaten other interests in the region, Arab countries and Europe seem to have been more alert to the dangers. It has always been true that the Israeli-Palestinian situation is a sort of black hole which draws everything else into it; one may lament that fact, but it is indeed a fact. It has also long been true that the US needs to be engaged actively; a sense of "benign neglect" or of waiting until the parties are able to make headway between themselves has a tendency to fail. This may not be as it should be, but it is as it has long been. Even so dramatic a gesture as Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977 did not lead directly to the Camp David Accords; it took a year's worth of US engagement to bring that about.

Although the US has been slow to acknowledge the fact, action against Iraq is simply going to have to be deferred until a few regional partners (other than Israel) can be found. And that is unlikely unless the rapidly deteriorating situation is reversed, and quickly. The Dossier in this issue argues that Israel's military operations are making some of the same mistakes the US made in Vietnam and the French in Algeria; military victory (as opposed to simply fighting constantly to maintain the status quo) will be elusive. Only a political solution will resolve the conflict in the long run.

And there are other dangers: the very real possibility of destabilizing moderate Arab states as their populations grow increasingly outraged by events in the West Bank, and the consequent dangers of a more general war, perhaps one created, as the 1967 war was, by bluff and blundering into a corner from which one cannot extricate oneself.

It may well be that Yasir ‘Arafat and Ariel Sharon are, as The Estimate has suggested previously, the wrong men for this moment in history to be leading their respective populations. But each has been chosen according to the mechanisms established by his community.

Many Israelis now say that ‘Arafat cannot be a negotiating partner. It may well be that he is incapable of making the hard compromises that peace will require. But one issue Israel has long had a problem understanding is that one does not negotiate peace with one's friends: one negotiates it with one's enemies. If not ‘Arafat, then with whom will it negotiate? And if with no one, how does it hope to end the violence? Permanent reoccupation? Few in Israel relish the sustained casualties that would entail. Population transfer would outrage the world. "Separation" and various types of wall-building discussed by many Israelis would leave the settlements outside the "wall". It is hard to see a military solution, however remote a political one may seem at this time. Besides, though ‘Arafat is a weak reed and a man whose instincts run more to revolution than evolution, he is not only the only leader most Palestinians will acknowledge, but a figure who would in fact be made stronger if he became a martyr to the cause. For all the weaknesses of ‘Arafat the living, Israel would have a much more difficult time dealing with ‘Arafat the martyr.

What is clear is that simply letting matters take their course is not going to work either. The very real danger of escalation into something broader can no longer be dismissed. It is true that Egypt and Jordan have much invested in their peace treaties and their alliances with the United States; but as Egypt's suspension of government-to-government contacts (as opposed to diplomatic relations) with Israel reminds us, these regimes are not immune to the building domestic pressures to do something. Neither they nor Syria can hope to challenge Israel militarily, but wars do not always come about because they are feasible, and earlier Arab-Israeli wars have been accidents caused by miscalculation or bluff. Allowing things to drift, allowing Israel a green light, have brought us to the present impasse; things can indeed get worse, and unless third parties (ideally the US, since Europe is not trusted by Israel) do something soon, they will indeed get worse.

The problem right now is not defining final status solutions, since it is essential first of all to manage the present crisis. But the Palestinians are not interested in talks that offer no political prospects, so the political solution must be pursued alongside the one of ending the violence.

These are difficult, trying times. To many in Washington, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict seems insoluble at this time, and Iraq a tempting target for the war on terror; therefore, the "on to Baghdad" calls have not disappeared. But the Arab world is not merely generating propaganda this time: the dismantling of the Palestinian Authority's infrastructure and the reoccupation (though temporary) of Palestinian cities has outraged the populations and deeply shaken the regimes. The Arab League's adoption of the Saudi peace plan has been met not by new hope but by new despair.

It is at least arguable that anti-American sentiment in the "Arab street" is greater than at any time in recent years, perhaps than at any time since 1967, when most Arab states broke diplomatic relations and Nasserism was at its height. Yet there was much sympathy for America seven months ago after the attacks on New York and Washington; the difference is that the US is perceived not only as Israel's protector, but as having tactily accepted Sharon's offensive.

These are trying times. Peace will not come overnight, or perhaps soon. But even an elusive peace is better than an explosive war at this time, and war is what appears to exist on the ground. Each side blames the other; each side has some truth in its case. The problem is not to assess blame. It is to stop the war, for it is a war, and wars have a tendency to spread. That is in no one's interest: not Israel's, or Palestine's (though some may imagine otherwise), or the US'.

Home

Current Issue

About Us

Back Issues

Resources

Subscribe