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Iraq: Recognizing the Military Problems of a Campaign It is, of course, well-known that the only source of war is politics—the intercourse of governments and peoples; but it is apt to be assumed that war supsends that intercourse and replaces it by a wholly different condition, ruled by no law but its own. We maintain, on the contrary, that war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means. We deliberately use the phrase "with the addition of other means" because we also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different . . . If that is so, then war cannot be divorced from political life; and whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, the many links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense. —Karl von Clausewitz, On War (Vom
Kriege) That is the classic definition of Clausewitz' dictum, so often misunderstood: war is an instrument of policy, and if one divorces the military considerations from the political, one ignores that key element. In the Dossier in The Estimate for March 22, 2002 ("Thinking About Options in Iraq: Some Key Questions: Part 1"), we examined a number of suggested options for military action against Iraq by the United States. The Israeli operations in the West Bank then intervened, and Part 2 of that Dossier never appeared. In fact, the situation has changed sufficiently in the past six weeks that this Dossier is not the deferred Part 2 of that one, but rather a new look at the major obstacles to a military campaign against Iraq which have been created in large part by the course of events and the rising anger in the Arab world. The political environment has changed, and the policy concerns are different than they were perceived by some as being then. This Dossier is not primarily about the link between policy and military affairs, despite the Clausewitz quote above: it is rather a consideration of the military constraints and considerations which have been created by the political environment. That includes the impact of other policy considerations — in the Arab-Israeli conflict and in bilateral relations with key Arab countries — which seem certain to limit US freedom of military action against Iraq. It is an attempt to present some of the reasons why many in Washington who not so many weeks ago were talking about a summer or fall campaign now are acknowledging that any military action this year is unlikely unless the US is prepared to pay heavily in political terms, while the lack of political support also guarantees a high cost in human, financial and logistical terms as well. As noted in the earlier treatment of Iraqi options in the March 22 Dossier, many suggested approaches to bringing down Saddam Hussein do not seem promising: use of local surrogates, as in Afghanistan, is hampered by the lack of a military force in being and by the divisions within the Iraqi opposition, divisions which have actually grown more acute rather than otherwise in recent weeks. (See Between the Lines.) Covert action has its limitations, and an air war alone is unlikely to work: air attacks without a ground component have only succeeded once, in Kosovo, and Iraq is not Yugoslavia nor is the environment comparable. This has led many US planners to the conclusion that the only certain way to remove Saddam Hussein is through direct US military action: namely, an invasion. As also noted in the March 22 Dossier, the most coherent case for such an invasion made public so far is that published by Kenneth M. Pollack of the Council on Foreign Relations in the April 2002 issue of Foreign Affairs. But Pollack's article — which acknowledged that the Iraqi operation was not truly part of the war on terrorism and might distract from it — was clearly written before Israel's operations in the West Bank. The level of anger at the US in the Arab world is such that Arab cooperation in any operation against Iraq seems increasingly unlikely. And that adds to the constraints in the political realm which will also have military implications. While some enthusiasts have spoken of being able to invade Iraq using somewhere between 70,000 and 90,000 troops, the most commonly heard number is 200,000, and because, since Vietnam, US doctrine has called for overwhelming force rather than gradualism, it seems unlikely that the US would embark on a campaign with anything less than that; political figures might urge a smaller force, but it would be strongly resisted by the Army leadership. A Problem With Allies That is now very much in doubt. Jordan is intensely concerned about the Palestinian situation and its always-precarious position would make it impossible for it to cooperate against Iraq without a major breakthrough on the Israeli-Palestinian issue. As a result, many in Washington have talked about the possibility of carrying out operations from Turkey and Kuwait. Before talking about the problems that entails militarily, it needs to be noted that Kuwaiti cooperation cannot be completely relied upon either: there are strong traditions of Arab nationalism as well as political Islam competing in Kuwait, and while the hatred of Saddam is profound, there would be challenges to supporting US operations against Iraq if the rest of the Arab World opposed them. Kuwait is, after all, very much in the shadow of Saudi Arabia, and it is unlikely to defy the Saudis too much. But Kuwait's contribution would be limited anyway, other than for air bases: to try to launch ground operations from Kuwaiti territory against Iraq gives the Iraqis many advantages because of the narrowness of the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border; the Iraqis, in other words, know precisely where the attack must come, and thus a frontal assault, with far higher human costs than a war of maneuver, would be required. Whether or not Kuwait is involved, the absence of the rest of the Arab World would mean dependence on Turkey, with possible support from Great Britain and Israel. The Turks are by no means enthusiastic. Reliance on Israeli bases for operations against Iraq would, to put it mildly, further infuriate the Arab world. As for the British, their enthusiasm seems to be waning as well. When Prime Minister Tony Blair visited Washington recently, it had originally been expected that he would make public a British dossier on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs. That was not done, and British expressions of concern over the Israeli-Palestinian issue were in the forefront. Blair faces strong criticism in his own Labour Party over the possibility of participating in an attack on Iraq. Britain is still likely to back the US, but if for any reason it did not, access to certain key bases might not be available. The most critical would probably be Diego Garcia, a British territory from which the US has flown bombing missions both in Desert Storm and in Afghanistan. If other bases in the Middle East were to be denied to the US, another possible option — the British sovereign bases on Cyprus — might be used, if the British concurred. Still, a reasonable planner might assume that Britain, Turkey, and perhaps Kuwait, would be willing to cooperate, and that Israel would support the operation in some way, probably not overtly though. Let us look at some of the problems imposed by that limited range of coalition partners. Can the US do it? Yes, because the US is the single superpower and has the most powerful military force at its disposal; but that does not mean that the cost of carrying out operations will not be far greater than in recent wars. The US could have won a military victory in Vietnam, but only by making choices which risked engagement with the Soviet Union or China; it lacked the political will to do so. Whether the US public has the political will to pay the price of a ground war in Iraq is less clear. Neither Desert Storm nor Afghanistan took significant numbers of American lives, and in Desert Storm much of the financial cost was offset by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. A major ground campaign against Iraq would have considerable costs in lives and money, but its political costs in the Arab World might be even greater, and whether the US is willing to pay the costs in political terms is as yet undemonstrated. Clausewitz' linkage returns. Logistical Problems Until quite recently, there was a general assumption that there would be no major constraints on US naval operations in the Gulf. But the breaching of the walls of the US Embassy in Bahrain last month (See the last issue) and calls by some Bahrainis for the withdrawal of the US Fifth Fleet, headquartered in Bahrain, mean that even that cannot be absolutely assumed. An air war without the Saudi air bases would have to be conducted from Turkish bases, from aircraft carriers in the Gulf, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean, and from more distant bases such as Diego Garcia (if Masira is not available). In most recent uses of air power, the US has relied upon strategic bombers — the B-52s, B-1s and B-2s — of which the B-2s operate directly from the US but the others normally require bases nearer to the theater, though they can operate from the US with inflight refueling. Because carrier-based aircraft cannot carry the kind of bomb loads that the strategic bombers carry, reliance on carrier-based bombing raids would mean a much higher sortie rate, and a higher sortie rate means quicker depletion of equipment, greater likelihood of loss of aircraft and, even more difficult to replace, pilots, and other disadvantages. Furthermore, while carrier-based aircraft raids may be effective against specific targets, the limited bomb loads make them less effective against troop formations. When the US was attacking Taliban formations in Afghanistan, it relied mostly on B-52s. Assuming the British and the Turks are on board, the US could conduct air operations from the Turkish air bases and from Diego Garcia, supplemented by strike aircraft from carriers. But the loss of bases in Egypt and Saudi Arabia would make operations more costly, more difficult, and possibly more dangerous to US fliers. But the problems of air power are overshadowed by the problems of inserting and supporting major ground operations though Turkey alone or Turkey and Kuwait. As already noted, operating from Kuwait, without Saudi Arabia as well, would force US troops into a narrow front, allowing Iraq to concentrate its forces against them. Operating from two distant platforms such as Turkey and Kuwait, without anything in between, also gives the Iraqis the advantage of interior lines, while taking away any real opportunities for envelopment. The great western sweep by the US VII Corps in 1991 would have been impossible without Saudi Arabia, of course (and would today be impossible because VII Corps is no longer available). Turkey provides a different set of challenges. Eastern Anatolia is mountainous, as is northern Iraq. The Turkish Army, in its various incursions into northern Iraq to pursue the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) fighters, has encountered considerable difficulties in finding its prey. It is true that northern Iraq is anti-Saddam and is under the US protective umbrella, and therefore access to northern Iraq is presumably available — one would at the moment not have to fight one's way in — but the logistical tail of an army operating through northern Iraq would be long, run through mountainous regions, and be vulnerable to pro-Saddam guerrillas who might also operate in the mountains, But this assumes that Saddam would not attack the Kurdish zone if a US buildup were under way in Turkey. The greatest mistake the Iraqis made in 1990-91 was to sit in Kuwait and watch the US buildup from August to January. Presumably that lesson has been learned. If a major US buildup were under way in Turkey — not something that can be kept very secret, given the need for reserve callups and other such moves in the US — Saddam might very well move against the Kurdish region, and then one would have to fight one's way in. There has been some talk, as well, of seizing the Iraqi oilfields early on, possibly with the use of a US airborne division, and thus consolidating a hold on northern Iraq and depriving Iraq of its main source of income. This could be done, but it apparently would involve the largest airborne operation by US forces since World War II. Once again, the US has the military power to do it, but whether the cost is worth it is another matter. Operating through Turkey alone also means Iraq would have to fight on only one front; and as noted, even if Kuwait were also used, Iraq would still enjoy interior lines, while the US would lack any real opportunities for envelopment. Would the US win? Yes. Would it pay a higher price than in Desert Storm or Afghanistan? Almost certainly. The US public may or may not understand that price. The Principles of War Mass, the application of overwhelming combat power at a decisive place and time, is the key to capitalizing on the superior power of US forces. The long logistical lines and difficult operational terrain from Turkey (especially if Saddam reoccupies Kurdistan before combat begins) would certainly reduce the US' overwhelming superiority in applying its power decisively. Operating from Turkey and Kuwait, two widely separated platforms for launching operations, would undermine economy of force. But where the US would really pay a price is in maneuver. In Desert Storm, the great flanking movement by VII Corps took advantage of the high mobility of US forces and their ability to project force through fast-moving armor and infantry (carried into battle through fast-moving armored personnel carriers), along with the use of airborne and other elements to achieve rapid movement. The best country for armored operations like that is desert: the worst, mountains. Operations from Turkey rather than Saudi Arabia would limit the mobility of US forces, the speed of its armor, and thus the advantage provided by its superiority in maneuver. It would still win: but it would be playing with a handicap. Security and Surprise are related. The virtual necessity of a long buildup means that while tactical surprise is still possible, strategic surprise is virtually impossible: the Iraqis will know the US is coming, and what country or countries it is coming from. A coalition ranged all around Iraq would keep some mystery about where the blow would fall; operating from only one or two countries makes that less likely. Security worked well in Desert Storm: Iraq was expecting an amphibious landing in Kuwait and missed the signs of the great western flanking motion. With fewer options, surprise and security are more difficult. In short, the US can fight Iraq, alone if need be, and probably win on the battlefield. But Clausewitz' link between operations and policy should not be forgotten, and an understanding of the real political as well as human costs should be the priority of anyone designing a war plan. |
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