Competing to Lead Iraq’s Shi‘a: A Guide, Part 1

[The people of Iraq are to be envied because] in their midst are the tomb-sanctuaries of the Commander of the Faithful [Imam ‘Ali] . . . and of Hussein, Lord of the Martyrs . . . and because, among other things, Shi‘ism is Iraqi.
— 10th Century Persian scholar Abu Bakr al-Khwarizmi

The enormous crowds which greeted Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim on his return to Iraq after 23 years of exile in Iran was the latest in a series of demonstrations of the power of the Sh ‘ite communities of southern Iraq, inveterate opponents of Saddam Hussein but also increasingly the biggest challenge to US hopes of running a successful occupation that will create a secularist, democratic federal state in Iraq.

As The Estimate has noted in several recent issues, not only Westerners but often many Sunni Arabs display a surprising lack of understanding of Arab Shi‘ites. (See the Dossier, “Did the US Misjudge Iraqis’ Will to Fight? Why Didn’t the Shi‘a Rise?”, in The Estimate for April 4, 2003, and “The Shi ‘ite Conundrum” in the issue of May 2, 2003.) Part of this is due to a widespread misconception that Shi‘ism is somehow equated with Iran, the only country where Shi‘ism is officially established. This overlooks the fact that it has only been established in Iran since the 1500s, and that it is the majority faith of Iraq, Bahrain and probably Azerbaijan, is the largest Muslim community in Lebanon, and is highly influential in eastern Saudi Arabia, parts of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan. Still, this is not merely a Western stereotype: it is often shared by Arabs who belong to the majority Sunni tradition, and by Iranians who tend to see Arab Shi‘ites as believers who come to Iran to learn their faith. In recent decades, when the Ba‘ath regime of Saddam Hussein has oppressed and undermined the great Shi‘ite religious centers at Najaf and Karbala’ in Iraq, Iran has indeed had to train clerics for the entire Shi‘i world, but its relatively young seminary complexes in Qom were originally staffed and strengthened by clerics who came from Najaf and Karbala’.

This Dossier attempts to introduce the competing factions within Iraqi Shi‘ism, after some background; this issue contains much of the background, and the factions will be examined more closely next time. Several key figurers are described in the Profiles in this issue. (See also the Profile of Grand Ayatollah ‘Ali al-Sistani in the May 2 issue of The Estimate.)

If the 10th century Persian scholar quoted above could say with envy that “Shi‘ism is Iraqi”, it is also true that Iraq is largely Shi‘i: they are the largest group in Iraq: perhaps 60% of the population, compared to 35% to 38% Sunni (though divided between Arab and Kurdish Sunnis) and a few percentage points for the various Christian and non-Muslim syncretist sects like the Yazidis, discussed in the last Dossier.

Most of Iraq south of Baghdad is Shi‘ite, but the spiritual and intellectual centers of the community remain the two great complexes of Najaf, where ‘Ali, the first Imam of Shi‘ism (also the fourth Caliph of Orthodox Sunnism), the Prophet’s son-in-law, is buried, and Karbala’, where the Prophet’s grandson and ‘Ali’s younger son, Hussein, the third Imam, is buried. Hussein’s martyrdom is the great event in the Shi‘ite hagiography; it was that martyrdom (in 680 AD) which was celebrated so passionately soon after the US conquest last month.

Iraq is the site of the burial places of the two most promiennt figures in Shi‘ism, ‘Ali and Hussein; in fact, of the 12 Imams of mainstream Shi‘ism, six are buried in Iraq, and only one in Iran.

Ahmad Chalabi, the sometimes controversial head of the Iraqi National Congress (Profile in The Estimate of May 3, 2002) is a Shi‘ite. If his US patrons have their way, he may well play an important role in post-Saddam Iraq. But he will do so because of either his American patronage or his personal qualities, not because of his religion, for he is a secular figure with no link to the traditional Shi‘ite institutions of Iraq. This is the only mention of Chalabi which will appear in this Dossier, which deals with the traditional Shi‘ite movements.

(It should also be acknowledged that your Editor has drawn much inspiration and guidance from the writings of Professor Juan Cole of the University of Michigan, the leading academic authority in the US on contemporary Shi‘ism in the Gulf region. But none of the analysis herein is the responsibility of Professor Cole.)

But before we examine the factions themselves, given the widespread lack of understanding of Shi‘ism in the West, we must spend a few pages on Shi‘ism 101.

Mujtahid and Marja‘
One distinctive feature of Shi ‘ism as practiced in both Iraq and Iran is the tradition of following a particular teacher. This stems from the practice, in the “Usuli” form of Shi‘ism, of following the teachings of a marja‘ al-taqlid, or “source of tradition”, usually shortened simply to marja‘.

(As was noted in the last issue, a number of journalists have said that Iraqi Shi‘ism is Akhbari while Iranian Shi‘ism is Usuli. In fact, both Iraqis and Iranians are Usulis, and it is unclear where this false distinction arose (perhaps from a misguided government briefer), but it has been much repeated. Akhbari Shi‘ism has a few adherents in Bahrain and other Gulf regions, but Iraq is fully part of the marja‘ system, as are most Shi‘ites today.)

Undersanding this system, and its rationale, is critical to understanding both Shi‘ism in its contemporary form and the particular loyalties which lie behind some of the factions in Iraq.

This requires a bit of history. Most readers of The Estimate probably already understand that among the Shi‘a, the leadership of the Islamic community was preserved in the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, whereas among the Sunnis, it was entrusted to caliphs chosen from the Prophet’s tribe but not necessarily from his family. the word shi‘a meant party, and so the Shi‘ites were the partisans of ‘Ali, the Prophet’s son-in-law and kinsman. ‘Ali’s two sons were the Prophet’s only grandsons to have descendants, and thus, though hte Prophet had no sons who had progeny, they are the senior male line. Even in Sunni communities, the sharifs or descendants of ‘Ali’s elder son Hasan, and the sayyids or descendants of ‘Ali’s younger son Hussein, are venerated. The Royal Houses of Jordan and Morocco claim descent from the Prophet (from Hasan in both cases); many leading Shi‘ite clerical families carry the title of Sayyid and wear the black turban of the Prophet’s descendants.

All those divisions of early Islam which followed leaders from the Prophet’s family are technically Shi‘ites. But the term is most usually applied today to the “Twelver” or Ithna‘ashari (“twelver” in Arabic) faith, who believe that there were twelve Imams who led the Muslim community after the Prophet. ‘Ali was the first, Hasan the second, Hussein (martyred in 681 AD) the third, and so through their descendants until the twelfth Imam was hidden from the world in the ninth century, and remains in occultation, as the “Hidden Imam”, to come again at the end of time. (Other branches of Shi‘ism exist, such as the Zaydis of Yemen and the Isma‘ilis, now found mostly in the Indian Ocean region. One branch of the Isma‘ilis continues to recognize living Imams in the world today in the person of the Aga Khans. But “twelver” Shi‘ism as in Iraq and Iran has far more adherents.)

In both Shi‘ism and Sunnism there arose, early on, a question of how to answer religious questions which are not directly addressed in the Qur’an. Generally speaking both groups accepted as well the practice (sunna) of the Prophet, as related in the hadith or sayings describing the Prophet’s practice. For Shi‘ites, so long as one of the twelve Imams was alive, he was also a source of teaching, and after their deaths, the collection of traditions of the Imam’s lives provided a source of emulation.

But both Sunnism and Shi‘ism also had to make room for other means of answering religious questions, and in various degrees they resorted to analogy (qiyas), the consensus of the scholarly community (ijma‘), and the use of individual reasoning (ijtihad, literally, “effort”). The latter created the most controversy, and three of the four legal schools of Sunnism eventually decided that ijtihad had only been valid in the early centuries of Islam. (The school that has always insisted on continuing ijtihad, the Hanbali, is ironically usually seen as the most conservative, including the “Wahhabis” of Saudi Arabia.)

In Shi‘ism, no one ever claimed, as many Sunnis did, that ijtihad was “closed.” It was always a fundamental element in religious jurisprudence (fiqh) and other forms of religious teaching and philosophizing. (Shi‘ism also has both philosophical and mystical elements in its tradition which were more controversial and sometimes excluded in Sunni orthodoxy.)

By modern times, with the Hidden Imam still occluded from the world and the traditions of the Prophet and the Imams not always providing clear guidance on contemporary issues, the role of the senior student of theology and religious law became enhanced. The mujtahid — the scholar qualified not only to practice ijtihad for himself but to teach and issue rulings to others — became a key figure.

Islam does not, strictly speaking, have a “clergy” in the way Christianity has a priesthood: the ‘ulama’ or religious scholars are those educated in theology and religious law, but they have no sacramental or sacerdotal role. They preach and lead prayer, they teach and have teaching authority, but not any special power imposed through ordination. (To use a not entirely exact parallel they are more like modern Jewish rabbis than ancient Jewish high priests.) In Sunni Islam particular preachers are followed for their oratory, but they have no real hierarchical authority.

Shi‘ism, especially after the Safavid dynasty in Iran made it the official religion of that country in the 1500s, did develop something which, though not a priesthood, can fairly be called a clergy. The recognized mujtahids in Shi‘ism had originally been so acclaimed by their followers, but as a system of religious schools (seminaries) gradually evolved, mujtahid became a title awarded to particularly astute and successful students after a period of time.

But a mujtahid, while acknowledged as capable of reaching a religious decision and issuing a ruling as a guidance to others, might disagree with other mujtahids. There therefore evolved the concept of the marja‘ al-taqlid, literally “source of tradition” or “source of emulation”; this was a mujtahid of such high repute and learning that the whole Shi‘ite community, or at least a significant part of it, considered his teachings to be more or less canonical.

The “Usuli” tradition in Shi‘ism essentially amounts to a belief that young religious scholars should follow the teachings, not just of their own teacher, but of a recognized marja‘. The consensus of all the maraji‘ (plural of marja‘) of the era amounts to something close to infallibility in the absence of the Hidden Imam. (“Akhbaris”, only heard of recently when many journalists reported wrongly that Iraqis were Akhbaris, disdained following a specific marja‘ and relied directly on tradition, but they lost out to Usulis overall centuries ago.)

The institution of the marja‘ is important because it has come to play a major role in debates about Shi‘ite leadership generally and its role in politics more specifically.

In Iran, new titles arose to recognize the emerging hierarchy of mujtahids and maraji‘; one, “ayatollah”, has become familiar to everyone since the Iranian revolution. Literally meaning “sign of God”, it is an honorific given to a senior teaching mujtahid; a higher rank, that of ayatollah ‘uzma or “Grand Ayatollah”, is generally restricted to those recognized as being a marja‘. (These titles are also used in Iraq and Lebanon; a lesser rank, Hojatolislam, is also in use, particularly in Iran.) Of course, not everyone in Shi‘ism agrees on who deserves the title: the radical young cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, currently a major challenger to the US in Iraq, only recognizes a single living marja‘ (See the Profiles in this issue.)

Because of this emerging clergy among Shi‘ites, and the tradition that a marja‘ is someone recognized by the consensus of his peers as being such, the great religious schools of Shi‘ism became in effect legitimizing agents for clerics, granting them the titles required to receive the honor of their students.

Historically, the most senior of these institutions was the Hawza or religious complex at Najaf, consisting of the senior schools and teachers associated with the tomb shrine of ‘Ali. Karbala’ was close behind. Qom and Mashhad in Iran were relatively latecomers by comparison, but during the 20th century, and especially under the Ba‘ath, the Iraqi schools came under government pressure.

Needless to say, the role a teaching cleric plays in society, in which not only other clerics but ordinary believers come to venerate him as a special source of authority and wisdom, meant that a powerful and respected mujtahid, especially a marja‘, could wield considerable power even at the expense of the secular state. This contrasts with Sunni Islam, in which, while there may be no official “separation” between mosque and state, there is also no official hierarchy with greater authority than the state. Thus throughout modern Iraqi (and Iranian) history, the Shi‘ite clergy have wielded some political power.

The US is already realizing this. Although it initially was suspicious of any clerical role, fearing an Iranian model, it has learned that in fact among the Shi‘ite communities, the leading clerics have been useful in denouncing looting, ordering their followers to return looted goods, and otherwise providing basic day-to-day leadership where there is a political vacuum. That role will continue under almost any imaginable system of government for postwar Iraq.

The Iranian Revolution changed much for Shi‘ites everywhere. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini espoused a new doctrine he called velayat-e faqih or the rule of the Faqih or legal specialist (another word, in this context, for mujtahid). He felt that a senior religious scholar (and he intended that person to be a marja‘, generally being acknowledged as one himself), should be the supreme guide of the state. This principle remains the constitutional underpinning of the Islamic Republic of Iran, but the Constitution does not explicitly require that the religious leader be a marja‘; when ‘Ali Khamene’i succeeded Khomeini he was not a senior ayatollah or considered to be a marja‘, and there has been a continuing debate in Iran between those who recognize him as a marja‘ and those who do not.

Iran’s Revolution and Iraq’s Shi‘ites
When Khomeini’s revolution succeeded, Iran hoped, and Saddam Hussein feared, that the Shi ‘ites of Iraq might emulate it. There were, indeed, some stirrings in Iraq, Bahrain, and particularly in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, and while the Da‘wa Party in Iraq — to be discussed more thoroughly in Part II — did in fact seek something like an Iranian-style revolution, the Shi‘ite leadership in Iraq never sought the sort of revolution they had seen in Iran, though they did press for greater rights and representation for the Shi‘a. Despite considerable repression then (and more in and after 1991), the Shi‘ite population served as the rank and file of the Army in the war with Iran without significant numbers of desertions, so far as can be determined.

Saddam had, at one time, sought to conciliate the Shi‘a, by making sure that they benefited from the largesse of the 1970s oil boom. But the outbreak of war with Iran in 1980 began to lesson the boom, and Saddam also tightened the political reins out of fear of a Shi‘ite fifth column. But that tightening took the form of restrictions on the clergy and the religious schools of Najaf — where, ironically, Khomeini had spent most of his years of exile from Iran — and thus was resented by the Shi‘ite population generally because of their identification with their clergy.

This is the essential background for understanding the various factions which emerged in Iraq since 1979, the uprising of 1991, and the actions of Iraqi Shi‘a since the war. With the biographies in the last issue and the next two pages, this Dossier and especially Part II in the next issue should help clarify the factions and provide a basic who’s who for the months to come.

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