Competing to Lead Iraq’s Shi‘a: A Guide, Part 2

The complexity of Iraq’s Shi‘ite political movements, combined with continuing evidence the US is rethinking how to approach the political reconstruction of Iraq, makes it increasingly imperative that the various shadings of the Iraqi movements be fully understood. Genuine and perhaps justified concerns about excessive Iranian influence in some Shi‘ite movements does not mean that every clerically-led organization is automatically an Iranian stalking horse: as Part 1 of this Dossier made clear, Iraqi Shi‘a have a great deal of pride in their Iraqi Arab identity, and Najaf seems intent on reclaiming its historic role as the spiritual center of Shi‘ism.

Part 1 of this Dossier, in the last issue, examined the background of Iraqi Shi‘ism, the role of the mujtahids or senior clergy, and the influence of the marja‘ (plural, maraji‘), or source of emulation, and the natural political power that such a figure can exercise. The Profiles columns of the May 2 and May 16 issues of The Estimate also introduced several of the key players.

This second part of a two-part Dossier introduces the political organizations led by these figures and some of the emerging trends. It should be emphasized that a number of Shi‘ite leaders appear to be repositioning themselves for the post-Saddam era, and that therefore it is not easy to describe with absolute confidence the state of play for many of the groups, which are realigning as the patterns of the US occupation become apparent.

The arrival of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 came at a time when Iraqi Shi‘a were already chafing under the Sunni-dominated and militantly secularist Ba‘ath Party. Already in the 1950s Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and other prominent clerics had founded the Al-Da‘wa al-Islamiyya (Islamic Call) movement or party, an outgrowth of the clerical establishment in the holy city of Najaf. In one way or another, Da‘wa is the progenitor of most of the Shi‘ite clerically-led political movements today, though its descendants and present incarnation do not all see eye to eye by any means.

It claimed to be a movement initially formed to fight communism and atheism, though at times these may have been code words for its opposition to secularism generally. It has always claimed that about 10% of its membership, at least originally, were Sunnis, but its close identification with the clergy of Najaf and the Hawza or religious school system there has led it to usually be seen by outsiders as a Shi‘ite force.

Organizationally, the Da‘wa movement dated from 1958 and thus was already in existence prior to the establishment of the Ba‘ath as the ruling party. Sadr was often supported by the Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim, father of Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim (See Profiles in the May 16 issue), who recently made a triumphant return to Najaf. The younger Hakim was an early supporter of the Da‘wa.

This group, and the Association of ‘Ulama’ of Najaf, which contained many of the same leading figures, grew increasingly dissatisfied with the secular governments of ‘Abd al-Karim al-Qasim (1958-1963) and the ‘Arif brothers in the early 1960s, but this opposition particularly crystallized after the Ba‘ath coup of 1968. Repression of the Shi‘ite clergy intensified when Muhsin al-Hakim did not take sides in the dispute with Iran over the Shatt al-‘Arab waterway, refusing to issue a fatwa supporting the Iraqi claims. Muhsin al-Hakim died in 1970. During this same period, Ruhollah al-Khomeini was teaching in Najaf, in exile from the Shah’s Iran, and it was there that he gave the series of lectures on wilayat al-faqih (Farsi velayat-e faqih) which became the basis for the system of clerical rule he instituted in Iran after 1979.

During this period of ferment in Najaf, Mahdi al-Hakim, son of Muhsin and brother of Muhammad Baqir, became the most prominent leader. After torture, he fled to Pakistan and then London. (Years later, in 1988, he was assassinated in Khartoum, Sudan.) In 1974 five of Da‘wa’s political leaders were executed by the regime.

The leadership of the Iraqi Shi‘ite clerics by the late 1970s consisted of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, considered a Grand Ayatollah, Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, son of Muhsin al-Hakim, and Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i, who did not involve himself in active political life. (Khu’i’s son ‘Abd al-Majid was assassinated in the Shrine of ‘Ali in Najaf soon after returning to Iraq after the American invasion.)

(It should also be noted that the Hakims and Khu’is are of Iranian origin though closely associated with Iraq. The Sadrs are of Arab background.) In 1977, a major Shi‘ite uprising was sparked when government forces blocked a pilgrimage from Najaf to Karbala’; this “Safar Uprising” (after the name of the Islamic month) brought about a new government crackdown. Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr was arrested.

Then came the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, who had had close links with Khomeini in Najaf, was placed under house arrest.

Soon after this, Da‘wa members were accused of several attempts against the regime: a bombing of a hospital in Baghdad, a strafing by a dissident pilot of an Air Force reviewing stand, and in 1980 an assassination attempt against Tariq ‘Aziz. In that year Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr was executed, along with his sister, also an activist. Membership in the party was made punishable by death. Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim fled to Iran and remained there until his recent return to Iraq.

The activities of Da‘wa were certainly interpreted by the Iraqi regime as an Iranian-supported attempt to overthrow the Iraqi government, and clearly contributed to the decision to go to war with Iran in September of 1980.

It may be a long time before the full role of Iranian efforts to export their Shi‘ite revolution in the activities of the Da‘wa Party in 1979-80 is fully clear. Certainly the party itself had been founded for Iraqi reasons, though some of its leaders (the Hakims for example) were of Iranian background. Certainly too, Iran in its initial revolutionary fervor was keen on exporting its revolution.

With the war, however, the situation was transformed in several ways. Massive repression drove the Da‘wa underground and forced leading clerical figures such as Ayatollah al-Khu’i to remain quietist and supportive of the government. Meanwhile Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, in Iran, founded, around exiled members of Da‘wa, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).

SCIRI grew out of Da‘wa but did not entirely displace it. Followers of the Sadrs, as opposed to followers of Hakim, did not fully support the concept of wilayat al-faqih as espoused by Khomeini, while SCIRI, based in Iran and supported by Iran, embraced the Khomeini vision for Iraq. Da‘wa elements within Iraq, meanwhile, claimed responsibility for, or were blamed for, attempted assassinations of Saddam Hussein in 1982 and 1987.

During the war with Iran, Saddam to a large extent was able to persuade Iraqi Shi‘a to see the war as an Arab versus Persian battle, rather than Sunni versus Shi‘ite; that was a major accomplishment. It also meant that the more openly Iranian-linked groups, such as SCIRI in Tehran, were branded as fighting against the Iraqi nation and the Arab world.

SCIRI was supposed to be a sort of umbrella organization aimed at rallying Iraqi Shi‘a against the regime, but it became closely identified with the Hakims and with the Iranian government. Other Da‘wa factions continued to exist both in Iraq and abroad. Its London branch and its internal branch in Iraq appear to have evolved somewhat independently from its Iranian branch, which in turn has maintained its independence from SCIRI.

Interestingly, the Iraqi Da‘wa movement has reportedly accepted as its primary spiritual figure Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah of Lebanon. Fadlallah, once close to Hizbullah and once targeted by the United States, has never been comfortable with Iranian domination of Hizbullah and has been a relative moderate in Lebanese Shi‘ite terms in recent years, being one of the first prominent clerics to denounce the September 11 attacks. (Fadlallah, though associated in most Western minds with Lebanon, was born in Najaf and only went to Lebanon in the 1960s.)

While crushing the Da‘wa and forces loyal to SCIRI, the Iraqi regime tried to conciliate other Shi‘a during much of the war with Iran. But after the war over Kuwait and the defeat of Iraq in 1991, the Shi‘ite uprising in the south led to harsh new repression. Not only was the uprising put down severely, with damage to the shrine mosque in Karbala’ itself, but Ayatollah al-Khu’i, who had always been a relatively quietist figure politically, was forced to go on television and support the regime, and then was placed under strict house arrest. When he died under house arrest in 1992, he was widely seen as the latest martyr. His son ‘Abd al-Majid operated a moderate opposition group from London, while Khu’i’s spiritual heir, Grand Ayatollah Sayyid ‘Ali al-Sistani (Profile in The Estimate of May 2, 2003) became the senior marja‘ still surviving in Iraq.

Nor did the story end there. A nephew of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, developed a following within Iraq; he and two of his sons were assassinated on February 18, 1999, almost certainly on orders from the regime. His youngest son, Muqtada, only in his 20s and too young to be considered a marja‘, leads the radical “Sadriyyun” in Najaf, and claims allegiance to Ayatollah Kazim al-Ha’iri, a Sadr follower who still lives in exile in Iran. (Biographies of most of these figures appear in the May 16 issue; Sistani appeared in the May 2 issue.)

These are, in essence, the players. Making sense of the teams is a bit more complex, and there are indications the United States has never quite figured out how to deal with the problem.

Since the Shi‘a represent the majority of Iraqis, and the Sunni Arab population were so closely linked with the years of Ba‘ath rule, US support of a greater role for the Shi‘a seems natural enough. But there were at least two obstacles intruding: the first was the continuing suspicion of Iranian influence among many of the Shi‘ite political movements in Iraq, and the second was the distrust engendered among many Iraqi Shi‘a by the US’ apparent encouragement of, but unwillingness to support, the uprising of 1991. Many Shi‘a felt the US had betrayed them; many Americans were uncertain if the Iraqi Shi‘a were stalking horses for a militant Iran, with which it has been at loggerheads for over 20 years.

In Part One, and in other articles since the war with Iraq, The Estimate has noted that some of the commentary on Iraqi Shi‘ism apparently originating with some of the neoconservative supporters of the war was either outright wrong — as in claiming that Iraqi Shi‘a are Akhbari while Iranian are Usuli Shi‘a, while both are actually Usuli — or misguided, perhaps through assurances from secularized Shi‘ites such as Ahmad Chalabi. There certainly does not seem to have been an appreciation of the influence of the clergy on Shi‘ism in Iraq generally, or of the desire of the shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala’ to once again lead the entire Shi‘ite world.

Early in the US drive north, Ayatollah Sistani reportedly urged his followers not to resist the Americans. This was reported as a fatwa supporting the war, which Sistani quickly said was not his intention. He has subsequently called for a quick end to US occupation. Americans also seemed surprised that they were not welcomed readily in many southern cities, but the legacy of 1991 and the sense of many Shi‘ites that the US might abandon them again seems to have influenced the lukewarm reception.

US relations with the exiled Shi‘ite groups had also been somewhat schizophrenic. SCIRI, despite its Iranian links, had been accepted as a member of the Iraqi National Congress umbrella, and sent delegates to Washington for meetings of exile groups. (Da‘wa itself had earlier flirted with exile links as well, but SCIRI played a more important role.) A provisional governing council voted on in London last December gave SCIRI 15 out of 65 seats.

But the US was never totally comfortable with SCIRI. Though its Iranian-trained Badr Brigade of perhaps as many as 10,000 or more fighting troops was a potential ally, it had been trained by the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps in Iran, which the US sees as a militant wing of the Iranian regime. SCIRI’s role was gradually downplayed as the Iraq war drew nearer, and when elements of the Badr Brigade moved into Iraq, the US issued warnings to Iran to stay away. The US also seems to have been caught somewhat off guard by the emergence of the militant “Sadriyyun”; certainly the assassination of ‘Abd al-Majid al-Khu’i caught them unprepared, as one of the most moderate clerical voices was suddenly removed from the scene.

The fumbling nature of the early weeks of US occupation also created a vacuum which only the Shi‘ite clergy and religious structure was prepared to fill. In the absence of civil courts, religious courts became a replacement. In the absence of the Ba‘ath Party, the one organizational infrastructure with authority at neighborhood and town levels was the mosque. Local clerics issued fatwas against looting and insisting on the return of looted objects, which seems to have done more to stem the tide of initial looting than the US Armed Forces. In many towns, including Najaf, clerical elements simply began running the town. There were some confrontations: when a Sadr ally named Sheikh Muhammad Fartusi was arrested in Baghdad, thousands of supporters turned out to denounce the US, and he was released. There was a confrontation in the town of Baquba between SCIRI, which had occupied the town, and the US. SCIRI also installed a mayor in Kut, and US Marines tried to oppose this, provoking more demonstrations.

The various Shi‘ite factions have continued to demonstrate against continuing US occupation. They have also regularly denounced Chalabi, though he is a Shi‘ite, since he is seen as a secularist with no links to the clerical establishment, and a stalking horse for the United States.

When Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim returned to Iran in mid-April, he was greeted with the biggest demonstrations up to that time. He has continued to turn out the crowds.

So far, the Shi‘ite religious establishment seems to have brought under control initial fears of fighting between the Sadriyyun on the one hand and the supporters of the more mainstream Hawza on the other: all are agreed on the need for an American departure as soon as possible. All are suspicious of US efforts to keep religious influence out of any postwar constitution.

The Hawza, the system of clerical hierarchy, the religious courts, all provide virtually the only neighborhood infrastructure in much of southern Iraq now that the Ba‘ath Party is gone and the Army and security services have dissolved. By default, the clerical establishment has stepped in where the US was unprepared. In fact, the political movements such as SCIRI and Da‘wa and the Sadriyyun have certainly benefitted from their readiness to step in where a vacuum existed.

Clericalism in Shi‘ite society is not new; it is not particularly Iranian in origin; it is genuinely a part of Iraqi Shi‘ite social order. This seems to have caught many in the US by surprise, especially among the neoconservative theorists who tend to dismiss the “Arabists” of academia or the State Department as having no guidance to offer.

What next? The US seems intent on creating a constitution that separates religion from the state, as the only means of keeping Iraq’s various communities from splintering. But to many Shi‘a, that will remind them of the secularist dominance of the past 35 years (45 really), and the repressions they associated with it. On the other hand, there is little evidence that most Iraqi Shi‘a want the Iranian system of clerical dominance. (There is also little evidence that most Iranian Shi‘a do, either, but that may be beside the point.)There is clearly a distinction between following a mujtahid or a marja‘ in matters of religion and law, and declaring him a political ruler. One thing is certain: non-Shi‘ites are unlikely to be able to dictate the exact role the clergy will play, particularly in local, as opposed to national, governance.

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