The Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Arsenals

The confrontation between India and Pakistan, like each of its predecessors since 1998 when the two South Asian powers demonstrated their nuclear weapons capabilities, has sparked new fears of a nuclear exchange. The reasons for this are widely understood: Pakistan, in particular, relies upon its nuclear weaponry as a force multiplier to offset India's massive conventional superiority, and since Pakistan also lacks strategic depth — its major cities are near the Indian border — it also faces a "use it or lose it" decision fairly early in a conventional war. These factors, plus uncertainty on the Pakistani side about questions about who, in a military-dominated government, has authority to release the weapons, adds to a fear that the Pakistanis might use nuclear weapons to defend their territory, provoking an Indian response in kind. Pakistan's decision to carry out missile tests in the midst of the confrontation has also exacerbated the situtation.

There are some other problems which add to the threat. Pakistan in particular is believed to rely on missile delivery more than aircraft delivery, which makes it impossible to recall once launched; it also raises questions about targeting accuracy. And recent publication of an account of how Pakistan apparently deployed its missiles in the 1999 Kargil crisis (See the Last Issue) has further reinforced the sense that nuclear deterrence is now a key element in Pakistani doctrine.

In addition, while in the Cold War the enormous arsenals of the two sides ultimately made nuclear use unthinkable (or almost so, given the close call of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis), use the small nuclear forces of South Asia is not nearly so unthinkable. The small arsenals — most guesses range around 25 weapons for Pakistan, 50 for India, perhaps a bit more on each side — and relatively small yields compared to the multi-megaton warheads of Cold War confrontation, mean that the unthinkable is at least marginally thinkable. An exchange would not destroy human civilization; but it would destroy hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of humans.

Adding to the volatility of the situation is the longstanding, and seemingly intractable, dispute over Kashmir, and the fact that Al-Qa'ida and its allies are seemingly part of the equation (See Story on Page One). Although India and Pakistan are generally peripheral to the regions which are the focus of The Estimate's coverage, the interlinked issues mean that the South Asian confrontation is complicating the war in Afghanistan and overshadowing the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation.

This Dossier examines the nuclear weapons arsenals of India and Pakistan, and what can be learned of them from the tests of 1998, and also at the possible delivery systems and the considerations which may drive use or non-use decisions in the event of a conflict.

When India detonated a nuclear "device" in 1974, which it insisted was not intended as a weapon, it nonetheless gave the spur to Pakistan's nuclear program, and the two countries proceeded to develop their nuclear arsenals while denying they were doing so. It was another 24 years, however, before the two sides brought their bombs out of "the closet" and staged detonations over a 17-day period in May of 1998. That removed any doubts about capability, though the tests themselves, and the actual yield and even number of weapons tested, remain the subject of some controversy. (See box, below.)

At the time, and under requirements imposed by existing legislation, the US imposed certain sanctions on both sides, and expressed its displeasure with the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The fact, however, was that from 1974 onward the development of weapons by Pakistan had been rendered certain by the Indian test of that year, and everything which followed was predictable.

Since both sides also have sophisticated air forces and are developing long-range ballistic missile capabilities, the delivery of nuclear weapons is also obviously a priority.

Although understandably neither side makes public which weapons systems are equipped to deliver nuclear weapons, the fact that both have developed medium-range missiles and are working on longer-range varieties is generally assumed to mean that these missiles are intended for nuclear delivery. Indeed, each side also has aircraft which could potentially be used to deliver weaponry.

In India's case, its aircraft platforms include the Jaguar, MiG-27 and Mirage 2000. India's missile program is considerably sophisticated (and unlike Pakistan, it has a satellite-launch capability as well). The shorter range Prithvi missile, with a range of 150-250 kilometers, is already in service, and a longer-range version is also in development, while India's Agni, with a range of some 700 kilometers, and the Agni II, with perhaps a 2,500 kilometer range, have also been tested.

In the Pakistani case, the medium-range Ghauri has now been tested three times; it appears to be a development of the North Korean Nodong, with future, longer-range versions planned, probably similar to the North Korean Taepo Dong. Its longer ange versions, perhaps up to 2,500 kilometers in range, are intended to counter the Indian Agni II. Earlier, shorter range missiles in the Shaheen series seemed to be elaborations on the Chinese M series of missiles, and the recently tested Ghaznavi and Abdali missiles (See Defense Briefs) are outgrowths of the same series, itself originally based on the Soviet Scud. Pakistan has always insisted that its missiles are indigenously developed, but the evidence of dependence on Chinese and North Korean designs is substantial.

Pakistan could also rely upon aircraft for delivery, but its Air Force is considerably inferior to India's and it would face a greater threat of loss of aircraft with payload. Some of its F-16s, dating back to the 1980s, may have been equipped to carry nuclear weapons, but it is generally believed that the Pakistani nuclear deterrent is extensively missile-based.

Both India and Pakistan normally do not, so far as is known, keep nuclear warheads assembled n their missiles. Evidence that Pakistan was deploying its warheads in 1999 has led to concern that this might happen again. Another inherent danger in dependence on missiles is the fact that given missile speeds and the short distances involved, combined with the fact that there is no simple way to tell if a missile is equipped with a nuclear or a conventional warhead, means that the launch of any missile by either side might be interpreted by the other as a nuclear strike, and met with a retaliatory response.

There is also some evidence that both sides may have developed, or at least experimented with, tactical nuclear weapons for battlefield use. Some of the statements made by Pakistani officials at the time of the 1998 tests indicated that the largest explosion was a warhead test but that the smaller ones were intended to test battlefield weapons.

Inherent Dangers
Some observers naturally wonder why there is so much nervousness about the Indian and Pakistani nuclear arsenals, when in fact the world survived a Cold War in which the two superpowers were armed with far larger arsenals.

There are a number of reasons for concern. During the 1962 Cuban missile crisis the two superpowers did come perilous close to a nuclear confrontation, but backed away. One element deterring a resort to nuclear weapons was the recognition that each side had such overwhelming arsenals that a nuclear exchange could lead to the end of civilization. The Indian and Pakistani arsenals are not capable of such devastation, though they could take millions of lives.

Although there is a considereable variation among estimates, most Western observers seem to assume Pakistan has around 25-50 warheads, while India has perhaps 60 or more (though one estimate goes as high as 150), and that each has enough fissile material to build as many again as already exist in their arsenals. While a formidable number, it is not at all comparable to the thousands of warheads of the US and Russian arsenals or even to the arsenals of China, France, Britain and Israel (the latter being widely assumed to have around 200 weapons).

Such smaller nuclear forces, while they would wreak devastation if used against cities of major concentrations of men, would nonetheless not be as apocalyptic in their results as an exchange at the superpower level. Small nuclear forces, in other words, have the potential danger of rendering the unthinkable thinkable again.

The Indian and Pakistani weapons also may have much smaller yields than those of the superpower arsenals, at least based on the size of the tests of 1998 (See Page Six).

There are other ground for concern. Pakistan has little strategic depth. Its major cities are in some cases only a few miles from the Indian border. Its capital of Islamabad and its companion city of Rawalpindi, as well as Lahore and Karachi, the country's major cities, are all close to India or, in the case of Lahore, to disputed Kashmir. Many of Pakistan's major air bases are also in the relatively flat country of central Pakistan; the western parts of the country are mountainous. As a result, a full-scale Indian ground invasion of Pakistan would quickly threaten the country's population centers and air bases. Pakistan could find itself in a classic "use it or lose it" decision as regards its nuclear weaponry.

A major Indian invasion of Pakistan is not, of course, what is threatened at the moment. India appears to be preparing for some sort of raid against the Kashmiri training camps from which Kashmiri guerrillas have been infiltrating into Indian-occupied Kashmir. The problem is whether such an Indian strike would be met with a Pakistani counter-blow which might quickly escalate into a full-scale war. In three wars, Indian and Pakistani forces have not made major headway in Kashmir itself; the Line of Control, or Line of Actual Control, remains relatively close to what it was at the end of the 1947 conflict. Kashmir is mountainous country and the terrain largely favors the defender. As a result, the sort of imminent military disaster that might lead to a nuclear exchange is less likely if combat can be confined to Kashmir.

That would probably be India's primary intention, but there are some in the Indian military who would like to win a decisive victory over the Pakistani Army, and a series of misjudgments could easily escalate into a broader war. For one thing, a conflict in Kashmir which showed little sign of resolution but also little sign of progress by either side might tempt each to strike the other along an "easier" front, where an Indian drive into Pakistan proper might gain momentum and thus provoke a Pakistani response, perhaps using nuclear weapons.

There are also questions, still, about the security of the weapons, especially if once deployed. In 1999, the US seems to have believed, at least, that the Pakistani generals ordered possible deployments without informing Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Concern that a rogue general might be able to launch a missile on his own remains, as does concern about the security of the Pakistani arsenal, given the fact that at least some scientists in the Pakistani program are known to have had links to Usama bin Ladin.

Pakistan insists that it has full security over its nuclear arsenal, and when a rumor spread in India that Pakistan was deploying missiles along the border, President Pervez Musharraf was quick to deny that story and to say that Pakistan had no intention of using nuclear weapons.

Still, there are compelling reasons for genuine jitters in the South Asian case. Many of the elements which deterred the US and Soviet Union from resort to nuclear force over a 45 year period simply are not present in the Subcontinent, and the bitterness of the long rivalry and the impasse over Kashmir adds to the dangers.

The day is coming when an Arab state, as well as Israel, will have nuclear weapons, and in time such calculations may have to be made in that arena as well. (If both Koreas, or Taiwan and China, were each nuclear armed, for example.) South Asia may prove to be the testing ground for small nuclear forces in the Third World and whether deterrence can work as well in that environment as it did in the superpower world. In the meantime, the dangers of a war between India and Pakistan are clearly greater than they were when earlier wars were fought between the two antagonists. One may hope that the realities of nuclear possession will act as the best deterrent, and the two sides will step back from the brink, but the jitters are real, and are there for a reason.

How Powerful Were the 1998 Tests?
The Confusion over Yields

Assessing the yield of an underground nuclear test can be difficult, and the scientific formulas used are complex, but one thing is clear: in the case of both India and Pakistan, most outside observers, basing their evidence on seismic data and other indications, have computed yields for the two countries' tests considerably below those announced by the governments themselves. This may not affect the potency of their weapons — nuclear tests are not always conducted at full deployable yield — but it raises questions as to how far public announcements by the two sides can be relied upon in determining their nuclear capacities. Even the number of Pakistani detonations remains debatable.

This has been true from the beginning; the 1974 Indian test "Smiling Buddha" test of a nuclear "device" was initially estimated at 10 to 15 kilotons, and many subsequent reports cited it as 12 kilotons. But Western analysts estimated the test as only four to six kilotons, and even lower estimates have been suggested.

The Indian and Pakistani tests of 1998 have both led to disputes over yield. The three Indian detonations on May 11 of that year (Shakti 1-3) were officially reported as 43-45 kilotons (for a thermonuclear device), 12 kilotons for a fission bomb, and 0.2 kilotons. India reported two more tests on May 13 (Shakti 4-5), citing yields of 0.5 and 0.3 kilotons.

Because the tests of May 11 were detonated simultaneously, overseas analysts could only estimate the combined yield, but it was widely agreed that the thermonuclear device could not have produced the claimed 43 to 45 kilotons. Various estimates place its yield somewhere between 22 kilotons and 30 kilotons. Initially some in the West believed that the weapon might have been a "boosted" device rather than a true thermonuclear device, but the consensus seems to ahve evolved that it was a two-stage thermonuclear device in which the first stage, a boosted primary device, functioned as planned but the second stage did not. The hoped-for 45 kiloton test yield, it is estimated, could indicate a deployable yield for such a weapon of some 200 kilotons, since it was apparently not intended to test full yield.

The second test of the first day, a fission weapon with a purported yield of 12 kilotons, is believed to have been a test of a deliverable fission warhead, and may well have produced the reported yeild. The third test of the first day is believed to have been an experimental test of a boosted device using non-weapons grade plutionium, to test the feasibility of using boosting technology to allow use of plutonium from Indian reactors. Its reported 0.3 kiloton yield may be accurate.

The two tests on May 14 apparently were not detected by international seismic networks, and India subsequently released photographs and radiological data in part in order to prove that the tests had indeed occurred. The claimed yields of 0.5 and 0.3 kilotons are considered high by some, who suspect that they may have had yields of 0.1 kiloton or less.

Pakistan's tests on May 28 and 30, 1998 have created even more confusion, and even some disagreement about how many devices were detonated. The first test was initially described in press reports as involving two devices, but Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced that five devices had been detonated simultaneously, and the man often credited with developing Pakistan's nuclear capability, A. Q. Khan (Profile, Page 9) said that one large weapon of about 30-35 kilotons in yield was involved, along with four smaller devices. Total yield for the combined tests was claimed to be as high as 40 kilotons, but foreign estimates are much lower, from a low of about six kilotons, to a high of perhaps 20 kilotons.

There have long been doubts about the claim that five devices were fired at once. Though it is difficult to detect multiple explosions at the same time seismically, detonating five devices in the same place makes little experimental sense; it uses up hard-to-replace fissile material in a manner that makes it hard to monitor the results of individual tests, and increases the risk that all data from the smaller tests will be lost. One explanation sometimes suggested is that in fact, as originally suggested, two devices were detonated, but the government insisted on announcing five in order to equal the number of tests already detonated by India, which was indeed five.

Pakistan's second nuclear test on May 30 involved a claimed yield of about 18 kilotons. Again there was confusion about the number of devices: the press cited numerous defense officials as saying there had been two devices, while the country's Foreign Minister insisted there had been one. External estimates placed the yield not at the 18 kiloton level but perhaps as low as four to six kilotons.

A.Q. Khan has been quoted as saying that while none of the blasts were thermonuclear, some or all were boosted weapons, and all used Uranium 235. There have been some reports suggesting that Pakistan may have also tested a plutonium weapon among these tests, but this was not confirmed by the Pakistanis.

Although the test yields and total number of weapons detonated in 1998 are still in some doubt, no one doubts that both sides have both the capability and the fissile material to have produced dozens of nuclear weapons each, and to have them in their arsenals.

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