Berber Spring
Renewal of Clashes in Kabylie Poses a New Problem for Bouteflika

The resumption, after a lull, of clashes between Berber demonstrators and Gendarmerie forces in Algeria's Kabylie suggests that the anger of the Berber-speaking region has not waned, suggests that President ‘Abdelaziz Bouteflika faces a more serious problem than he at first calculated. Although apparently still below the violence level of the "Berber Spring" of 1980, the troubles already are threatening to surpass the riots of 1998. (For background on the current troubles, see the Dossier "The Kabylie Erupts" in The Estimate of May 4, 2001.)

Bouteflika's approach has been somewhat uncertain. Last month he promised an investigating commission would look into the killing of an18-year-old on April 18, and other incidents stemming from that one. But the demonstrators have tended to dismiss the commission as a delaying action, and have begun demanding that the Gendarmerie be withdrawn from the Berber region. This new demand has been added onto the earlier cultural/linguistic claims.

That raises problems: the paramilitary police known as the Gendarmerie are the main central government security presence in the region, and if withdrawn, would leave the region vulnerable to the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) or other guerrilla movements. Bouteflika in a May 27 address called for an end to the violence and said that the commission report would be published "so that all judicial and legal measures can be taken against those who ignited the fire of sedition and kindled the ember of division", phraseology suggesting that the commission might blame the demonstrators, not the Gendarmerie, for the outbreak. As he had in April, Bouteflika indicated that the question of Berber language rights would be considered under a possible constitutional revision.

A further complicating factor is that growing discontent is not limited to the Berber region. Most of Algeria's newspapers shut down for a day recently to protest a new press law containing a prohibition on defamation which publishers say would stifle Algeria's relatively (for the Arab world) vigorous press. That has sparked accusations that the military is pressuring Bouteflika to impose a more authoritarian system. And protesting journalists also marched in sympathy with the Berber demonstrations, suggesting a convergence of opposition forces.

The latest round of troubles resembles the earlier ones in April: both in the Greater Kabylie, centered on Tizi-Ouzo, and the Lesser Kabylie, centered on Béjaïa, mass demonstrations protesting the Gendarmerie and demanding greater Berber language rights have been met by tear gas or stronger measures from the Gendarmeries, and degenerated into rioting and burning. Protestors have blocked roads in the mountainous Kabylie, thrown molotov cocktails at shops, burned cars, and otherwise created havoc in response to the police crackdowns; in one case three policemen were reportedly nearly lynched. The response of the Gendarmerie has generally been harsh, fueling more violence. Ten days after half a million people showed up in Tizi-Ouzo for a demonstration, an estimated 100,000 demonstrated in the capital of Algiers on May 31.

The two leading political movements in the Kabylie, Sa‘id Sa‘di's Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) and Hoçine Aït Ahmed's Socialist Forces Front (FFS) have supported the demonstrations but called for nonviolence; neither seems able fully to control events, and village and tribal groupings seem to be in control of the demonstrations by some reports. The RCD has left the broad governing coalition supporting Bouteflika, in protest over the Gendarmerie's response to the protests. (For Profiles of Sa‘di and Aït Ahmed, See The Estimate for May 4, 2001.)

Adding to and further complicating efforts to respond to the protests is that it is playing into a general distrust of the regime and of the security forces, combined with widespread dissatisfaction with the country's economic plight. That problem affects all Algerians, not just Berbers, but the Kabylie has often felt it was a neglected region, and now economic concerns combine with cultural frustrations and complaints about the Gendarmerie to create an explosion. Then there is the power of coffeehouse rumor: some Berbers believe that the military has deliberately provoked the demonstrations in order to distract attention from the economy and from reputed splits in the upper military leadership.

Nor does Bouteflika appear to have any easy ways out of the quandary. His critics have long charged that his Presidency has been mostly one of rhetorical flourishes and gestures, not of real leadership; he has indeed overseen a reduction in Islamist violence (in part because of the ceasefire on the part of the largest opposition force), but has done little to improve the daily life of the countryside.

As this went to press, a few days of calm seemed to have returned to the Kabylie. But clearly, there is a popular rejection of the idea that the investigative commission is going to genuinely respond to the issue of excessive violence by the Gendarmes; and Bouteflika's repeated vague promises about constitutional amendments to increase Berber rights have remained noticeably unspecific, while the existing Arabization laws on the books, though not always enforced to the letter, would virtually close down information and cultural exchange in the Berber language. (For more on the overall cultural and linguistic issues at stake, in addition to the May 4, 2001 Dossier cited earlier, see the two-part Dossier, "Algeria's Berbers: Third Force in a Complex War", in The Estimate for July 17, and July 31, 1998.)

Bouteflika's options are further limited by the growing demand that the Gendarmerie be removed entirely from the Kabylie. While it would remove the immediate irritant, it would also remove the key security forces, and the government argues that this would invite GIA or other guerrilla groups to attack. On the whole, the Berber population has been strongly anti-Islamist, in part because the Islamists are strong supporters of Arabization, and in part because the Berber country is more secularized or, in some cases, attracted to Sufism or other expressions of Islam which the radical Islamists tend to reject. Sa‘di's RCD has been one of the strongest opponents of political Islam in Algeria. So, the government can argue, withdrawal of the Gendarmerie would invite GIA to target Berbers.

There may be some truth in that, but it seems clear that at the moment, the Kabylie is more upset with the Gendarmerie than concerned about attacks from Islamists. And it also seems clear that to date, Bouteflika's major speeches on the subject have done little if anything to calm matters down. Spring 2001 may go down as another "Berber spring" like that of 1980 and the troubles of 1998.

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