Kuwait‘s Political System: Part 2: Parliament

Modern Kuwaiti political history has largely been a contest between the ruling family, the Al Sabah, and elected Parliaments. (On the Al Sabah and key personalities, See Part 1 of this Dossier in the last issue.). It has been a contest usually won by the Al Sabah. Parliament was prorogued outright in 1976 and again in 1986. The present Parliament has been characterized by frequent disputes between deputies and the ruling family (or rather the Cabinet, which for key positions amounts to the same thing). But when the Amir dissolved Parliament on May 4 he followed the Constitution by calling new elections within 60 days, in this case on July 3. (Municipal elections were held June 9.)

Kuwait’s Parliament is the only elected legislative body in the six Gulf Cooperation Council states, though Qatar is moving towards creating an elected Parliament and Oman’s advisory council has a partially elective nature. Kuwaiti Parliaments have tended to be controlled by the “opposition”, that is, by critics of the ruling family, who tend to serve as watchdogs of Cabinet ministries suspected of corruption, overspending, or other misdeeds. Because key ministries like Finance and Defense are almost always in the hands of members of the ruling family, this has created a certain tension when Parliaments have sought to question ministers. Although a side issue over misprinted Qur’ans was in fact the ostensible reason for the dissolution this time, it was widely recognized that it was aimed at blocking Parliamentary investigations of the Oil and Finance Ministers (both of them Sabahs).

It is an open question whether the dissolution will produce a more tractable Parliament. Most of the most outspoken critics of the government are running again, and may well win. They have been warning the government against trying to “buy” votes and defeat them.

But the government, this time, has wielded an unexpected weapon. An Amiri decree extending the right to vote and stand for office to women was announced soon after Parliament was dissolved. The new Parliament will have the power to overturn the decree, but to do so would likely be most unpopular. (Women will not vote this year; assuming the decree stands, they will vote in the next elections, due in 2003 unless Parliament is dissolved sooner.)

One major source of opposition in Parliament has come from various

Kuwait’s Parliament Building

Islamist groups, both Sunni and Shi‘ite. The vote for women has been publicly criticized by some of these, and also by some conservative tribal groups. With one gesture the Amir and the government have made themselves the symbol of democratization and modernity, while their Islamist critics race to try to find a position that will not lose them votes. But another source of criticism of the government, the Arab nationalists, support the vote for women and are therefore not so vulnerable.

Kuwait’s Parliament is not (yet at any rate) an equal branch with the executive, but its powers have been growing. This  second part looks at Parliament.

Kuwaiti Amir Sheikh Ahmad al-Jabir in 1920 created an appointed consultative council (something Saudi Arabia did not do until the 1990s), though it was short-lived. A municipality council followed for a while, and in 1938 Kuwait held elections for a legislative assembly. After full independence in 1961, a Constituent Assembly was elected,writing the constitution which was promulgated in 1962. That constitution, still in effect with some amendments, set up a National Assembly. The Amir at the time, Sheikh ‘Abdullah al-Salim Al Sabah (father of the present Crown Prince), was a supporter of the body, though his son is often seen as suspicious of it.

As the first and (since the dissolution of the Bahrain Parliament in 1975) only Gulf Cooperation Council state elected assembly, until Qatar’s planned Parliament is chosen, the Kuwaiti assembly’s sometimes turbulent history has been closely watched.

At a period of some considerable internal dissent, Sheikh Sabah al-Salim Al Sabah dissolved Parliament in August of 1976, also suspending some constitutional guarantees relating to a free press.

A Limited Franchise The Amiri decree to open up voting (and candidacy) to women will not, in itself, give Kuwait universal franchise. The narrowness of the franchise is one issue often raised by critics of the Kuwaiti system. Because a majority of persons residing in Kuwait are expatriate workers, the franchise is limited to Kuwaiti citizens, but very precisely defined. Until the 1996 elections, only Kuwaiti males over 21 whose families had been in Kuwait prior to 1920 could vote. With the 1996 elections, the franchise was extended to males and their descendants who had become naturalized Kuwaitis at least 30 years previously. And, as with most Gulf states, naturalization is not an easy process, and few expatriates in Kuwait have a prospect of becoming naturalized Kuwaitis. As a result, by some estimates only about 10% of the total population are in fact eligible to vote. Presumably the extension of the vote to women will roughly double that proportion. By one estimate, 113,000 Kuwaiti men will be eligible to vote on July 3.

Kuwait had no Parliament until new elections were called in February 1981, by which time the present Amir, Sheikh Jabir al-Ahmad Al Sabah, was ruling, the Iranian Revolution had occurred and the Iran-Iraq war had broken out.

After nearly five years without a Parliament, Kuwait in the early 1980s managed to survive just over five years with one. By the summer of 1986, Parliament had become constantly critical of the government and a thorn in the side of the ruling family. In the wake of allegations of a coup plot, and amid the continuing instability of the Iran-Iraq war, the Amir dissolved Parliament again on July 3, 1986.

With the end of the Iran-Iraq war, more demands were being heard for a restoration of Parliamentary life. Kuwaiti merchant leaders, businessmen, tribal leaders and others relied on the traditional diwaniyya or gathering at someone’s home as a means of increasing political debate. On April 22, 1990, Sheikh Jabir issued a decree for the creation of a “National Council”, consisting of 50 elected and 25 appointed members, to appraise Kuwait’s “Parliamentary experience”. The “National Council” was clearly not the National Assembly provided for in the Constitution, and it was widely criticized by political leaders. Then, that August, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait.

The extinction of Kuwaiti sovereignty and its resurrection through war had a major impact on Kuwait’s politics. While the ruling family waited in comfortable exile in Ta’if, Saudi Arabia, the Kuwaiti resistance inside the country (many of them Shi‘ites) fought the Iraqis. In the US and other western democracies, criticisms were heard of a war to save a monarchy which had dissolved its elected parliament. The Kuwaiti leaders publicly promised a return of parliamentary life after Kuwait was liberated.

There seems to be little doubt that the US, in particular, applied some pressure on the Kuwaitis after the victory, to make sure that the promised restoration of Parliament took place — the constitutional National Assembly, not the hybrid “National Council” of 1990. On October 5, 1992, a new National Assembly was elected, and unsurprisingly, something like 35 of its 50 members could be characterized as “opposition”.

That first postwar Parliament had the usual share of quarrels with the government, including efforts to investigate defense purchases in the massive rearmament which followed the war, but it served its full term, being replaced by another Assembly in October of 1996. In that Assembly, the Islamists lost some seats, the pro-government merchants and tribalists won some, but the overall tenor of the Parliament did not change dramatically.

There was a crisis at about this time last year (See The Estimate , June 19, 1998) when some expected the Amir to dissolve the Parliament, but that crisis was averted. But the prospect of multiple Parliamentary investigations of key ministries headed by members of the Sabah family finally became too much, and on May 4 the Amir dissolved Parliament, setting the new elections for July 3. On May 16, 12 days after the dissolution and with many Parliamentarians claiming that the government was planning to work to see that its critics were not re-elected, the Amir made his announcement about giving the right to vote to women.

The issue of women voting has been brought up frequently, and past Parliaments have even voted on it, always rejecting it. By acting while Parliament was not in session, the Amir created a sort of fait accompli: the new Parliament will have the opportunity to reject it when it meets, but that could be politically dangerous. And the move drew public criticism from Islamists and some conservative tribalists, who may lose votes as a result — if not now, then when women have the vote.

The Issue of Primaries

Another issue which has come up during the present campaign is the frequent use of primaries by tribal groups, giving them an opportunity to field only one candidate in areas where their tribe is strong. Primaries are banned along with political parties (see box, below), but frequently do take place and are even reported in newspapers.

Kuwait’s Parliament consists of 50 elected members (Cabinet officials are also ex officio members). Those 50 are elected in 25 geographical constituencies, two members from each, usually from a wide field. About 12 of the constituencies are rural, desert areas where bedouin tribes still constitute a substantial part of the population. Tribal primaries allow the tribe to narrow its choice down to a single candidate or two, whose chances are therefore enhanced against other competitors. The government, apparently convinced that many of the tribal candidates are sympathizers with its Islamist critics, is cracking down on the primary system and has referred a number of cases for prosecution.

In addition, a number of mosque imams who preached against the move to give votes to women were reportedly arrested, most of them apparently being unlicensed preachers to begin with. These moves have been seen as a crackdown by the government against Islamists and other conservative forces which have opposed it in the past. So far at least, the government does not seem to have been particularly heavy-handed about this crackdown; that could clearly produce a backlash.

Kuwaitis, or at least the elite, traditionally flee their country in the summer months for Europe or for cooler parts of the Arab world. (That is one reason so many senior Sabahs were away when Iraq invaded in August 1990.) This year, however, many are said to be delaying their trip in order to take part in the municipal elections, just held on June 9, and the Parliamentary elections due on July 3. And this despite record-breaking heat in much of the Middle East; temperatures in parts of Kuwait on the day of the municipal elections hit 50 degrees Celsius (about 122 degrees Fahrenheit). Turnout was nonetheless good.

Critics such as former Speaker Ahmad al-Sa‘adun, nationalist ‘Abdullah al-Naibari and a variety of Islamist gadflies will probably be re-elected in July, though the Islamists may have hurt themselves in their early responses to the move on giving women the vote. That will likely mean that Parliament and the Sabah family will continue their longstanding duels. Only the proportion of critics to pro-government deputies may change, and it could change as readily in the critics’ direction as the government’s.

Kuwait’s Parliamentary life is a far cry from the experienced and smooth workings of Western legislatures, but it is not a mere rubber-stamp or ineffective debating house (like many Arab parliaments) either. Its fondness for challenging government ministers (especially royals) may have led to its being dissolved on several occasions, but the deputies involved always make a comeback. In some countries of the region, they would never be heard from again.

The move to give the vote to women may indeed be a rather obvious political ploy on the part of the monarch, but it does liberalize participation somewhat. So long as Kuwait is reliant on foreign labor, it is unlikely to make naturalization easy, and thus the limitation of the franchise to old (or long-naturalized) families is likely to continue. But there has been a gradual broadening of the franchise (in including those naturalized over 30 years in the 1996 elections, and women perhaps in 2003).

By the next Kuwaiti Parliamentary elections, assuming that the new house lasts its full term until 2003, it is unlikely to still be the GCC’s only elected Parliament, for the Qatari body will likely be functioning by then, which may help reinforce the role of Kuwait’s sometimes beleaguered and add to pressures for a broadening of the franchise.

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