Arab World Succession Scenarios: Part 1: The Gulf

As The Estimate noted in its issue of July 30 (“1999: A Year of Transition”), the deaths in a six-month period this year of King Hussein of Jordan, Sheikh ‘Isa of Bahrain and King Hassan II of Morocco reminded the world that the Arab world is about to witness generational change in a wide variety of countries. The apparent attempt on the life of Egyptian President Husni Mubarak on September 6 in Port Said, in which a man attacked the President as he was waving from a motorcade and injured him slightly on the hand, has  also reminded Egyptians of the fact that there is no identified heir apparent for Mubarak, who is 71 and will mark 18 years in power in a few weeks’ time. Combine the three deaths so far this year and the assassination attempt with  the apparent virtual retirement of Saudi King Fahd to his villa in Marbella, Spain, the apparent frailty of Hafiz al-Asad and Yasir ‘Arafat, the fact that Sheikh Zayed of Abu Dhabi is past 80 (and in a US hospital as this was written), and the growing ranks of Arab leaders in their 70s, and it is clear that succession is not just an issue for the future but one which must be faced now.

The Estimate last attempted an overview in a two-part Dossier, “The Arab World Leadership’s Coming Generational Change”, in The Estimate for December 6 and 20, 1996. Individual Dossiers on various Arab countries have, of course, dealt with the issue frequently as well, and in greater detail than can be attempted here. But the accelerating pace of change makes it seem an appropriate time to revisit the question.

Since the two Arab monarchies outside the Arabian Peninsula (Morocco and Jordan) have already seen successions occur this year, this first part of a two-part Dossier will concentrate on the monarchies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman. In two of these six, there have been recent transitions: Qatar’s ruler overthrew his father in 1995, and the current Amir of Bahrain succeeded no his father’s death earlier this year. Even in those two countries, however, there are some dynastic and other outstanding questions. In many of these traditional monarchies, the heir apparent is clear but who will be named next in line when he succeeds is not. In only one, Oman, is there no Crown Prince or Heir Apparent. In the case of the biggest of the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, the succession is already under way and the next in line is also fairly clear, but the longer-term future is a major issue.

In Part One, in this issue, The Estimate looks at the six GCC states and the succession issues in each, concentrating on those where a recent succession has not occurred.

Part Two, in the next issue, will be devoted to some of the outstanding questions in the Arab republics, including the issues of succession to Mubarak in Egypt, Asad in Syria, and ‘Arafat in the Palestinian Authority.  

The generation of Gulf rulers now passing from the scene in the Gulf mostly came of age in a more turbulent time. Sheikh Zayed of Abu Dhabi, past 80 and the dean of all Arab leaders, can remember an age when rulers often killed a father or brother in order to achieve power. Zayed himself merely overthrew his brother and sent him into exile. A much younger man, Sultan Qaboos of Oman, nevertheless also had to overthrow and exile his father to achieve power. Both Zayed and Qaboos had the tacit (or not so tacit) support of Great Britain, which was tidying up dynastic issues before withdrawing from “east of Suez” in 1970-71.

The Gulf has not completely outgrown the habit of a son displacing his father: Sheikh Hamad of Qatar toppled his father, Sheikh Khalifa, in 1995, but Hamad had already been de facto ruler in most areas, and his father was spending most of his time abroad.

But other successions have been quite peaceful.  The Saudi Royal Family years ago worked out a system of defining the succession, though it has not yet figured out when the line passes to the next generation. The long illness of Sheikh Rashid of Dubai gave his sons time to parcel out duties and offices before the succession formally occurred.

The succession in Bahrain this year  was smooth and peaceful, and most observers expect no major problems in Abu Dhabi or Kuwait, two states where the age of the ruler makes succession likely in the fairly near term. The main concern in Oman is not over rivalry for the throne but over who the heir will be, since there is no clear candidate.

Below, a brief review of likely scenarios, and future questions, in each of the six GCC states.

Saudi Arabia: When Will the Next Generation Inherit?

The Saudi succession was last discussed in detail in the two-part Dossier, “Preparing for the Saudi Succession”, in The Estimate of March 27 and April 10, 1998.

Saudi Arabia has been undergoing a slow-motion succession since King Fahd suffered a serious stroke in late 1995. At the beginning of 1996, he designated Crown Prince ‘Abdullah as virtual regent, but only some five weeks later, resumed power himself. Reportedly Fahd’s full brothers, including Defense Minister Prince Sultan, Interior Minister Prince Nayef, and Riyadh governor Prince Salman, felt ‘Abdullah had moved too rapidly to consolidate power.

Since that time, Fahd’s health has waxed and waned, but ‘Abdullah has gradually worked out a modus vivendi with Fahd’s full brothers (often called the “Sudeiri seven” as their mother was Hassa bint Sudeiri). In July, Fahd left for a “vacation” at his villa in Marbella, Spain. Under the rules established by a decree by Fahd in 1992, when the King is out of the country, the Crown Prince is virtual regent, so the King’s “vacation” may well amount to a retirement. As noted in the last issue of The Estimate, Fahd did not return home for the funeral of his eldest son, Feisal bin Fahd.

The immediate Saudi succession is not in question. When King Feisal was assassinated in 1975, and succeeded by King Khalid, it was agreed that Fahd would become Crown Prince, but since many conservative princes objected to Fahd’s lifestyle, the more austere ‘Abdullah was chosen to be next in line after Fahd. Subsequently, it came to be understood that Prince Sultan, a full brother of Fahd and the powerful Defense Minister, would be next in line after ‘Abdullah.

It is unlikely that ‘Abdullah would seek to displace Sultan from the succession, though there are those who have suggested that he might, given the fact that the Islamic opposition considers Sultan the virtual embodiment of royal corruption. But the delicate balance within the family will be retained. However, ‘Abdullah is about the same age as Fahd — in his mid-70s — and Sultan is in his early 70s. Sultan’s personal lifestyle has been rather indulgent like Fahd’s, and the more austere ‘Abdullah might well outlive Sultan.

The real issue is when the succession might pass to the next generation. Every King since the death of the founder of modern Saudi Arabia, King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Al Sa‘ud, in 1953 has been a son of the old King. Since the old King married constantly and had almost 50 sons, the succession could remain in the generation of the “sons” for years to come, but the “grandsons” are chafing at remaining in the second string. The grandsons themselves are now in many cases grandfathers. They are more Westernized, for the most part, and better educated.

Whenever the line does pass to the next generation, there is plenty of talent there. The late King Feisal’s sons include Foreign Minister Sa‘ud al-Feisal, now approaching 60, and Turki al-Feisal , the Georgetown-educated head of Saudi Intelligence. King Fahd’s sons include the powerful Muhammad bin Fahd, Governor of the Eastern Province, and Sa‘ud bin Fahd, Deputy Chief of General Intelligence, among others. Crown Prince ‘Abdullah has several sons, most of them having held posts in the National Guard (commanded by ‘Abdullah). Two of Defense Minister Prince Sultan’s sons are well known abroad, Bandar bin Sultan, longtime Ambassador to the US, and Khalid bin Sultan, who commanded the Joint Forces during Desert Storm and now owns the London-based Arabic daily al-Hayat. This is not an exhaustive list: of the hundreds of sons of the sons of the old King, a great many hold important posts in the Kingdom.

‘Abdullah’s admirers think that he might seek to achieve some sort of family consensus on passing the line to the next generation, perhaps after Sultan. Such speculation of course remains to be proven.

Kuwait: Another Case of Waiting for the Next Generation

The Kuwaiti succession issue resembles the Saudi one in one respect: the Crown Prince is almost as old as the Amir. Succession is complicated by the tradition of alternating between the two main branches of the Al Sabah family; for a fuller discussion see the Dossier, “Kuwait’s Political System: Part 1: The Al Sabah Family” in The Estimate of June 4, 1999. Since that report was so recent, the issue will be dealt with only briefly here. Since the death of Mubarak the Great in 1915, the Amirship has alternated between the descendants of his two eldest sons, Jabir (ruled 1915-17) and Salim (ruled 1917-21). The only exception to this alternation  occurred in the 1960s when Sheikh ‘Abdullah was succeeded by his brother Sheikh Salim; in 1977 the alternation was restored by a return to the Jabir line. The present Amir, Sheikh Jabir, who has ruled since 1977, is of the Jabir line; the Crown Prince, Sheikh Sa‘d al-‘Abdullah, is of the Salim line.

Jabir was born by most accounts in 1929, and Sa‘d either in 1929 or 1930. Thus they are essentially the same age. Jabir’s health is understood to be rather frail. Should he be succeeded by Sa‘d, the latter — seemingly healthy although turning 70 — could rule for years. Assuming that the alternation is retained, his Crown Prince would come from the Jabir line; certainly the strongest candidate at the moment would be the present Amir’s brother, the powerful Foreign Minister, Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad. But he, too, is about the same age as his brother and his cousin the Crown Prince. There are numerous talented Sabahs in both lines of the next generation, and if someone from that generation is chosen, it would likely be a son of a previous Amir.

Bahrain: A Stable Succession with Some Question Marks

Bahrain’s succession occurred this year, with the death of Sheikh ‘Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa on March 6, and the succession of his son and heir, Sheikh Hamad bin ‘Isa. Sheikh Hamad is 49, and as his first act as Amir named his son, Sheikh Salman bin Hamad, as Crown Prince. Sheikh Salman turns 30 in October.

Thus the Bahraini succession seems clearly established for many years to come. The major question mark is the continuing power of the late Sheikh ‘Isa’s powerful brother, the Prime Minister, Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman. For years, Bahrain watchers have speculated about potential conflict between Khalifa, who controls the internal security services, and Hamad, who essentially created the Bahraini Army while Crown Prince. Some of Hamad’s gestures since taking power, including the freeing of a Shi‘ite opposition leader, have seemed to suggest he is more liberal than his hard-line uncle, but the evidence is really not yet in.

Sheikh Hamad was the subject of a Profile in The Estimate of March 12, 1999, an issue which also discussed his father’s death.

Qatar: Reinforcing the Succession with Liberalization

Qatar is another country in which the succession to a younger generation of leadership has already occurred, in this case by the current ruler deposing his father. On June 27, 1995, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani deposed his father, Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad. (See The Estimate, June 23-July 6, 1995.) Hamad had been de facto ruler in every area except finance since 1992; his father had spent much of his time in Europe indulging his own interests. Subsequently, Qatar uncovered an alleged coup plot aimed at restoring the father, who had been received with honors by several neighboring states; the coup allegedly had the support of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain, according to never-quite-explicit Qatari accusations. But after the plot was foiled, Hamad was publicly reconciled with his deposed father.

Besides the lingering possibility of the father seeking to regain power, there is a longstanding rivalry in Qatar between various branches of the Al Thani family. Hamad has essentially sought to defuse any such problems by the most visible liberalizations of any Gulf country: elections of a municipality council (in which women voted and could stand as candidates) and plans for both a written constitution and an elected Parliament. He appears to be secure for the time being. Only 49 himself, he has issued a decree limiting the succession to the sons of the ruling Amir (thus ending rivalries among various branches of the Al Thani, but also eliminating Hamad’s brother, Sheikh ‘Abdullah, now Prime Minister), and surprised many by naming his third son, Sheikh Jasim bin Hamad , only 18 at the time (he is now 21), as Crown Prince, passing over Sheikh Hamad’s two older sons. (For Sheikh Jasim, See the Profile in The Estimate of October 25, 1996.)

The UAE: Waiting for the Abu Dhabi Succession

The United Arab Emirates is actually seven states, each a hereditary monarchy, but Abu Dhabi and Dubai  strongly dominate. (Sharja is of some importance in its own right; the others are Ra’s al-Khaima, Fujaira, ‘Ajman and Umm al-Qaiwain.) When the UAE was created in 1971, the ruler of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahayyan, became President of the Federation, and the ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Rashid bin Sa‘id Al Maktum, became Prime Minister.

Sheikh Zayed is still ruler of Abu Dhabi (as he has been since 1966) and President of the UAE (since 1971). According to his official biographies he is somewhere in his early 80s. Many believe he is several years older than that. As this issue went to press, Sheikh Zayed was in the Cleveland Clinic in the United States, undergoing “medical tests”; the UAE denied reports that he was scheduled to undergo surgery, and said his tests were favorable. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Abu Dhabi succession is likely within a few years.

The Dubai succession has already occurred, and many consider it a model. The late Sheikh Rashid suffered a debilitating stroke years before he finally died in 1991. As a result, his three sons had the time to work out any rivalries among themselves. The eldest, Maktum, became ruler; the second eldest, Hamdan , the UAE Minister of Finance, became Deputy Ruler, but the third son, Muhammad, the UAE Minister of Defense, was named Heir Apparent. That arrangement seems to have provided for a stable succession in Dubai.

Something similar seems likely to be in store in Abu Dhabi. The heir has long been Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed, Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces. There is no reason to doubt that he will in fact succeed. Less clear is who would become Heir Apparent. The present Deputy Ruler, Prince Sultan, or the third son, Armed Forces Chief of Staff Prince Muhammad, are the likeliest candidates; an arrangement such as the one followed in Dubai, in which one becomes Heir and the other Deputy Ruler, might be followed. There are other branches of the ruling family and other possibilities, but these seem the most likely.

When Sheikh Rashid of Dubai died, the post of Prime Minister of the UAE remained with Dubai and was entrusted to his son and heir. Sheikh Zayed has been the only President of the UAE, and it is presumed that the job would pass to the next ruler of Abu Dhabi. That is not writ in stone however: in theory it could go to any of the seven rulers so long as neither Abu Dhabi nor Dubai veto it. But the UAE’s distinction as the only successful experiment in Arab unity suggests that the rulers will not be tempted to tinker with the formula which has worked so well for nearly 30 years.

Oman: A Monarchy with No Heir Apparent

The Sultanate of Oman is the only Gulf monarchy with no heir apparent. This makes some Omanis rather nervous. Sultan Qaboos is only 58 and is not known to have major health problems, but when he was injured in a car accident in September of 1995 — an accident which killed two key advisers — the succession issue was suddenly brought to the fore. Since he overthrew his father in 1970, the Sultan has transformed Oman from a desert enclave with neither schools nor roads to a modern Arab state. Despite the creation of a quasi-elected advisory council and other aspects of liberalization, Oman is still very much a monarchy run by its Sultan. So the question of who will succeed Qaboos is not an academic one. For more on Oman, including the succession issue, see the Dossier, “Oman after 25 Years: Part One: Political Questions” in The Estimate, March 29, 1996.

Although Qaboos married a royal cousin in 1976, there were no children and that marriage was reportedly later dissolved. It is generally understood that the Sultan is unlikely to marry again or have children. The ruling Al Bu Sa‘id dynasty has a number of royal cousins who might be candidates; and after the death of the Sultan’s powerful uncle in 1996, the Sultan introduced a Constitution with a provision under which the Sultan would reveal in a letter to the Royal Family his personal choice as successor. Should the family not choose a successor within a fixed time, the country’s Defense Council would do so. This curious system, under which no one knows the Sultan’s own choice of heir until the Sultan dies, appears to be as far as Qaboos is currently prepared to go in revealing his intentions.

When Omanis and outsiders do indulge in guessing, the candidates mentioned are those members of the Al Bu Sa‘id who already occupy government positions. Among these is the Sultan’s cousin and “Personal Representative”, Sayyid Thuwaini bin Shihab, an intimate personal friend. Others include a Deputy Prime Minister, Sayyid Fahd bin Mahmud, and the Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry, Sayyid Haytham bin Tariq, though the list is not exhaustive.

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