The Terror Attacks

Trying to Get at the Whys

In the wake of the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington, the Middle East has at times seemed — while appalled with the rest of the world — a bit more understanding of the whys behind the event. In part that may be because violence, including senseless terrorism against civilians, is more familiar in the region. But in part it is also because many do share, in moderation and without the ruthlessness, the same opposition to the United States presence in the region which, at its most extreme, can lead to an act as sweeping as the destruction of the World Trade Center.

At least some of those who were seen celebrating after the disaster may have been displaying their own dismay at US policy, or may not yet have comprehended the sheer human scale of the killing, but may also have been giving in to a natural human willingness to see the giant fall and be humbled. Americans are not well understood in the Middle East, of course, but Americans often fail to understand just how they are perceived.

None of this is to give into to the simplistic response some have made: that if the US changed this or that policy, this would not have happened. Because of the sheer enormity of the act, it is hard to comprehend the passions which must have gone into it. Assuming that Usama bin Ladin and his followers are, indeed, at the heart of the conspiracy, it is clear that no one single aspect of US policy motivates them.

Certainly US support for Israel is part of the root cause of the hatred those like Bin Ladin have for the United States. But this was clearly not about, or provoked by, the present Al-Aqsa intifada, or a response to it: it could not have been, since the flight training and other planning for the attacks clearly have been under way for years. Bin Ladin himself became staunchly anti-American when the US deployed troops to Saudi Arabia in 1990, but the US presence in the Gulf, by itself, is not the sole cause, either, and removing that presence would not make these people any less anti-American.

For there is a third element, besides Israel and the presence in the Gulf, which is clear in most of Bin Ladin's interviews: the whole power of cultural Westernization, secularism, the penetration of outside ideas, that can be subsumed under that catchall phrase "globalization". The presence of coca-cola and MTV and bluejeans is sometimes portrayed as being as much a part of "imperialism" by the West as is the presence of US troops. The fact that it is not the US, but local markets and the local marketers who create those markets, that cater to these demands is easily overlooked. (When French farmers attacked a McDonald's, they overlooked the fact that its owners were French.)

But of course, all of these things — support for Israel, the US presence in the Gulf, the popularity of American tastes and globalized entertainment — explain the resentment of America. They do not explain the killing of 6,000 or more innocent people.

For that reason, it is easy to simply describe the act as that of madmen. Certainly the carnage seems extraordinary.

And certainly the act was a mad one in any sane world, but that does not mean that the perpetrators themselves were raving maniacs. The coolness of the planning is a reminder of the fact that they were not: years of training, learning to fly the aircraft, the suicide of at least 19 men on four aircraft, the apparent skill with which the aircraft were pointed at their targets at the moment of impact, are clear signs of careful calculation and intricate organizational and operational skills. This was not done by amateurs or raving lunatics. It was done by intelligent, and thus very dangerous, people.

And if reports of stock manipulations in such investments as insurance and airlines prove to be part of the conspiracy, the calculation seems even more impressive (and frightening): not only staging a terror attack of unprecedented magnitude, but finding a way to make windfall profits from it.

In trying to get behind the whys of the act, though, there is another question which arises: if these men were so cool and calculating, so skillful at planning and implementation, what did they expect to achieve? After all, the United States is responding in the only way a great power could under such an assault, with force. Usama bin Ladin's patrons in Afghanistan, and probably other countries as well, are suddenly in the American gunsight. Why? What did killing a few thousand Americans accomplish that would make the response worth the risk?

The answer may never be known, of course. But there do seem to be some hints that the very scale of the attack — and suggestions that something even more devastating was intended, if the fourth aircraft had reached a target or other aircraft had been hijacked — might have been intended to guarantee an American response on a massive scale.

Why? One possible explanation might be that Usama bin Ladin really is ill, as rumors have had it for months, and that this was intended as his valedictory: Samson bringing the temple down on his own head, as it were. But there seems little direct evidence of that, and the rumors of illness have never been confirmed.

It seems more likely, if one wishes to speculate about what response the perpetrators sought to provoke, that Bin Ladin sought not to bring the temple down on himself, but on the regional rulers who have isolated him and hounded him from Saudi Arabia to Yemen to Sudan to Afghanistan. Bin Ladin may assume that a massive American intervention will inflame the Muslim world, toppling thrones and presidencies.

He has likely miscalculated, if that is the case. Though there were some, in some Muslim countries, who celebrated or welcomed the attacks, most people were almost certainly appalled at the brutality and brazenness of the attack and the suffering inflicted. Except for Saddam Hussein, no Muslim leader failed to offer sympathy to the United States (even the Taliban did that).

A decade ago, Saddam also seemed to feel that the American intervention in the Arabian Peninsula would topple thrones. It did not.

Dangers to Specific Countries
If that is the goal — an apocalyptic explosion of the whole Islamic world in reaction to American intervention — it is probably a fantasy. But that does not mean that some specific, individual countries do not face very severe challenges, internal disruptions, even collapse.

No country (other than already-failed Afghanistan, anyway) faces greater stresses than Pakistan, a state whose survival was already in question, and which now finds itself on the front lines. The fracture lines are apparent, the Army itself is not of one mind, and the campaign has not yet begun.

There are other countries which face special challenges. Every country with an active Islamist insurgency (Algeria, to a lesser extent Egypt) or significant local Islamist power (Yemen, perhaps regions of Saudi Arabia) could face exacerbation of present stresses or new threats of coups from dissident officers. After Afghanistan and Pakistan, however, the stresses may be greatest, however, in the Palestinian Authority, where the de facto alliance between Islamist groups and the PA over the past year has been blown apart by the attacks. The particular reactions in Israel and the Palestinian Authority are dealt with in greater detail in Listening Post.

But the crisis may also provide opportunity. The cautious but unmistakable gestures coming from Iran, while ambiguous (like every signal from Iran during the power struggle there), could well open up new routes of cooperation and reconciliation. The US is clearly engaged in exploring ideas with Russia, China, and the Central Asian states that would have seemed impossible two weeks ago. And some Arab countries long frustrated by the fact that the US seemed indecisive and therefore refrained from support which would have exposed them to domestic critics, may actually find the new US resolution to be welcome, even if they do not say so openly.

Home

Current Issue

About Us

Back Issues

Resources

Subscribe