Arab World Succession Scenarios:
Part 2: The Republics
Part 1 of this Dossier, in the last issue, looked at succession scenarios in the six Gulf Cooperation Council states. All are hereditary monarchies. All, except for Oman, have designated heirs apparent, and often the only real speculation is about who the next heir in line will be, or when the succession will pass to a younger generation.
The Arab republics are a different matter. Although in theory they all have constitutional succession processes, these usually call for the temporary succession of
some figurehead (often the Speaker of the Parliament) until a real successor is anointed. As a result, the republics often have no clear successor, and some Presidents fear entrusting too much power in a deputy who might be tempted
to overthrow them. As a result, the prospects for instability may actually be far greater in the republics than in the monarchies. When Egyptian President Husni Mubarak escaped an apparent assassination attempt in Port Said on
September 6, it was yet another reminder that Egypt has had no Vice President for the past 18 years, and there is no clear-cut successor, or even a strongly probable candidate. Yasir ‘Arafat of the Palestinian Authority turned 70
in August, visibly weakened, in clearly declining health, and with no certainty of who would succeed him, either. In Syria, where a visibly frail Hafiz al-Asad turns 69 on October 6, his son Bashshar is clearly being promoted as
Heir Apparent, but the young man — who was an ophthalmologist until his older brother Basil died in 1994 — may or may not be able to claim the job. In Iraq, where the future of Saddam Hussein is always debatable, his two sons seem
to be rivals for the job. In Libya, Mu‘ammar Qadhafi is no longer the young lieutenant who took power 30 years ago, and is limping from an injury sustained in a “fall” last year. Yemen is having a competitive election this year for
President, though the outcome is not really in doubt. Not all the Arab republics are close to a succession, of course, barring an assassination. Tunisia underwent a peaceful transition in 1987, and the political futures of Sudan
and Algeria could see changes in the system at some point. The second part of this Dossier looks with greater detail at three of the more crucial successions — Egypt, Syria, and the Palestinian Authority. Potential successions in
other countries, including Libya and Iraq, will be addressed when events make them seem more imminent than they do now. Given the long tenure of some of the Arab world’s “republican” Presidents — Hafiz al-Asad came to power in
1971, Yasir ‘Arafat took over the PLO in 1968, Saddam Hussein was power behind the throne by 1969 and President since 1979, and Husni Mubarak succeeded in 1981 — the distinction between monarchies and republics is hard to define
except to say that republics do not have hereditary successions. But North Korea did, and Syria looks prepared to, while Iraq and perhaps even Libya have toyed with the idea. Clearly, in a region where most of the republics (with
some exceptions such as Lebanon) have no real provision for rotation of power, long “reigns” by strong, usually authoritarian leaders are the rule. What is unusual today is the length of tenure of some of these rulers, and the
importance of their countries in regional power balances and the peace process. In the 26 years between World War II and 1971, Syria had more than 20 governments. In the 28 years since 1971, it has had one. Egypt has had four
Presidents since the monarchy was overthrown in 1952, and one of them, Muhammad Naguib, did not make it past 1953. The other three have ruled for the 46 years since: Gamal ‘Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Husni Mubarak. Although
Yasir ‘Arafat did not take over the PLO until 1968, he is the only person who has ever been so thoroughly identified with the Palestinian cause. The man who overthrew the Libyan monarchy 30 years ago this month is still running
Libya. Saddam Hussein has been President for two decades and a power to be reckoned with for three. These latter two may well survive for years. But ‘Arafat is 70 and failing, Mubarak 71, Asad a frail 69. Each of these three, in
particular, is a crucial player in the peace process, and in the case of the Palestinian Authority and Syria, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak apparently realizes that the clock is running and that he will achieve a better deal
with these men, who are strong enough to bargain, than with a weaker successor struggling to consolidate power.
Egypt: The Question That Won’t Go Away
The old proverb Misr umm al-dunya
, “Egypt is the mother of the world”, may be hyperbole, but even non-Egyptians recognize that as the largest and most populous Arab country, the source of many of the Arab world’s doctors and
engineers, Egypt is an indispensable state. Though not the pan-Arab leader it was in the Nasser era, it still dominates the Arab film industry and many other realms.
The September 6 attack on Husni Mubarak in Port Said has provoked some of the same kind of talk as the more serious attempt on his life in Addis Ababa in 1995 sparked: worry about the fact
that Mubarak has no designated or even visibly favored successor. Egyptians, especially Egyptian officials, often dismiss such concerns by noting that Egypt has a constitutional
procedure for choosing a new President. But even Egyptians sometimes worry when reminded of the danger; after the 1995 attempt, veteran commentator Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, in the pro-government Rose al-Yousef
, warned that uncertainty about succession could “lead to the state falling apart” and that those who assumed the Army would provide the solution should note
that “the Army is forbidden territory which we do not speak about or know what is in it”. Egypt’s four Presidents since the overthrow of the monarchy have come from the Armed Forces:
Naguib, Nasser and Sadat from the Army and Mubarak from the Air Force. But Nasser had been Naguib’s Prime Minister, Sadat Nasser’s Vice President, and Mubarak Sadat’s. Mubarak has no
Vice President, and Prime Ministers these days are essentially technocrats. The Estimate looked more fully at the question of Egypt’s succession in a two-part Dossier,
“Who Would Succeed Mubarak?”, in the issues of June 23-July 6 and July 7-20, 1995. Although a few of the minor players have changed since then, most of the key figures are the same. There
has been no figure generally seen as a likely successor since the fall of Field Marshal Muhammad ‘Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazala in 1989. Mubarak has never had a Vice President.
Under the Constitution, the Speaker of the People’s Assembly (Parliament) becomes President on the office becoming vacant, until such time as the People’s Assembly can nominate a
candidate who is then approved in a popular referendum. This happened, pro forma, on the assassination of Sadat, but it was clear from the first moments that Mubarak would succeed.
Neither the present Speaker nor his predecessors have been figures of sufficient weight to expect to keep the job. Because of the traditional role of the Army — outside of politics but protecting the system — the
Army will certainly have a major say in choosing the new President. Should Mubarak leave office by assassination, or at a time of national crisis, the Army’s role would no doubt be overwhelming.
Present Defense Minister Field Marshal Muhammad Hussein Tantawi, though the first Defense Minister to be given the rank of Field Marshal since Abu Ghazala, is not seen as a particularly
strong figure; several generals behind him, and the powerful ‘Omar Suleiman, who ran both Military and General Intelligence at one time or another, are sometimes seen as stronger. But
the Army and the Egyptian establishment might decide that a civilian would be more reassuring. Here the choices are not so clear. Current Prime Minister Kamal Ahmad al-Ganzouri has had to
struggle with economic issues; the Deputy Prime Minister and longtime Minister of Agriculture, Yusuf Wali, is powerful and talented but considered by some too close to Israel. Interior Minister
Habib al-‘Adli, despite considerable success in reducing the Islamist violence in Upper Egypt, is probably too closely linked with the feared security establishment to have much popular support.
(And the Army does not always trust the Police.) Foreign Minister ‘Amr Moussa and longtime Presidential advisor on Foreign Affairs ‘Oussama al-Baz are both well known abroad, but the
former may be too externally oriented and the latter too much a back-room player to have a real chance. Should Mubarak leave the scene suddenly, however, these men and other senior officials, and
most of all the Army, will be the powers who decide on a nominee for the People’s Assembly to put before the public.
The Palestinian Authority: Is ’Arafat Indispensable?
But ‘Arafat, despite his success in surviving so many of his enemies, cannot forever survive
aging, and he is visibly in poor health. In 1992 he was severely injured in an air crash in Libya, and may have suffered serious neurological damage at the time. That is sometimes given as a
reason for the visible shaking of his hands in public, though others believe he is suffering from Parkinson’s disease. Despite denials, it is widely believed that he fainted during a 1997 summit in Cairo.
‘Arafat, like other Arab Presidents, has long avoided having a clearcut successor. The close aides of his early years in the PLO, Abu Jihad (Khalil al-Wazir) and Abu ‘Iyad (Salah Khalaf),
were both killed years ago, the first by Israel and the second, perhaps, by Abu Nidal. Although the Palestinian Authority has not formally adopted its Constitution, the draft calls for the Speaker
of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) to serve as President for 60 days on the death of the President. That would be Abu al-‘Ala’ (Ahmad al-Qurei‘). Though an important figure, he would
probably be at best a transitional figure. Of the old guard Fatah leaders, Faruq al-Qaddumi was long close to ‘Arafat and remains high in nominal rank, but he remained in Tunis long after the
Oslo accords, and was more or less bypassed by the emergence of the new PA leadership. Next in line would be Abu Mazin (Mahmud ‘Abbas), de facto number two in the PA, head of the
negotiating team that worked out the Oslo Accords, and still the man in charge of much of the peace process. There were rumors last year that ‘Arafat had told Bill Clinton that Abu Mazin was
his personal choice for successor, and he is probably the leading candidate. Certainly there would be other potential claimants. Minister of Information and Culture Yasir ‘Abd
Rabbuh (Abd Rabbo), and Minister of Planning and International Cooperation Nabil Sha‘ath, are among the old PLO stalwarts who have retained influence in the PA. Some of the scions of old
Palestinian families are in the PA leadership — Maher al-Masri from Nablus, Feisal al-Husseini from Jerusalem — and then there are the younger faces, better known abroad, such as Sa‘eb
‘Erekat, familiar in the West as leader of the PA’s negotiations with Israel. (Even better-known figures such as Hanan ‘Ashrawi might play a role, but probably only as a figurehead.) Then there
is the question of the security services. ‘Arafat has several of them, and their leaders have been competing with each other for authority. Despite some rather unpleasant incidents and a far from
clear human rights record, however, the PA seems to be less dominated by the security services than most Arab republics. Still, in a post-’Arafat power struggle, a group of “colonels” from the
various “police forces” could play the role of the Army elsewhere. They could also tilt the balance towards one candidate in such a struggle.
There is some reason to believe that ‘Arafat’s health problems have been somewhat exaggerated, partly by Israel in the Netanyahu years, and partly by rivals for his job. But he is clearly not in
good health. Abu Mazin is a leader of the negotiations on final status with Israel, and may cement his position as number two man in the PA if the talks succeed. But whoever succeeds
‘Arafat will not have the broad legitimacy, with both old PLO Tunis exiles and local West Bank and Gaza notables, that ‘Arafat has enjoyed.
Yasir ‘Arafat turned 70 last month. He has led the Palestine Liberation Organization since 1968, Fatah even longer, and the Palestinian Authority from
its creation. He is the survivor of survivors, written off time after time, after Black September of 1970, after the Lebanese debacle of 1982, chased from
‘Amman to Beirut to Tunis. Israel tried for years to find some Palestinian, any Palestinian, other than ‘Arafat to talk to. In the end, it talked to ‘Arafat. He has created the Palestinian Authority
(PA) by merging the leadership of the old PLO in exile in Tunis, and the local leaders of the West Bank and Gaza.
Syria: Can Primogeniture Work?
As this issue was going to press, there were reports of clashes in Latakia — in the heartland where the ruling ‘Alawites of Syria have their roots — between supporters of President Hafiz al-Asad and old-guard loyalists of his exiled brother Rif‘at. If true (See Coffeehouse Gossip ), it could be a further sign of preparations for the succession, or even a signal that President Asad, whose appearances have recently been infrequent, is nearing the end of his rule.
Back in late 1983 and early 1984, Hafiz al-Asad suffered some sort of health collapse. It has variously been described as a heart attack or a stroke, though his biographer, the veteran Middle
East hand Patrick Seale, described it as a collapse from exhaustion. Whatever the nature of the ailment, within a few weeks several different factions of the Syrian leadership were in the streets,
sometimes with tanks to back them up: the Defense Companies of Asad’s brother Rif‘at, the Murtada force of his brother Jamil, the Presidential guard under his wife’s relative ‘Adnan Makhluf,
and so on. Asad was given a display of what might be expected to happen on his death: his kinsmen and colleagues fighting over the spoils. Soon after that incident, Rif‘at lost control of his
private Army (though he remained as a nominal Vice President until last year). By the late 1980s, Asad had clearly signaled that he wanted to be succeeded by his son Basil, and a cult of
personality centered around Basil was soon quite intense. But Basil, fond of fast cars, died in a crash in 1994. The second son, Bashshar, was living in Britain, having trained there as an ophthalmologist.
Since 1994, Bashshar has been the heir apparent. He has been put through staff college, is now a Colonel, is in charge of the Syrian Computer Society, has made a number of overseas tours,
and the sort of cult of personality which once was accorded his brother is being cranked up for this man who seems, from his pictures at least, to be a rather unassuming if intelligent sort — a
man who looks more like the ophthalmologist he wanted to be than the Arab ruler he may be about to become. [For earlier, more detailed treatment of Syrian succession issues, See the two-part Dossier, “The Asad Factor” in
The Estimate, May 10 (“How Syria Works”) and May 24 (“Present and Future”), 1996. Also, on more recent reshuffles, See “Asad Cleans House” in The Estimate
, July 17, 1998.] As noted earlier, between 1945 and 1971 Syria had more than 20 governments; between 1971 and 1999 it has had, in reality, one: Hafiz al-Asad. Asad is a shrewd
leader and he clearly learned from the events of 1983-84. He has been slowly but surely removing the likely challengers to his son’s succession, either by encouraging pleasant retirements to
Europe, comfortable sinecures at home, or simply replacing those who seemed to be a problem. Bashshar’s clear ascendancy has been marked by many shifts in power, but he is not quite in
position yet for actual succession. For one thing, the President must be chosen from the Ba‘ath Party’s Regional Command (the party leadership: “regional” meaning Syria as the “national”
leadership is supposed to be pan-Arab). But a Congress is expected soon, and he is expected to be elected to a position. One sign of the younger Asad’s growing power is the fact that he apparently has been given
overall charge of affairs in Lebanon, an area long dominated by Vice President ‘Abd al-Halim Khaddam (whose power is clearly diminished and who may be given a relatively powerless post,
Prime Minister). The removal in 1998 of Chief of Staff Hikmat Shihabi and the decline of Khaddam has isolated the other longtime power in Lebanon, Ghazi Kan‘an, and given Bashshar more clear
influence. Meanwhile, Bashshar’s recent tour of the Gulf (See
But there are still many powerful figures in Syria, including the various ‘Alawite generals and intelligence chiefs, though they have less power than they once did, and Rif‘at and his sons, though out of power, still have money and some influence and residual loyalty. One interpretation of the reputed Latakia confrontations is that it is a crackdown against former loyalists of Rif‘at’s “Defense Brigades” of the 1980s. It was rumored that Yasir ‘Arafat’s welcoming Sumer al-Asad, Rif‘at’s son, to Gaza sparked the feud between Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas and ‘Arafat last month (See The Estimate , August 13, 1999.) And of course, Bashshar would not only have to hold the job if it passes to him, but consolidate his power thereafter. That is surely one reason why his father wants to find a resolution to the question of peace with Israel before passing the mantle of power to his son.
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