Collateral Damage?
What Will War Provoke in Muslim World?

Opponents of a war with Iraq insist that a protracted war could undermine friendly regimes throughout the Middle East: Pakistan and Jordan perhaps most of all, but even Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states if the war goes on for an extended period. At least some supporters of such a conflict argue that in fact many of these regimes deserve to be replaced anyway, being authoritarian security states with little evidence of democracy or liberal values; they argue that the creation of a democratic Iraq — a goal the precise achievement of which is not fully articulated — could lead to a brushfire spread of democracy in the Arab world.

Neither of these scenarios is quite as absurd as its opponents try to paint it; neither is exactly a guaranteed result, either. War is by definition unpredictable, chaotic, filled with what Clausewitz called “friction”, which devastates one’s plans and distracts one’s direction.

On the other hand, there are some inklings, some auguries, that should not be ignored. As is noted in the analysis in this issue, an Islamist bloc in Pakistan which has traditionally been on the periphery won a majority in the local Assembly in the North West Frontier Province, the very area where many in the West believe Usama bin Ladin and his associates have gone to ground. The very area which is by definition the critical key to controlling the Afghan border has fallen to opponents of General Pervez Musharraf’s military rule and opponents of the United States. Though Musharraf carefully outmaneuvered and banned his secular rivals Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif from making comebacks, he did not block an attack from the Islamist right.

That does not mean that Pakistan is about to become a radical state: the North West Frontier Province has always been a marchland, and a rather uncontrollable one at that: the subject of many Kipling poems but few modern development successes.

What follows is based on both The Estimate’s longstanding tracking of events in the region and recent conversations with persons just returned from the Gulf, Southwest Asia, and other key areas. It is a tentative survey, fully recognizing that unpredictable events are by definition likely in wartime.

First, the good news. The bad will come momentarily.

Everyone has heard that anti-Americanism has never been at a higher pitch in the Middle East region, and this seems to be true: its implications will be discussed later. But not everyone appears to be anti-American, particularly in the smaller Gulf states. Conventional wisdom does not always hold. Though US troops have recently been attacked and even killed in Kuwait, Kuwaitis are not as hostile to an attack on Iraq as some reports suggest them to be. Some Kuwaitis — establishment to be sure, but not government — are critical of George W. Bush because he is not sufficiently clear on why Saddam needs to be removed. Others, it seems, are eager to help in any way they can. The argument goes something like this: you have a really good case for removing Saddam, but you aren’t making it effectively. By this argument, the case for regime change is quite a bit clearer and more unambiguous than the Bush Administration has made it.

Of course, these are the elites, those who lost the most in the 1990-91 occupation of Kuwait, and who want revenge, or their lost cousins, or at least Saddam’s head. But Kuwaitis are not the only Gulf residents who seem to have unusual, and unpredictable, reactions to what may be about to happen.

Qatar, the US’ closest ally in the region at the moment, seems determined to capitalize on its current favoritism in Washington to exacerbate and underscore its historic rivalry with Saudi Arabia. The Qataris are determined to prove that they, not the Saudis, are the most sincere and reliable American ally in the Gulf. The very concerned, very nervous Saudis are unlikely to compete very hard any time soon, while Qatar’s Al-‘Udayd Air Base becomes a major US overseas base facility and the site of a major command and control center.

As for the “street”, so often invoked by analysts (including, it must be admitted, The Estimate), there are few barometers. Certainly most Islamists are opposed to the US moves against Iraq because they suspect everything the US does; old-guard Arab nationalists see the US as undermining the hopes for a Palestinian settlement and oppose its support for Israel; and there is a general suspicion, outside the elites, of globalization, which is often seen as imperialism in disguise.

But there appears to be another, little-reported-upon attitude in the Gulf states at least, and perhaps in some of the less open Arab societies as well. This is one which, if not enthusiastic about the American role and stated objectives, sees the destruction of the Iraqi regime as, possibly, the beginning of a new era in the Middle East.

This may sound, suspiciously, like some of the pipe dreams of the neoconservative right in the United States, pipe dreams which some Middle East analysts rightly suspect are inspired by wishful thinking rather than solid evidence. The idea that Jeffersonian democracy is going to break out from Casablanca to Karachi if Saddam is brought low seems to be the latest utopian fantasy of some advocates of the war. But — according to some informants recently in touch with young Gulf Arabs — some comparable pipe dreams seem to be affecting young Gulf dreamers as well.

These young men and women probably have little in common with the American “neocons”. Nor is their vision necessarily that which American conservatives hope for: what they seem to be yearning for, several informants suggest, is a sort of catalytic change which is going to reshape the landscape so completely that their conservative societies will be swept away. If the US is the instrumentality which brings that about, so much the better, but their goals are not necessarily those of the US, and it is far from likely that these goals are those of the regimes under which they live.

This line of argument is mostly found among young liberal intellectuals, who genuinely believe that a democratic system could and should be achieved. They may, as at least one put it, wish that the United States were not the instrument for the change, but they welcome such a change by whatever instrument.

Such a scenario is just as subject to qualifications when it is envisioned by Middle Easterners as when it is envisioned by the neoconservative advocates of an American role in reshaping the Middle East. For such a scenario to work, a war would have to be short, sharp, and successful, removing the existing Iraqi regime without massive destruction of Iraqi life or national infrastructure. A long war or one which becomes encumbered in broader issues such as the Arab-Israeli conflict would undermine the chances of such a scenario working out.

Another problem is the simple one of installing a democracy where there is little tradition of true representative government. Though Iraq has had periods of parliamentary life in the past, most are far in the past, and were always interspersed with coups and periods of strife. The notion that democracy will flourish once tyranny falls is romantic but not terribly likely.

The Other Side of the Coin
If some young Gulf liberals are hoping for a wave of democratic change in the wake of a war, many other Middle Easterners are more likely to react in the manner critics of the war plans suggest: by anti-American demonstrations which could, under certain circumstances, lead to a destabilization of certain regimes.

Some American analysts dismiss talk of the Arab “street” as irrelevant and point out, correctly, that neither during the 1991 Gulf war nor during the US intervention in Afghanistan did the Arab “street” do much of anything at all. This is true, though Afghanistan was a regime which evoked little sympathy in the Arab world. Both campaigns were brief; anything longer than a brief campaign is more likely to create problems.

The biggest difference, however, between Desert Storm in 1991 and circumstances today lies in the collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and the continuing Al-Aqsa intifada. The Israeli retaliations against the Palestinian Authority following suicide bombings in Israel has left the Palestinian territories divided, curfewed, and in places reoccupied; it has left Yasir ‘Arafat periodically besieged. Many Arabs believe that the United States has given tactic approval to Ariel Sharon’s campaign against ‘Arafat and the PA; fairly or not, the US is seen as having abandoned the peace process. The radical Islamist charge that the US is the enemy of Islam has won a broader audience in the wake of the new intifada and the Israeli response.

A war with Iraq is being portrayed in the region (most prominently by the Iraqis) as an American effort to control Middle Eastern oil; this diverts the debate away from the issue of weapons of mass destruction and the nature of Saddam’s regime. But it also increases the danger if Saddam were to be able to bring Israel into any war (most likely by a major missile attack on Israel). A war of the US and Israel together against an Arab state would seem to embody the nightmares evoked by Islamists and other opponents of the US.

Even without that development, which the US and Israel are clearly trying to take measures to avoid, the general level of anti-Americanism seems to be at the greatest level it has achieved since the era of Gamal ‘Abdel Nasser.

That means that while it may be easy to overstate the dangers from the “street”, it is also unwise to dismiss those dangers entirely. Some regimes are more vulnerable than others, and if the course of events should spin out of control (a long war, or direct Israeli involvement, or the use of weapons of mass destruction against an Arab neighbor of Iraq, and such), the dangers of destabilizing domestic protest could increase.

Some of those who advocate catalytic change seem to assume that the results will automatically be a more democratic, more liberal, more pro-Western set of regimes. There is little evidence to support that view: the main anti-government forces in Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and several other potential candidates for destabilization are radical Islamists, not liberal democrats.

A brief checklist of some of the potential danger spots:

Pakistan. Pakistan has to lead the list of potential problems because in many ways the war in Afghanistan has already destabilized a never very secure system. The recent parliamentary elections created an electoral mosaic from which it may be difficult to form a workable majority. President Pervez Musharraf’s legitimacy is under attack from the secular parties because he took power through a coup, and from the Islamists because he is seen as doing the US’ bidding. Bombings, assassinations and attacks on churches have increased, and the dangers of war with India have been reduced only by comparison with their levels last spring. The danger of an unstable, radicalized, nuclear-armed Pakistan invite considerable caution.

Jordan is genuinely caught between two fires. It has already postponed elections because of the intifada, and with the collapse of the peace process Jordan, which had the best relations with Israel of any Arab state, naturally finds itself a target of criticism from domestic opposition and other Arab countries as well. Iraq is also its neighbor, and there is much pressure to allow US forces to operate from Jordan; major training exercises have been taking place there. Jordan remains publicly opposed to the war, but does not want to jeopardize its relations with the US as it did in 1990-91, when it was perceived as pro-Iraqi. King ‘Abdullah II also is still somewhat untested; his father King Hussein was a perennial survivor, but the young King’s survival instincts and skills remain to be proven. Jordan could find itself subject to strains from both the Palestinian and Iraqi conflicts.

Egypt is probably less immediately threatened than Pakistan or Jordan, or perhaps even Saudi Arabia, but it will certainly endure stresses. Since the Al-Aqsa intifada began, there have been frequent student demonstrations, and the regime has been reluctant to crack down on these. In fact, the frequency of the demonstrations at Egyptian Universities threatened to delay the recent celebrations surrounding the “restoration” of the Alexandrian Library, a major public relations effort for the government.

Even government-tolerated demonstrations can, under the right circumstances, get out of hand. This has happened in Syria and other Arab countries in recent years, and most famously happened in Egypt on “Black Saturday” of 1952, when Shepheard’s Hotel and other symbols of British rule were burned.

The primary support for the Egyptian regime is, of course, the military, and its loyalty is essential. Though there is some evidence of limited Islamist influence in the military, it is virtually impossible to gauge the level of such sentiments.

Saudi Arabia is another country where many neoconservatives have argued that democratization could be the result of regime change in Baghdad. Again, since the main opposition to the present regime in Saudi Arabia comes from radical Islamists, a destabilization of the Kingdom would seem likelier to produce a radicalized regime. While there is some evidence that outside events can produce efforts to liberalize (during the buildup to Desert Storm, Saudi women staged a protest of the ban on their driving), it takes a considerable leap to assume that catalytic change would automatically produce a more liberal society.

On the other hand, there are certainly those within the ruling establishment who favor liberalization. Dramatic changes in the region, including a US occupation of Iraq, might indeed increase the influence of those within the Saudi leadership who want to see liberalizing change. Dramatic events could, under some quite imaginable scenarios, lead to a redrawing of the line of succession, for example, to make it possible for someone from the younger generation of princes, or at least a younger member of the older generation, to succeed after Crown Prince ‘Abdullah.

Pundits who predict the fall of the Saudi regime have a poor track record; since the Iranian Revolution in 1979 there have been analysts predicting that Saudi Arabia is “next”; but there has been no “next”.

The smaller Gulf states. The smaller Gulf states have, in fact, liberalized far more than Saudi Arabia or for that matter Egypt. Bahrain has just restored a Parliament; Qatar is writing a constitution and holding elections; Kuwait has long had a Parliament. Oman has increased the role of popular input in its advisory council. The UAE, though it has shown less progress in political organization, is a leader (more precisely, Dubai is) in the information revolution. These states for the most part seem less susceptible to internal upheaval, but they are all very susceptible to an Iraqi attack using weapons of mass destruction. A chemical attack on Kuwait would fit Saddam’s pattern of fighting, and certainly there is some nervousness in the northern Gulf about such a spillover.

Iran. Some have said that “Iran is next” on the list of terror-supporting states once the United States eliminates Iraq. But even if the US does not intend to attack Iran, the continuing power struggle between hardliners and reformers inside the country would of course be influenced by a US occupation of Iraq. Geopolitically, Iran would find itself in a position in which US troops were stationed on either side of it, in Iraq and Pakistan. This would without question have some impact on the internal competition, though it is hard to be certain what: arguable, the hardliners could use it as evidence that in fact the US is indeed the imperialist power that Iranian leaders have claimed.

Syria. Those who argue for a “housecleaning” of authoritarian regimes usually include Syria on the list. Syria has played a cautious game of late, opposing the war with Iraq but supporting the US in the war on terrorism and providing, it is said, some genuine help. Bashar al-Asad is far from being completely in charge in Damascus; the network of ‘Alawite generals, Ba‘ath Party officials and security services he inherited from his father may be calling the shots. Syria, once plagued by regular coups from the 1940s to 1970, has been remarkably stable internally for over three decades. But the passing of Hafiz al-Asad means that nothing is as certain in Syria as it once seemed, and cautious liberalization has been attempted.

So, to conclude, the impact of any war is unlikely to be as simple or straightforward as either the advocates of catalytic change or the prophets of catastrophic doom anticipate.

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