The Fall of Driss Basri

November 9 was the 10th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, and many Moroccans thought it appropriate that that was the day King Muhammad VI brought down another wall of sorts, firing one of the most powerful and feared security chiefs in the Arab world (where powerful and feared security chiefs are numerous). The fall of Interior Minister Driss Basri is the most direct attack yet on the makhzen, the powerful cadre of political figures who control much of Moroccan life. And his decision to appoint a technocrat, 51-year-old Ahmed El Midaoui, as Interior Minister and a young classmate of the King’s as his deputy suggests a major change in the way Morocco’s powerful security services will be run.

Basri’s power was enormous. Not only did he, as Interior Minister, preside over the entire internal security establishment and also control local governors, but he also held, in effect, the Western Sahara “account”, being the late King Hasan II’s de facto specialist on that issue. If the King (occasionally) tried to portray himself as the good cop, Basri was always the tough cop, the King’s enforcer. He was also at the center of a network of cronies who controlled much of Moroccan business and the economy. For a quarter century, Basri was untouchable, the virtual shadow Prime Minister. When new Prime Minister ‘Abderrahmane El Youssefi sought to replace Basri, he was overruled. (And Youssefi was in Paris when Basri was fired: it was the King, not the Prime Minister, who made the change.)

The fall of Basri seems more or less complete. Though he was given the Grand Ribbon of the Arch, the country’s highest honor, that was in effect his proverbial “gold watch”; within a week of his departure, the publication al-Ahdat al-Maghribiyya reported that dozens of his close aides had been ordered not to leave Morocco without permission. If true, that suggested that Basri’s cronies as well as the man himself might be due for a housecleaning.

King Muhammad VI

Since he came to the throne on his father’s death last July, Muhammad VI has promised much, pledging to reform the country’s cumbersome bureaucracy and deal with its entrenched poverty. But his ability to deliver on those promises has been less clear. As The Estimate noted in its “ Forward Tracking” column last September 24, the fact that he had not removed Basri was seen by many as a sign that he was not prepared for a genuine change in his father’s policies.

Now Basri is gone, replaced by a former security chief with a reputation as a technocrat rather than a policeman, and backed up by a deputy who just happens to be the King’s classmate and former Chief of the Royal Cabinet. These two, Ahmed El Midaoui and Fouad ‘Ali El Himma (both the subject of Profiles in this issue), are likely to show a very different approach to the security apparatus. Midaoui has served in security posts and knows the Interior Ministry’s functionings, but is essentially an expert on public enterprises, not a cop. Himma, the King’s personal friend and aide, is clearly intended to be the throne’s eyes and ears in the Ministry.

This Dossier examines the importance of Basri’s fall in the context of other changes made so far by Morocco’s new King.

Driss Basri

As stunning as the replacement of Driss Basri was, it had not been without its foreshadowings. It was an open secret that King Muhammad VI did not share his father’s enthusiasm for Basri. Basri’s visibility on state television had been declining. During the King’s tour of poverty-stricken northern Morocco in Basri’s company, the Interior Minister was reportedly booed. During the recent exchange of accusations between Morocco and Algeria, Basri reportedly sent a deputy to Algiers without informing the palace. After recent riots in La‘ayoun, capital of Western Sahara, there were reports that the King had stripped Basri of his longstanding responsibilities over that territory. Certainly, only days before Basri’s firing, the King, speaking on the anniversary of his father’s “Green March” to take the Western Sahara, announced a decentralization plan which would permit considerably more local autonomy to the region, and promised that there would be no “marching to the rear” on democratization. That also seemed to suggest a very different approach than Basri had been following.

Another omen: in a Kingdom full of golf courses built by the late King Hasan II, where golf is the sport of choice of the elite, the Crown Prince, Moulay Rachid, replaced Basri as head of the Moroccan Golf Federation.

The King’s recent tour of Fez, Tangier, Tetouan and the Rif — the same tour on which Basri was booed — reportedly moved the King, who was shocked by the poverty of the country’s north. (King Hasan was not known to travel to the north during most of his reign.) The Interior Ministry, which is responsible for local government as well as for security (and Basri of course dealt with many issues beyond his ministry’s own turf), may have received part of the blame.

An Obstacle to Reform?

In 1998, with King Hasan’s encouragement, longtime opposition leader ‘Abderrahmane El Youssefi became Prime Minister. Leader of the leftist Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), Youssefi is an advocate of a wide variety of social reforms. He reportedly sought to replace Basri but the King made it clear that the Prime Minister’s power did not extend to the point of choosing his Interior Minister. It is widely believed that Basri loyalists throughout the government were entrenched and resisting efforts by ministers to press reforms. Most of the ministers of the Youssefi government have not even been able to reshuffle their key deputies in the first year and a half of the government. And Youssefi reportedly was not even consulted when Basri carried out a major reshuffle of provincial governors and local authorities, part of his Interior Ministry’s responsibilities.

Ahmed El Midaoui

Youssefi may gain in power, or at least be able to see some of his reforms carried through, if Basri’s removal reduces the power of Basri cronies elsewhere in government. If, as noted earlier, it is true that dozens of Basri allies have been told not to leave Morocco, a major housecleaning may be under way, which could strengthen the hand of the Cabinet.

On the other hand, Youssefi not only did not have the pleasure of firing Basri; he was on his way to Europe when the King fired the Interior Minister. Although the King has talked about his admiration for Spanish-style constitutional monarchies, on the most crucial decision of his reign so far it was the King, and no one else, who made the decision and carried it through.

The Makhzen

Moroccans refer to the inner elite that run the government as the makhzen. The word in standard Arabic means a storehouse or treasury (it is also the origin of the word magazine), but in Morocco, the territory under the direct control of the Kings, as opposed to tributary regions, was known as the bled al-makhzen, and by extension, the word came to be applied to the central government. In recent decades it has come to mean the inner cadre of rulers exercising real power, more or less independently of the political parties, and for some time now that has meant Basri and his clique.

Fouad `Ali El Himma

King Hasan II was threatened several times with military coups, and when his trusted aide in the 1970s, Mohamed Oufkir, turned against him, the Army’s prerogatives were severely limited. The officer who devised the winning tactics in the Western Saharan war, Ahmed Dlimi, was an exception and gained considerable political power, but in the end he died under suspicious circumstances. After that, no Army officer was fully trusted by the King.

The Interior Minister was a different matter. Basri was fiercely loyal to Hasan, if also very protective of his own prerogatives. Though he controlled a powerful security establishment, he was never suspected of harboring any coup thoughts of his own, and the King came to rely heavily upon him. Though the Crown Prince was rumored not to get along with him, it still took more than three months on the throne before the new King was ready to move against the powerful advisor.

A Record of Promises

During those months, however, the King has frequently promised a new commitment to democracy and justice in Morocco. Arguably, progress in both those areas quickly confronted the obstacle of the entrenched Basri network. Opposition parties have long insisted that elections have been manipulated, even outright rigged, by the Interior Ministry’s agents. And Morocco’s none-too-pleasant record in the human rights arena also stems from the actions of the Interior Ministry.

Early in his reign, the King announced the appointment of an independent commission to look into human rights abuses and the “disappeared” anti-government activists of the 1960s and 1970s. He and the increasing number of young appointees, many of them classmates of the King, have all been talking of a greater respect for human rights, genuine pluralism, and amelioration of the country’s enormous gap between the very rich and the very poor. But doing anything about all of those problems depended on removing the obstacle of Basri and his allies.

Even improving the country’s business climate seemed to face problems because of Basri. Moroccan businessmen have complained that the cronyism and “tentacles” of the makhzen interfered with the normal functioning of the market. With Basri’s departure, and the expected dismantling of his networks, businessmen will likely be freer to engage in normal market activities.

Ironically then, virtually everyone, left and right, human rights activists to bankers, seemed to welcome the departure of Basri.

Now What?

That leaves the question of what happens next. The King does appear to be popular. Though Basri was booed during the northern tour, the King was generally cheered. By most accounts, the man in the street was delighted at the news of Basri’s departure.

Prime Minister `Abderrahmane El Youssefi: Power Strengthened?

It must be kept in mind that, by Moroccan standards, Prime Minister Youssefi’s Cabinet is unusually broad, and that Youssefi’s own USFP is a traditionally leftist opposition party. But Youssefi and the other Cabinet officials have been thwarted, so far, in their efforts to reform the ministries, due to the entrenched power of Basri and his allies. That may now change.

Recently, Youssefi made a speech in which he pledged that government civil services would be held accountable for abuses of power, and that every effort would be made to increase the efficiency of the bureaucracy and to end corruption. Some interpreted that as the lead-up to a Cabinet reshuffle, but in interviews since, Youssefi has indicated that that was not his intention (though perhaps the removal of Basri is part of the effort at increasing accountability).

The King’s reputed admiration for a Spanish-style monarchy, mentioned earlier, has been much commented upon, especially in Europe. But so far the King shows signs, less of fading into the background as a unifying national symbol, than of perhaps becoming the kind of strong, decisive King his father and grandfather were, but in the name of reform. When some columnists in the political press began to call for a reduction in royal ceremonial, to the point of no longer kissing the King’s hand, the palace made it clear that its efforts at democratization do not extend to lèse majesté, and that the ceremonies will continue. But while the King has dressed in traditional garb for public prayers, on his tour of the north he normally wore a European business suit, albeit an obviously expensive one.

So far, the King does seem to be running things. One of his first acts was to name a Palace spokesman, something his father managed to function without. That post, and a number of others in key sectors, have gone to classmates the King’s age, men in their 30s, with European as well as Moroccan experience in most cases. The King, and the King’s men, seem to be the source of decisionmaking. Perhaps they will in time introduce reforms which turn the King into more of a constitutional monarch than he now is, but if so, those reforms will come from the Throne, not from the political parties and Parliament.

But that said, the King’s own training, which included a stint working in Brussels with the European Union (See the Profile in the July 30, 1999 issue of The Estimate ), means that his experience of Europe and the West is very different from that of his father and grandfather. He does appear to recognize that Morocco’s at times dismal human rights reputation, its inefficiency and corruption, and its social inequalities need to be addressed.

It also must be noted that while the country still faces enormous problems of poverty and widespread illiteracy, the richest landholder in the country is the Royal Family. Not only does the ruling house own much of the country’s best land, but it also enjoys a virtual monopoly over its phosphate industry, a major source of hard currency. (The King has recently named a new head of the phosphates board.) If the King’s reported sensitivity to the country’s poverty is genuine, he is not without family resources to redistribute some income.

The late, deposed King Farouq of Egypt once famously observed that soon there would be only five Kings in the world: the King of England and the four in the pack of cards. Morocco’s monarchy, so far, does not seem that vulnerable. Its Kings claim descent from the prophet; the present dynasty has ruled for more than three centuries and Morocco maintained its independence from the Middle Ages to the present with only a brief (1911-1956) period as a French protectorate. It is the only Arab north African state (other than Mauritania) which never came under Ottoman rule. Its Kings are known as amir al-mu’minin, Commander of the Believers, a traditional title of the Muslim Caliphs, and continue to enjoy enormous prestige.

Basri’s fall is a risky move, to be sure, but it was made with caution and seeming confidence, and so far as can be determined from abroad, was received with relief and pleasure by almost all elements in society.

The King During His Tour of Northern Morocco in October, Said by Many to Have Been a Turning Point

The firing of the long-dominant security chief has, however, merely further fueled already high expectations about the young, inexperienced King’s intentions. He has made many promises, and in a daring stroke he has removed one of the most entrenched and intransigent obstacles to reform. But that has also robbed him of any excuse for not following through on the many promises already made about ending corruption, cronyism, bureaucratic inefficiency and lack of accountability.

For the moment, the King seems to be in an enviable position. He has removed the main obstacle to the reforms he keeps promising. Now he has a chance to show he can follow through.

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