Concealing WMD: What Iraq Might Be Hiding

Iraq’s massive accounting to the United Nations of its weapons of mass destruction program elicited predictable reactions long before the translators had finished with the documents. Many in the US Administration were dismissive, and certainly many others were skeptical, of any Iraqi assurance that all its WMD programs have been abandoned. The Iraqis themselves essentially said that this was their accounting and it was now up to the rest of the world to prove otherwise.

This raises one of the thorniest questions in any effort to intrusively inspect for weapons of mass destruction. Although nuclear materials can be detected because they are radioactive, the basic ingredients for chemical and biological warfare are portable, concealable, and in many cases can have perfectly innocent uses. The “precursor” chemicals for many chemical agents have other industrial or scientific uses, and the same viruses used in biological agents may also be used to develop vaccines. And while nuclear materials can be detected by radioactivity, there are many medical and other innocent uses of radioactive materials (though not of weapons grade), and thus even there inspectors would have to visit virtually every site which might have radioactive materials to determine if weapons grade materials exist.

It can be, therefore, hard to prove convincingly that no chemical or biological weapons program is in existence, that no weaponized agents are stored, that no nuclear materials are destined for weapons use. Delivery systems can be sought out, but there are so many potential ways of delivering a weapon that it is hard to be confident of finding them all; it is believed that Iraq still has useable Scuds despite massive efforts to find and destroy them, and in fact Iraq is permitted to retain shorter-range missiles under the UN sanctions.

One may expect several weeks of arguments over whether Iraq has really come clean, and one may with equal confidence expect the United States ultimately to reject the declaration. There is likely to be increasing pressure on the United States to make public intelligence data it possesses that seem to point to continuing weapons programs: to demand that the US produce the “smoking gun”. Whether or not that happens remains, of course, to be seen, but US hopes of a fairly broad coalition may depend on convincing more nations than are now on board that the violations are real and flagrant, and that Iraq’s declaration still conceals much. This Dossier looks at the question of what Iraq may be hiding, drawing extensively from the reports issued in recent months by the US CIA and the British Government. While these are of course prepared to support the US and UK case, they also amount to the fullest explanation the two countries have yet made of what they believe the evidence shows. Of course they do not reveal intelligence sources and methods, and therefore their evidence may be challenged.

The case made so far by the United States and the United Kingdom for believing that Iraq continues to maintain its weapons of mass destruction development programs is mostly circumstantial, in part because of a reluctance to identify intelligence sources and methods. But while the so-called “smoking gun” may not be obvious, the history of these Iraqi programs and of Iraq’s concealment of them and interference with inspections in the past leads to a reasonable conclusion that the Iraqi leopard is unlikely to have changed its spots. But whether that reasonable suspicion is sufficient as a casus belli is of course another question. While it is easy to turn to rhetorical arguments (such as the one used by Condoleeza Rice and since by others, that “you don’t want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud”), assembling a genuine coalition against Iraq may require convincing some countries that want to see more than mere suspicions.

In fairness to the US and the UK, however, it is only fair to say that they have already made a considerable case. The British white paper released a few months ago, combined with the most recent CIA report on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, both detail Iraq’s extensive programs in the past and the persistent efforts to conceal them.

The British report, for example, concluded that based on current intelligence since the end of the previous inspection regime in 1998:

• Chemical and biological weapons continue to play a major role in Iraqi military thinking. The British Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) assessed that Saddam Hussein “believes that respect for Iraq rests on its possession of these weapons and the missiles capable of delivering them,” and that he is determined to retain that capability.
• Iraq is also attempting to retain its existing but banned weapons. The British report (written before the renewed inspections) notes that Saddam was already “taking steps to prevent UN weapons inspectors finding evidence of its chemical and biological weapons programme” and that Saddam “has learnt lessons from previous weapons inspections, has identified possible weak points in the inspections process and knows how to exploit them. Sensitive equipment and papers can easily be concealed and in some cases this is already happening. The possession of mobile biological agent production facilities will also aid concealment efforts. Saddam is determined not to lose the capabilities that he has been able to develop further in the four years since inspectors left.
• Saddam is willing to use chemical and biological weapons. The British report pointed to previous use of chemical weapons in the war with Iran and against the Kurds, and noted that “intelligence indicates that as part of Iraq’s military planning Saddam is willing to use chemical and biological weapons, including against his own Shia population. Intelligence indicates that the Iraqi military are able to deploy chemical or biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so.”

In fact, the CIA report goes to considerable length to document Iraq’s earlier use of chemical weapons as an indicator of its willingness to use such weaponry.

What does Iraq likely retain? It is clear that the United Nations inspection regime, between 1991 and 1998, did in fact destroy or supervise the destruction of considerable stocks of chemical and biological weapons and the dismantling of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. Based on the UNSCOM report to the UN Security Council in January 1999, after the withdrawal of the inspectors the month before, the British note that the United Nations failed to account for:

• “ up to 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare agent, including 1.5 tonnes of VX nerve agent;
• "up to 3,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals, including approximately 300 tonnes which, in the Iraqi chemical warfare programme, were unique to the production of VX;
• "growth media procured for biological agent production (enough to produce over three times the 8,500 litres of anthrax spores Iraq admits to having manufactured);
• "over 30,000 special munitions for delivery of chemical and biological agents.”

This, note, is material that Iraq admitted having produced but did not adequately account for. The recent Iraqi report to the United Nations may have offered further explanations in some of these cases. According to the British report, “In mid-2001 the JIC assessed that Iraq retained some chemical warfare agents, precursors, production equipment and weapons from before the Gulf War. These stocks would enable Iraq to produce significant quantities of mustard gas within weeks and of nerve agent within months. The JIC concluded that intelligence on Iraqi former chemical and biological warfare facilities, their limited reconstruction and civil production pointed to a continuing research and development programme. These chemical and biological capabilities represented the most immediate threat from Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Since 1998 Iraqi development of mass destruction weaponry had been helped bythe absence of inspectors and the increase in illegal border trade, which was providing hard currency.”

The CIA report reaches similar conclusions. (Readers should, of course, consult the originals for detailed documentation. The CIA report can be obtained from the CIA website at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm and the British report at several British government websites, including http://www.mod.uk/publications/iraq.htm.

“Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons effort,energized its missile program, and invested more heavily in biological weapons; most analysts assess Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.

“Iraq’s growing ability to sell oil illicitly increases Baghdad’s capabilities to finance WMD programs; annual earnings in cash and goods have more than quadrupled.

“Iraq largely has rebuilt missile and biological weapons facilities damaged during Operation Desert Fox and has expanded its chemical and biological infrastructure under the cover of civilian production.

“Baghdad has exceeded UN range limits of 150 km with its ballistic missiles and is working with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which allow for a more lethal means to deliver biological and, less likely, chemical warfare agents.

“Although Saddam probably does not yet have nuclear weapons or sufficient material to make any, he remains intent on acquiring them.

“ How quickly Iraq will obtain its first nuclear weapon depends on when it acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material.

“If Baghdad acquires sufficient weapons- grade fissile material from abroad, it could make a nuclear weapon within a year.

“Without such material from abroad, Iraq probably would not be able to make a weapon until the last half of the decade.

“Iraq’s aggressive attempts to obtain proscribed high-strength aluminum tubes are of significant concern. All intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons and that these tubes could be used in a centrifuge enrichment program.

Most intelligence specialists assess this to be the intended use, but some believe that these tubes are probably intended for conventional weapons programs.

“Based on tubes of the size Iraq is trying to acquire, a few tens of thousands of centrifuges would be capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a couple of weapons per year.

“Baghdad has begun renewed production of chemical warfare agents, probably including mustard, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX. Its capability was reduced during the UNSCOM inspections and is probably more limited now than it was at the time of the Gulf war, although VX production and agent storage life probably have been improved.

“Saddam probably has stocked a few hundred metric tons of CW agents.

“The Iraqis have experience in manufacturing CW bombs, artillery rockets, and projectiles, and probably possess CW bulk fills for SRBM warheads, including for a limited number of covertly stored, extended-range Scuds.

“All key aspects—R&D, production, and weaponization—of Iraq’s offensive BW program are active and most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf war.

“Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives, including potentially against the US Homeland.

“Baghdad has established a large-scale, redundant, and concealed BW agent production capability, which includes mobile facilities; these facilities can evade detection, are highly survivable, and can exceed the production rates Iraq had prior to the Gulf war.

“Iraq maintains a small missile force and several development programs, including for a UAV that most analysts believe probably is intended to deliver biological warfare agents.

“Gaps in Iraqi accounting to UNSCOM suggest that Saddam retains a covert force of up to a few dozen Scud-variant SRBMs with ranges of 650 to 900 km.

“Iraq is deploying its new al-Samoud and Ababil-100 SRBMs, which are capable of flying beyond the UN-authorized 150-km range limit.

“Baghdad’s UAVs—especially if used for delivery of chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents—could threaten Iraq’s neighbors, US forces in the Persian Gulf, and the United States if brought close to, or into, the US Homeland.

“Iraq is developing medium-range ballistic missile capabilities, largely through foreign assistance in building specialized facilities.”

The Dual-Use Problem
Iraq, of course, insists that it has given up its weapons of mass destruction programs. One of the problems faced by weapons inspectors is the sheer size of the country and the ease with which many of the prohibited ingredients (chemicals, virus, etc.) can be concealed. But another problem is the so-called issue of dual-use, since chemical weapons are often based on chemicals which have innocent use in agriculture, manufacturing or other industries, and biological agents are very often the same viruses used in preparing vaccines. A factory which appears perfectly innocent may indeed be manufacturing products which can be turned into weapons, just as one can also build explosives from relatively innocent materials such as fertilizer. As the British report put it, in speaking of the dual-use issue:

“Almost all components and supplies used in weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes are dual-use. For example, any major petrochemical or biotech industry, as well as public health organisations, will have legitimate need for most materials and equipment required to manufacture chemical and biological weapons. Without UN weapons inspectors it is very difficult therefore to be sure about the true nature of many of Iraq’s facilities.

“For example, Iraq has built a large new chemical complex, Project Baiji, in the desert in north west Iraq at al-Sharqat . . . This site is a formeruranium enrichment facility which was damaged during the Gulf War and rendered harmless under supervision of the IAEA. Part of the site has been rebuilt, with work starting in 1992, as a chemical production complex. Despite the site being far away from populated areas it is surrounded by a high wall with watch towers and guarded by armed guards. Intelligence reports indicate that it will produce nitric acid which can be used in explosives, missile fuel and in the purification of uranium.”

Now that the inspectors are back, that particular site and others can of course be examined. But the problem is whether any chemical plant with an ostensibly civilian purpose can be transformed into a weapons plant on short notice.

The problem remains that nothing short of a permanent, intrusive inspection regime can hope to detect cheating, particularly in the relatively low-cost realm of chemical and biological weapons production, if a nation is determined to cheat. Even where inspections are formally instituted across the board, as with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of adherents to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, countries such as Iraq and Pakistan have managed to hide their nuclear programs. Iraq’s extensive history of clandestine weapons production and research does not reassure; in fact, since it is fairly clear that Saddam Hussein’s Armed Forces still train to use chemical weapons, there is little reason to believe Iraqi assertions that they have abandoned them for good.

The problem is the divergence between the US view, which is that Iraq must conclusively prove beyond a doubt that it has abandoned its weapons programs, and Iraq’s assertion that the burden of proof lies with the US and the outside world to prove that it continues to pursue them. It is almost impossible to prove a negative, of course, and the US position is that the Iraqis are unlikely to have come clean in their presentation.

Clearly, the US would like to find evidence of weapons programs; the United Nations inspectors may, indeed, find something. But the ease of concealment (and the small number of inspectors) make it less likely that a “smoking gun” is going to emerge from the inspections. Iraq has already shown that it will use its asserted readiness to readmit the inspectors as an argument against any US-initiated war. And it will seek to prevent the US from winning a United Nations endorsement of such renewed hostilities by insisting that it is, at long last and despite earlier refusals, adhering to the conditions imposed upon it in 1991.

The chemical and biological programs, in particular, are simply too easily hidden for inspections to have much chance of finding everything. (Nuclear programs are clearly another matter.) Iraq has had four years, as many have noted, to find new means of concealment. That makes conclusive evidence even harder to find.

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